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Abstract

With the rapid evolvement of information science, data-oriented research has solicited a
new philosophy for the future mobile network and security design, since it can not only
encourage new designs achieving more efficient and reliable networks, but also pose new
challenges towards security designs. In this dissertation, we propose four novel data-oriented
designs or frameworks to prompt or calibrate the performance with respect to efficiency,
reliability, and security.
In the wireless domain, packet corruption and packet collision are two major threats
that jeopardize the performance of a mobile network. To cope with the packet corruption,
we propose the STAteful inter-Packet signaL procEssing (STAPLE) framework, which is
an inter-packet oriented signal process design for wireless networking. STAPLE transforms
the signal processing procedure into a lightweight stateful process that caches in a smallsized memory table physical and link layer header fields as packet state information. The
similarity of such information among packets serves as prior knowledge to further enhance
the reliability of signal processing and thus improve the wireless network performance. For
the packet collision, we present a new design called comb decoding (CombDec) to efficiently
resolve RTS collisions without changing the 802.11 standards. We observe that an RTS
payload, when treated as a vector in a vector space, exhibits a comb-like distribution; i.e.,
a limited number of vectors are much more likely to be used than the others due to RTS
payload construction and firmware design. This enables us to use sparse recovery such as
compressive sensing to resolve RTS collisions.
For the network security design, we revisit network tomography and inference from a
data-driven perspective and discover that there are two vulnerabilities. The first one is of
xi

the measurement integrity. By taking advantage of this vulnerability, we develop an attack
strategy, called measurement integrity attack, which not only destroys the measuring system,
but can even mislead the system to scapegoat other innocent users. The second vulnerability
is of the measurement confidentiality since network inference is able to leak network flow
information without directly measuring it. To prevent disclosing the flow information, we
find that random routing strategies are capable of hiding the flow information. Then, by
leveraging the measurement data, we propose a new framework that can systematically
study the behavior of different randomized routing protocols, and explore the fundamental
reason why randomized routing strategies can prevent information leakage against network
inference.

xii

Chapter 1: Introduction

With advances in mobile technologies, computing capabilities, improved access to networks, interconnected devices in different networks, e.g., wireless local area network (WLAN),
cellular network, personal area network (PAN), Internet of things (IoT), etc., have become
more advanced and integrated into people’s life, inevitably generating a large amount of
data. The emerging data broadens our horizons when seeking new approaches in the nextgeneration wireless network and security designs since leveraging data provides many powerful capabilities, such as the predictive sight or continuous improvement. Therefore, dataoriented approaches have become a new dimension in a wide range of areas, including network and security design, in the future. In this dissertation, we propose four data-oriented
approaches that renovate or calibrate current network and security designs.
1.1

Wireless Data Based Mobile System Design
Mobile technologies have become one of the dominant ways for people to access the

Internet. However, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channels, the intensive traffic
environment can desperately jeopardize the performance within a mobile network. To cope
with this issue, we revisit the fundamental part within wireless mobile networks, and deal
with two main aspects to improve mobile network system performance: packet corruption
and packet collision. The first one is due to the unpredictable wireless fading, and the
second one is resulted from concurrent transmissions. We discover that there are indeed
opportunities from a data-driven perspective to further improve mobile network efficiency
and reliability.
1

1.1.1 Inter-Packet Based Approach for Packet Corruption
In a wireless network, signal processing is an essential procedure at a receiver during
packet reception to resist the packet corruption. It includes three major steps: timing/frequency synchronization, channel estimation, and equalization [1, 2, 3, 4]. These together
are generally treated as an independent process, serving as the foundation towards data
decoding and higher layer protocol management [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Our research finds out that leveraging common protocol information across network packets can substantially improve the signal processing performance in a wireless network. Our
motivation is that in a realistic network scenario, packets are not transmitted with uniformly
random in-packet settings, such as date rate, packet size, source and destination addresses in
the physical (PHY) or medium access control (MAC) fields. There exist common PHY and
MAC header fields across different packets. For example in a WiFi network: a station only
receives data from the access point (AP), indicating that the packets it cares about always
have the same source address; and packets for data-intensive applications usually have the
same packet size (i.e., the maximum allowable size). Such commonness of in-packet settings
can serve as prior knowledge to improve the signal processing performance.
Hence, if we take signal processing out of its traditional domain and place it in a practical wireless network, there is indeed a lot of prior knowledge that can be used to boost
its performance. The underlying challenge is how we are able to harness all possible common information and piece everything together to re-design signal processing with limited
overhead for practical use in the wireless network domain.
To deal with these challenges, we propose the STAteful inter-Packet signaL procEssing
(STAPLE) framework, which is a generic design to improve the performance of signal processing for wireless networking. Rather than designing signal processing in its traditional
domain, we make signal processing stateful within the network domain. In particular, the
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key design in STAPLE is that a receiver maintains a small-sized state table, whose entry
includes bit values of selected PHY/MAC fields from successfully decoded packets, such as
MAC addresses, packet length and data rate, depending on a standard. These bit values
constitute the state of a packet.
When a new packet arrives and decoding error happens, STAPLE performs state association (i.e., matching the bit values of its header fields with a known entry to restore the
packet to a previous state). If the association succeeds, STAPLE considers the state of the
packet is known (i.e., a part, if not all, of PHY/MAC information is known). Then, such
known knowledge serves for the same purpose of “training sequence” (also known as “preamble” in many standards [11, 12]). Therefore, the restored state is combined with the original
preamble in the packet to form a longer preamble. STAPLE re-performs signal processing
on this longer preamble. Because more “prior” information is fetched for signal processing,
STAPLE can obtain better frequency and channel estimates, which helps packet decoding
and accordingly improves the network link performance.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive system study in the literature
to utilize the “prior knowledge” extracted from packet headers to improve the signal processing performance in wireless networks. We propose STAPLE as a general software radio
system framework, then explore the feasibility and evaluate effectiveness of such a framework. In particular, we design and implement STAPLE with adapted configurations for
802.11a/b/g/n/ac and 802.15.4 on USRP X300 devices. The features of STAPLE are as
follows: (i) lightweight processing and low overhead with a very small state table size (as
experimental results suggest that it is sufficient to store 2-5 states at a station and 12-20 at
the AP); (ii) a universal framework that benefits a wide range of wireless networks; (iii) no
modification to any wireless standard; (iv) orthogonality to existing packet data decoding
mechanisms (e.g., partial packet recovery [13, 14, 15]).

3

We conduct comprehensive experiments to show the benefits of STAPLE for different
wireless standards. Our main contributions are summarized as follows: (i) We propose to
improve signal processing within the network domain. We introduce the concept of the state
of a packet as the bit values of selected PHY and MAC fields, and demonstrate that stateassociating a packet to a previous state and re-performing signal processing in STAPLE
improve the wireless network performance. (ii) We design, implement and configure the
STAPLE prototypes for 802.11b/g/n/ac and 802.15.4. STAPLE is lightweight, effective and
brings universal performance benefit to the packet reception process for wireless networks.
Comprehensive experimental results show that STAPLE improves the packet delivery ratio
by up to 20.8% under various conditions.
1.1.2 RTS Data Based Approach for Packet Collision
CSMA/CA is fundamental for WiFi to coordinate multiple nodes to access the wireless
channel. RTS/CTS is a widely-used mechanism in WiFi, which uses short RTS packets for
fast collision inference, transmission path check as well as combating the hidden terminal
problem [11]. In many early WiFi products, RTS/CTS was disabled due to the concern
of overhead [16]. With the substantial increase of data demand in recent years, WiFi data
packets become longer and longer, and today’s WiFi devices send an RTS packet when the
size of a data packet exceeds a given threshold. The threshold is usually set to around 2,300
bytes [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] to balance the performance and the overhead. RTS/CTS is also used
in advanced WiFi functionalities, such as beamforming and MU-MIMO [11]. In addition,
global RTS/CTS [22, 23, 24] has also been proposed for cross-technology communications.
The essence in the RTS/CTS mechanism is to trade a small cost of the RTS collision
for a potentially large cost of data collision. In this research, we revisit the RTS collision
problem and present the comb decoding (CombDec) system to resolve RTS collisions without
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changing the 802.11 standard and thus improve the wireless channel utilization as well as
the network throughput.
The observation behind designing CombDec is that the data payload of an RTS packet,
when treated as a vector in a vector space, exhibits a comb-like distribution. Specifically, the
RTS content consists of 160 bits, which leads to 2160 possibilities. We find that the standardstructured data fields in RTS actually result in at most around 221 possible contents in
today’s WiFi networks. Therefore, the probability distribution of such contents will exhibit
a comb-like shape: only up to 221 out of 2160 contents having non-zero probabilities.
As a result, we reformulate the RTS collision problem as a weighted sum problem: we
consider the received signal due to an RTS collision is the sum of all 221 RTS contents
transmitted at the same time, but with different channel weights. An RTS content has
a non-zero channel weight if it is actually transmitted, and zero weight otherwise. Then,
resolving the collision is equivalent to solving for the channel weight for each RTS content.
The key observation to solve the problem is that a vast majority of the 221 channel weights
should be zeros because a collision involves only a few RTS packets in a real-world network.
In other words, the vector that includes all channel weights is sparse, which opens a path to
use sparse recovery [25, 26, 27] to resolve RTS collisions.
One significantly challenging issue around collision resolution based on sparse recovery
is the computational complexity because we start from around 221 possibilities of RTS signals to resolve a collision. To cope with this issue, we analyze how a key RTS data field,
Duration (that specifies the time duration an RTS packet reserves), is constructed in stateof-the-art 802.11 firmware. A comprehensive set of 802.11ac packet traces are also collected
to understand the distribution of Duration in various scenarios. It is found that today’s
firmware imposes extra restrictions on Duration and is biased towards a limited number of
value selections, and the distribution of Duration in real-world packets is highly uneven and
patterned. Based on this observation, CombDec is designed with two key components: (α,
5

β)-construction and γ-decimation, which adaptively narrow down the search range in sparse
recovery to a set of only hundreds of potential RTS signals, making system design of collision
resolution practical for WiFi networks.
We implement CombDec in a 20-node network testbed, and evaluate it in different scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that our design has both direct and indirect impacts
on today’s WiFi systems and setups.
• For the direct impact, today’s WiFi devices usually adopt a conservative RTS threshold
(i.e., around 2300 bytes), which results in 30% - 45% data transmissions initiated
by RTS (according to our packet trace collection and analysis). By directly using
CombDec with current RTS settings, we find via experiments that CombDec is able
to decode 98% of two-RTS collisions and improve the network throughput by up to
23.3%
• For the indirect impact, CombDec offers a new capability of decoding RTS collisions
and in fact encourages changing today’s WiFi setups for more RTS transmissions.
Therefore, by reducing the RTS threshold to zero and letting every device always
send RTS before data (indicating that most collisions in the network become RTS
collisions), CombDec significantly improves the network throughput by up to 46.6% in
experimental evaluations.
The design of CombDec is the first systematic work towards resolving RTS collisions in
WiFi networks. It is non-invasive and redefines the role of the RTS functionality and pushes
WiFi towards a collision-free environment.

1.2

Measurement Data Based Network Security Design
Accurate and timely monitoring of network performance is vital to ensure a reliable and

efficient network environment. However, under some situation, direct observation is not fea6

sible, then network tomography or network inference has emerged as an algorithmic process
to transfer end-to-end path measurements into link metric estimates [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
34, 35, 32, 36, 37, 38]. However, when revisiting network tomography from a data-driven
perspective, there are two vulnerabilities. The first one is of the measurement integrity.
Specifically, in network tomography, existing studies make a seeing-is-believing assumption
that measurements over end-to-end paths between monitors indeed reflect the real performance aggregates over individual links. However, such an assumption does not always hold
in the presence of malicious autonomous systems. Therefore, by taking advantage of this
vulnerability, we develop an attack strategy, called measurement integrity attack, which not
only destroys the measuring system, but can even mislead the system to scapegoat other
innocent users. The second vulnerability is of the measurement confidentiality. In particular, network tomography (inference) [39, 40, 41, 42, 43] offers a way to obtain the path
information without directly measuring it, which poses severe challenges in many anonymous
networks. Therefore, to prevent disclosing the path information, we find that random routing
strategies are capable of hiding the path information. Then, by leveraging the measurement
data, we systematically study the behavior of different randomized routing protocols, and
explore the fundamental reason why randomized routing strategies can prevent information
leakage against network inference.
1.2.1 Vulnerability of Measurement Integrity
By nature, network tomography does not directly observe network link metrics, but
“tele-measure” them via measurements over end-to-end paths. Each path consists of a few
or more links. Existing work mainly focused on algorithm design and applications (e.g.,
[33, 34, 35, 32, 36, 37, 38]); and some recent papers also considered the problems of placement of monitors and identifiability of link metrics (e.g., [44, 45, 46, 47]). In essence, network
tomography can be considered as an algorithmic process to transfer end-to-end measurements
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into link metric estimates. Interestingly, most existing studies on network tomography emphasize extracting as much information about link metrics as possible from available measurements, and always make a seeing-is-believing assumption that measurements over end-to-end
paths between monitors indeed reflect the real performance aggregates over individual links.
However, such an assumption does not always hold in the presence of malicious autonomous
systems [48, 49], backdoor-infected routers [50], and node-capture attacks [51, 52] as these
adversaries actively affect packet forwarding and have become increasingly possible in today’s complicated environments. Rather, the assumption renders a serious security problem
of measurement integrity during the network tomography process.
By taking advantage of this seeing-is-believing vulnerability in network tomography, we
develop a new class of attack strategies, called measurement integrity attacks. Unlike conventional data integrity problems that are usually protected by standard methods (e.g., encryption and authentication), a key challenge associated with measurement integrity attacks
is that the facts (e.g., packet transmission/delivery timings) during network measurement
cannot be protected by such standard methods, but can be easily manipulated by malicious
attackers. The basic idea of measurement integrity attacks is to intentionally delay or drop
packets at malicious nodes to manipulate end-to-end measurements between monitors in
a way such that a legitimate node is incorrectly identified by network tomography as the
root cause of the problem, thereby becoming a scapegoat. We propose three basic attack
strategies with different objectives.
1. Chosen-victim scapegoating, in which attackers target one or more given victims such
that these victims are misleadingly identified by network tomography as the root cause
of a problem.
2. Maximum-damage scapegoating, in which attackers find the optimal set of victims
among all nodes to inflict the maximum damage to the network.
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3. Obfuscation, by which network tomography is tricked to produce a substantial number
of link estimates beyond the normal status to confuse a network operator.
We analyze the feasibility of these strategies, and present the conditions for detecting and
locating such attacks. We also use network datasets to perform simulation experiments to
show the success possibility, damage, and the detectability and locatability of such attacks.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We are the first to investigate the vulnerability in network tomography mechanisms
from a security perspective, and reveal that measurement integrity attacks are able
to damage the network while substantially misleading network tomography without
knowing the global routing knowledge of the network.
• We systematically construct three basic attack strategies, and investigate the feasibility
of such attacks, then propose methods to detect and locate measurement integrity
attacks.
• We use real-world datasets to evaluate the threats of measurement integrity attacks
in network systems with various settings. Experimental results demonstrate that the
current practice of network tomography is even vulnerable to a single attacker.
Our work demonstrates that when a measurement integrity attack is successfully launched,
network tomography generates misleading and erroneous outputs, based on which failure recovery or mitigation procedures may further exacerbate the damage caused by the attack.
As security plays a critically important role in network design and measurement, network
tomography should be developed not only for conventional goals such as efficiency and identifiability, but also for security. Hence, existing network tomography methods in various
applications need to be revisited to increase attack resilience and adopt necessary detection
mechanisms.
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1.2.2 Vulnerability of Measurement Confidentiality
In a wireless network, network flow information (i.e., the flow data rates of sourcedestination pairs on end-to-end paths) is the essential knowledge about the network. Equipped
with such knowledge, malicious adversaries will know who is communicating with whom in
the network or how much data rate a pair of communicating parties has, and then launch
powerful, effective attacks targeting the network [53, 54].
In many large-scale wireless networks, such as wireless sensor network (WSN) [55] or mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) [56], directly observing the end-to-end flow information is not
always possible or even infeasible because of the prohibition in anonymous networks or the
measurement traffic overhead. To acquire network flow information, adversaries can leverage
the method of network inference to infer the end-to-end flow rates through eavesdropping on
wireless link activities, which is widely feasible in wireless networks because of the broadcast
nature of the wireless medium. Network inference was originally designed for the effective
network management and diagnosis, therefore most existing studies focus on optimizing the
inference performance [57, 42, 41, 58, 59, 60, 43]. However, from the adversary’s perspective,
such a line of work indeed exposes the vulnerability of leakage of network flow information, in
which the adversary can simply obtain such information through wireless link measurements.
How accurately the adversary can obtain the flow information depends on the inference
method the adversary uses, network traffic patterns, and routing protocols. Although it
has been noted recently [61] that the inference error for an adversary can be maximized
if a network can make sure the adversary has no knowledge of how packets are routed in
the network, little progress has been made to reveal how a network can indeed meet this
goal. Obviously, a larger inference error helps a network to hide its flow information against
leakage more. To achieve this, the network can make the routing of packets unpredictable to
adversaries. For example, if a deterministic routing protocol like the shortest path routing
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[62] is used, it can be very likely that the adversary can accurately infer the flow information
from link measurements based on standard network inference methods [63]. On the contrary,
if a routing protocol is randomized, such as using Tor [64], the intermediate relay nodes are
randomly selected to form an end-to-end path, yielding unpredictable behavior of packet
forwarding observed by an outside adversary.
In this work, we study the security benefits of randomized routing protocols against
malicious network inference as well as their associated costs. In particular, we focus on analyzing three major templates for randomized protocols based on common routing behaviors
in wireless networks.
1. k-random-relay: k forwarding nodes (called relays) are selected randomly in a network.
The routing path for each packet must contain such relays.
2. k-random-neighbor: in which the next hop is selected randomly. Specifically, for each
packet, at each hop, one neighbor is selected randomly from k neighbors with the
shortest distances (the distance is measured by the number of hops) to the destination.
3. k-random-path: each packet is sent by one randomly selected path from the k shortest
end-to-end paths.
These templates capture the majority of randomized behaviors during packet forwarding
that can make the entire routing unpredictable. In this chapter, we use an asymptotic
approach to theoretically model these routing templates and measure their induced inference
errors. We also analyze the incurred delay cost of three templates. Our major results can be
summarized in Fig. 1.1, which depicts the lower bound of inference errors for three templates
√
scaled by the delay cost in asymptotic notations for a network with N nodes and N active
end-to-end flows under the condition that N is sufficiently large.
From Fig. 1.1(a), we see that the inference errors induced by all templates are on the same
√
order of N with constant difference. Both k-random-relay and k-random-path templates
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Figure
√ 1.1. Asymptotic inference error and delay performance for a network with N nodes
and N flow, where (a) shows the relationship of them, and (b) provide more exact results.
have delay costs on the same order of

√

N. The k-random-neighbor template incurs a

delay cost of N log k ln N. Our results indicate that k-random-path achieves the inference
error with the same order of the other two templates while maintaining the lowest delay
cost. But it requires knowing the global path information of the network, and in practice,
such information is generally unavailable or prohibited to know. For a large k, the delay
of k-random-neighbor is significantly larger than others, but the inference error is still on
the same order of the others. As a result, k-random-neighbor with a large k should be
avoided. From Fig. 1.1(b), for k-random-relay, both the inference error and the delay are
larger than k-random-path by a constant order of magnitude. In addition, k-random-relay
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does not require to know the global information, thus a number of real-world applications
(e.g., Onion routing or Tor [64]) leverage this template to achieve the anonymity.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• We are the first to study the vulnerability of the leakage of network flow information
from the routing protocol perspective, and reveal that randomized routing protocols
help to prevent revealing flow information by inflicting large inference errors. Whereas,
a large inference error is always associated with a large delay cost.
• We propose three templates based on routing behavior, i.e., k-random-relay, k-randomneighbor and k-random-path. Then we systematically characterize and model these
templates, and investigate the inference error as well as the incurred delay cost of each
template. Our theoretical results verify that each randomized template is able to hide
the flow information with different capabilities.
• We conduct comprehensive simulations to evaluate the inference error and delay of
each template under a practical network inference setup. Experimental results confirm
the relationship between the inference error and the delay cost.
1.3

Dissertation Overview
In Chapter 2, we present STAPLE, which is a lightweight, efficient mechanism to improve

the signal processing performance for wireless networking. In Chapter 3, we present a new
decoding system CombDec that uses (α, β)-construction, γ-decimation and sparse recovery
to resolve RTS collisions. In Chapter 4, we present new attack strategies called measurement
integrity attacks against network tomography, and use theoretical and experimental results
to analyze the feasibility. We also present the conditions to detect and locate these attacks.
In Chapter 5, we systematically categorize randomized routing protocols into three tem-
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plates, k-random-relay, k-random-neighbor and k-random-path, and theoretically analyze
the inference errors and incurred delay costs of them.
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Chapter 2: Stateful Inter-Packet Signal Processing for Wireless Networking

2.1

Abstract
Traditional signal processing design (e.g., frequency offset and channel estimation) at

a receiver treats each packet arrival as an independent process to facilitate decoding and
interpreting packet data. In this chapter, we enhance the performance of this process in
the wireless network domain. We propose STAteful inter-Packet signaL procEssing (STAPLE), a framework of stateful signal processing residing between the physical and link layers.
STAPLE transforms the signal processing procedure into a lightweight stateful process that
caches in a small-sized memory table physical and link layer header fields as packet state
information. The similarity of such information among packets serves as prior knowledge to
further enhance the reliability of signal processing and thus improve the wireless network
performance. We implement STAPLE on USRP X300-series devices with adapted configurations for 802.11a/b/g/n/ac and 802.15.4. The STAPLE prototype is of low processing
complexity and does not change any wireless standard specification. Comprehensive experimental results show that the benefit from STAPLE is universal in various wireless networks.
PHY Payload
Preamble PHY Header MAC Header MAC Payload (usually encrypted)

Figure 2.1. Generic packet structure viewed at the PHY and MAC layers.
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2.2

Preliminaries
In this section, we describe preliminaries about signal processing and packet decoding in

wireless networks.
2.2.1 Packet Specifications in Wireless Networks
In today’s wireless networks, elements for data exchange are packets that contain both
standard-specified information and user data. Figure 2.1 illustrates a generic packet format
viewed at the PHY and MAC layers. As shown in Figure 2.1, a packet consists of the
preamble, the PHY header, and the PHY payload that includes the MAC header and payload.
The preamble is specified in a wireless standard and known to the public. It is also called
as pilot or training sequence [65] for energy detection, timing/frequency synchronization and
channel estimation [66]. The PHY header usually provides specific PHY layer information
for decoding the PHY payload. Depending on a wireless standard, such information may
include packet length, modulation type, and data rate. The PHY header may also contain
a checksum field, such as cyclic redundancy check (CRC) in 802.11b, to verify the successful
decoding of the PHY header. The MAC header facilitates the functionality of coordinating
multi-access of network nodes to share the wireless channel. It generally includes the source
and destination MAC addresses, and packet type information, such as acknowledgement
(ACK), beacon, and data packets in 802.11a/b/g/n/ac [11]. MAC payload is the actual
data at the MAC layer, including high-layer protocol information and the user’s data at the
application layer. In today’s wireless networks, this payload is usually encrypted [11, 12].
When a packet is transmitted by a sender to a receiver in a wireless network, the increase
of the energy level at the receiver triggers the packet reception process.
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Figure 2.2. Packet reception at a receiver.

2.2.2 Packet Reception in Wireless Networks
The packet reception process consists of two relatively independent procedures: signal
processing and signal decoding, as shown in Figure 2.2. The signal processing procedure
is used to prepare all necessary pre-decoding steps before decoding the packet data at the
receiver. These steps generally happen in sequence as synchronization, channel estimation
and equalization. The signal decoding procedure is to first decode the PHY header to obtain
essential PHY information, which is then used to decode the PHY payload, including the
MAC header and the MAC payload.
2.2.2.1 Signal Processing
Because the radio wave propagating through the wireless channel is a complicated phenomenon characterized by various environmental factors, such as the multi-path fading and
the doppler effect [66], the signal processing procedure estimates and compensates those factors before the signal is decoded into data bits. Generally, signal processing contains three
major steps: synchronization, channel estimation, and equalization, as shown in Figure 2.2.
All these steps are based on the known preamble with length n in the packet, denoted by
x = [x1 , x2 , · · · , xn ], where xi is the i-th baseband symbol in the preamble.
Synchronization includes timing synchronization and frequency synchronization. Timing
synchronization is triggered by energy detection, and is to find the start position of the first
PHY layer symbol in a packet [67] such that the later processing on the symbols in the packet
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is aligned. After timing synchronization, the received signal of the preamble in the packet
is represented as a vector s = [s1 , s2 , · · · , sn ]. Frequency synchronization is to estimate and
compensate the frequency offset ∆f between the transmitter and the receiver [66] from the
received preamble signal s based on the knowledge of the preamble x.
After frequency offset compensation, the received signal vector of the preamble s =
[s1 , s2 , · · · , sn ] has been compensated to a new vector s′ = [s′1 , s′2 , · · · , s′n ] [4], based on
which channel estimation is performed to estimate the channel state information (CSI). The
maximum-likelihood (ML) algorithm that minimizes the estimation error on the flat-fading
channel [66] is
ĥ = (xH x)−1 xH s′ ,

(2.1)

where (·)H and (·)−1 denote the matrix conjugate transpose and inverse, respectively. ML
channel estimation for frequency-selective channels [3], orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) [1] or multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) channels [68] are performed in a similar linear process to (2.1). Note that although the matrix inverse operation
in (2.1) is nonlinear, the preamble x is known to the public and accordingly (xH x)−1 xH in
(2.1) can be pre-computed.
Once the receiver obtains the estimated CSI ĥ, it performs channel equalization [69]
to compensate the channel effect to support coherent demodulation. Note that OFDM has
been widely adopted in today’s wireless standards, such as in 802.11a/g/n/ac [11], because it
significantly simplifies the channel equalization process by transforming a frequency-selective
wireless channel into multiple parallel flat-fading ones.
2.2.2.2 Signal Decoding
Signal decoding follows immediately once signal processing is finished. As a packet may
have different modulation and coding schemes in the PHY header and payload (e.g., in
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802.11a/g/n/ac), the receiver first demodulates and decodes the PHY header and obtains
the data rate information (i.e., the modulation and error-correction coding information)
about the PHY payload, along with other necessary information. As shown in Figure 2.2,
if a checksum (e.g., CRC or parity) exists in the PHY header and the decoded header does
not pass the error check, the receiver has to drop the packet (when there is no other error
recovery option); otherwise, the receiver uses the data rate information in the PHY header to
demodulate and decode the PHY payload, obtaining the MAC header and the MAC payload.
If the receiver verifies the checksum of the MAC payload, it passes the payload data to the
upper layer for protocol management and data delivery.
Demodulation and error-correction decoding during the signal decoding process have
been well studied in the wireless communication domain [70, 16].
2.3

Design Motivation behind STAPLE
In this section, we introduce the intuition behind stateful signal processing, then use

real-world measurements to validate our intuition. Finally present our basic design of the
STAPLE mechanism.
2.3.1 Basic Intuition and Observations
Traditionally, the entire packet reception is treated as an independent process at a receiver. Recent studies have focused on enhancing the signal decoding procedure to improve
wireless link performance, such as partial packet recovery [71, 15, 72, 14, 7, 9]. Little attention has been focused on re-designing the signal processing procedure for wireless packet
reception, even in the signal processing community, because synchronization, channel estimation and equalization are all well explored in the literature [2, 1, 4, 66, 73, 65].
In this chapter, we take a closer look at the signal processing procedure. Intuitively, such
a procedure must be treated as an independent process for each packet arrival. For example,
19

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0

500
1000
1500
Packet length (byte)

Probability distribution

Probability distribution

0.8
SIGCOMM04
SIGCOMM08

SIGCOMM04
SIGCOMM08

0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

(a)

20
40
Data rate (Mbps)

60

(b)

Figure 2.3. Distributions of (a) packet length and (b) data rate in SIGCOMM04/08 datasets.
upon arrival of a packet, the receiver estimates the frequency offset and the CSI from the
preamble, compensates their effects on the received signal for decoding. As the frequency
offset and the CSI are time-varying and hard to predict [4], the receiver has to estimate and
compensate their effects again when a new packet arrives.
It is difficult to further improve a well-established signal processing algorithm in practice.
Our design intuition is that if we place signal processing in the network domain, we should
be able to boost its performance if we can leverage the common information across different
packets. In a wireless network, packets indeed have some common information, which can
serve as prior knowledge during packet arrival. We analyze the realistic packet trace datasets
SIGCOMM04 [74] and SIGCOMM08 [75] to see whether common information exists between
packets in typical WiFi network usages. Figure 2.3(a) shows the packet length distributions
in the datasets. We observe that the distribution in each dataset is extremely uneven and
consists of two regions: the first region includes small packet lengths (1-250 byes), indicating
control or short data packets; and the second is around the maximum allowable packet size
(1400-1600 bytes), indicating packets for data-intensive applications. Similarly, uneven distributions of data rates in packets are shown in Figure 2.3(b). Given an AP in SIGCOMM08,
we also find that on average 4.2 nodes sent 51.7 packets to the AP within one-second period.
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Those packets have the same PHY/MAC field values with high probability. The quantitative
evaluation on each of these fields will be detailed in Section 2.5.
2.3.2 Basic Design of STAPLE
The preliminary observations show that there exists common (but maybe scattered) information among packets, which can serve as prior knowledge for signal processing during
packet reception. If we look at such prior information solely within the signal processing
domain, a traditional way is to perform profiling/training among all PHY/MAC fields in
collected packets to build the prior distributions of such fields, and then integrate these distributions into a maximum a posteriori (MAP) framework [66] to improve signal processing.
Nonetheless, such a method faces two practical issues: (i) Profiling empirical distributions is always practically cumbersome due to its heavy dependencies on variable factors,
such as physical environments, the number of users, and how they use the network, all of
which cannot be easily predicted from time to time. (ii) Different data fields in packets are
very likely to exhibit distinct distributions and also have correlations. Integrating these distributions into a unified framework is challenging. Moreover, the design must be lightweight
and efficient to ensure low overhead and timely signal processing.
Thus, we avoid designing this method solely in the signal processing domain. Rather, we
look at it from the network perspective. A core idea in network management is to maintain
a network state, such as the backoff state at the MAC layer or the congestion control state
in TCP. When a sender transmits a packet, we can use its header field values to form its
state. Formally, we define the state of a packet as follows.
Definition 1 The state of a packet is a bit sequence concatenated by one or more bit strings
in the PHY and MAC header fields in the packet.
All PHY/MAC header fields in a packet can be combined to represent a state. In this
way, the state space of a packet might be very large in theory. In practice, we can carefully
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select a few fields that are very likely to have the same value across packets to form the
state (as indicated in our packet trace analysis). Hence, our motivation is to introduce state
management into signal processing in a network context. Figure 2.4 draws the sketch of
STAPLE, which consists of three major steps.

state association
Step 3

reconstruct
longer preamble

Receiver

Step 2
associated state
101010...

Step 1
signal
decoding

signal
processing

State Table
101010…
…...
if the state has errors
(e.g., 100010...), they
can be corrected here.
upper
101010...
layer

Figure 2.4. Sketch of STAPLE.

1. When a receiver receives a packet, it first goes through signal processing and decoding.
If no error happens, the receiver can directly send the data to the MAC and higher
layers, finishing the packet reception.
2. When errors happen, STAPLE tries to associate the corrupted packet with a previous
state. Specifically, it compares the PHY/MAC fields in the corrupted packet with
a state table that stores those fields from successfully decoded packets, which finds
the closest state to the packet and recover it into that state. As shown in Step 2 of
Figure 2.4, when the state of the packet has errors, they can be then corrected after
state association; when the state contains no error and exactly matches a previous one,
other parts of the packet, such as the packet payload, should have errors leading to
decoding failure. In both cases, the state of the packet is associated.
3. At this point, the PHY/MAC header fields in the packet state can be considered as
prior knowledge. This indicates that the information can be combined with the original
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preamble in the packet to form a longer preamble to re-perform the signal processing,
which can yield better estimates for frequency offset and CSI (as estimation errors
in signal processing generally decrease with the preamble length increasing [2, 76, 1,
77]). Then, the receiver re-performs the signal decoding using these better estimates.
They can improve the performance of decoding the payload because it usually has a
higher modulation/coding rate than the packet header, and accordingly requires more
accurate frequency offset and CSI estimates.
STAPLE transforms prior information in a wireless network into the concept of packet
state. In this way, prior information is recovered by state association, and is then used to
construct a longer preamble. This new preamble is in turn used to re-do the signal processing
to obtain better frequency offset and CSI estimates, which is called signal re-processing in
this chapter.
2.4

Architecture and Components
In this section, we turn the basic concept of STAPLE into detailed design. We first

present the STAPLE architecture, and then elaborate its key components.
2.4.1 STAPLE Architecture

packet

(a)

Signal
Processing

decoding fails

Traditional
Signal Reprocessing

(b)

PHY / MAC Header
Decoding

find a
state

State
Association

succeeds
previous
states

to upper
layer

update

State Table

STAPLE

Figure 2.5. Architecture of STAPLE.
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STAPLE can be regarded as a module (as shown in Figure 2.5(b)) flexibly attached to
the traditional architecture of a wireless receiver (as shown in Figure 2.5(a)).
There are three key components in STAPLE: state association, signal re-processing, and
state table management. To provide a generic framework, we decouple the design of STAPLE
into two independent parts: (i) designing STAPLE components (i.e., state association and
signal re-processing) and (ii) constructing the state of a packet from PHY/MAC fields. In
the following, we describe the first part, which is standard-independent. The second part
answers what PHY/MAC fields are used to construct the state of a packet and will be
discussed based on wireless standards in Section 2.5.
2.4.2 State Association
State association is triggered when the decoding of a packet P fails. From Definition 1,
we know that the state of a packet is the bit combination of several selected PHY/MAC
fields. Thus, STAPLE can read the state of the packet S(P ) by combining the decoded bit
values in certain PHY/MAC fields in P , as shown in Figure 2.6. Note that even upon failure
of decoding an entire packet, the bit values in its PHY/MAC fields can still be decoded (with
potential errors), and then fetched into state association for state look-up and comparison.
After obtaining S(P ), STAPLE associates it with a previous state in the state table,
which stores a set of previous states, denoted by S = {S1 , S2 , · · · , S|S|}, where |S| denotes
the cardinality of S.
As P is a corrupted packet, any bit in P can be erroneous. However, if we can find a state
in S that resembles S(P ), it is very likely that S(P ) should be equal to that state, but may
exhibit another value because of noise or interference during the reception of P . This is from
our observations in packet trace analysis: a node is found to send packets to another node
with limited variations of bit values in PHY/MAC headers, therefore exhibiting a limited
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Figure 2.6. State association in STAPLE.

set of most frequent states. If these states are all stored in the table, the state of a corrupted
packet is very likely stored in the state table.
As a result, the state association component in STAPLE finds the stored state closest
to S(P ) in the state table. The measure of “being closest” is by the Hamming distance,
which is defined as the number of bit differences between two bit sequences. Accordingly,
the association algorithm can be written as

Objective :
Subject to :

Ŝ(P ) = arg min H(s, S(P ))

(2.2)

H(S(P ), Ŝ(P )) < dth ,

(2.3)

s∈S

where H(· , ·) denotes the Hamming distance between two bit sequences, and the objective
(2.2) is to re-associate the packet P with a new state Ŝ(P ) ∈ S that is the closest to the
original state S(P ). A constraint (2.3) also exists to make sure that the Hamming distance
between Ŝ(P ) and S(P ) must be smaller than a threshold dth . This is because the real state
of P does not always exist in the state table. A large value of H(S(P ), Ŝ(P )) indicates that
(i) packet P was transmitted with a completely different state that was never stored in the
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state table; (ii) too many bit errors happened because of low signal quality. In both cases,
STAPLE stops state association and simply drops the packet P .
It is also possible that the corrupted packet P is associated to a wrong state Ŝ(P ), which
can happen when the Hamming distances among some pairs of states stored in the table are
very small. STAPLE makes best efforts to associate P with a previous state. When P is
indeed associated to a wrong state, STAPLE is not likely to recover P by signal re-processing.
But this only reduces the gain from STAPLE and does not degrade the performance as P
is already corrupted. Wrong association can be mitigated by carefully choosing PHY/MAC
fields to construct the state of a packet, which is detailed in Section 2.5. A smaller threshold
dth can also mitigate wrong association from happening. We will evaluate the impacts of dth
in experiments in Section 2.6.
Figure 2.6 shows two simple examples of how state association works: (i) when a corrupted packet P has a state with one error bit S(P ) = 10010110, state association is performed based on (2.2) with threshold dth = 2 to obtain Ŝ(P ) = S2 = 11010110 because
their Hamming distance H(S(P ), S2) = 1. This indicates that the second bit in S(P ) is
likely an error, and is corrected from 0 to 1. Then, the state of P is associated to a new
one Ŝ(P ) = 11010110. (ii) When P has a state without any error bit S(P ) = 11010110,
obviously Ŝ(P ) = S(P ) = S2 = 11010110 after state association.
When the header is coded in some standards (e.g., convolutional coding is used for
802.11g/n/ac headers), state association can be performed on the coded data and thus the
Hamming distance comparison will not be affected by the coding scheme.
Note that the performance benefits of STAPLE do not come solely from error-correcting
a part of the PHY/MAC header in a packet during state association. More importantly,
STAPLE helps improve the performance when the payload, not the header, is decoded with
errors. This is because the payload usually has a higher modulation/coding rate than the
header, therefore requires more accurate frequency offset and CSI estimates that STAPLE
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can provide based on a longer preamble formed by the conventional preamble and the state of
a packet. Overall, state association serves as the first essential step for this generic framework
to improve the signal processing performance.
2.4.3 Signal Re-processing
Given the corrupted packet P as the input, the output of state association is the associated state Ŝ(P ). Then, STAPLE performs signal re-processing, which consists of two steps
as shown in Figure 2.7.
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Step 1: longer
preamble xL is
formed

Figure 2.7. Signal re-processing in STAPLE.

First, STAPLE converts Ŝ(P ) that represents the recovered bits from PHY/MAC fields
in packet P to physical layer symbols, which is done by re-modulating Ŝ(P ). If a header
is interleaved or/and coded (e.g., 1/2 convolutional coding in WiFi signal), STAPLE reinterleaves or/and re-encodes, then re-modulates Ŝ(P ). Denote by m(Ŝ(P )) the symbol
vector of re-modulated symbols from Ŝ(P ). The longer preamble is constructed as xL =
h
i
x m(Ŝ(P )) , where x is the original preamble described in Section 2.2.2.
Second, given the newly constructed preamble xL , we can improve both frequency syn-

chronization and channel estimation during signal processing, as shown in Figure 2.2: (i)
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Frequency synchronization for low complexity processing must leverage a special repetitive
structure (e.g., two same consecutive symbols in 802.11 a/g/n/ac) in the preamble. The
longer preamble xL does not generally result in such a repetitive structure, leading to a
non-convex optimization problem in [1, 2]. (ii) In contrast, channel estimation is usually a
linear process (as discussed in Section 2.2.2). A longer preamble in general results in a more
accurate CSI estimate.
As performing signal re-processing requires a tradeoff between performance and complexity, and we wish to ensure low complexity in the STAPLE implementation, we choose
to perform signal re-processing only based on channel estimation, and avoid solving the
non-convex optimization to re-estimate the frequency offset at the receiver. Thus, given xL ,
STAPLE re-estimates the CSI as
−1 H ′
ĥL = (xH
L xL ) xL sL ,

(2.4)

where s′L is the vector combined by the received symbols from the original preamble part
and from the PHY/MAC fields in the received signal of packet P at the receiver.
After obtaining a better CSI estimate ĥL , STAPLE re-demodulates and re-decodes the
corrupted packet P in order to recover it. The implementation for this step can be optimized to minimize the processing complexity for a wireless standard. We will analyze the
implementation complexity for 802.11ac in Section 2.6.2.1.
If there are pilot signals in the payload of the packet P (e.g., pilot subcarriers in 802.11
a/g/n/ac), because more information is obtained by STAPLE, it can yield a better initial
channel estimate ĥL , which can be based on to track the channel change using these pilots
[65] in a fast fading wireless channel environment.
−1
Although (xH
is not a linear operation in (2.4), in OFDM equalization for many
L xL )
H
−1
wireless standards, xH
only incurs a division operation
L xL is a complex number and (xL xL )
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−1
in the complex domain. In addition, the value of (xH
can always be pre-computed
L xL )

during state update and stored along with its associated state in the state table.
2.4.4 Table Management Policies
The state table (shown in Figure 2.5(b)) is used to store the states of successfully decoded
packets. We design two table update policies.
1. Timestamp-based policy, which uses packet arrival time as an indicator to update the
table. Each state is stored with a timestamp. Once the most recent packet is decoded
successfully, STAPLE updates the state’s timestamp if the state is already in the table,
or otherwise replaces the oldest state with this new one.
2. Frequency-based policy, which stores a timestamp and a usage count with each state
in the table. Similar to the previous policy, the timestamp is used to indicate the last
update time of a state. Once a packet is decoded, STAPLE updates the state’s timestamp and increments the usage count if the state is already in the table. Otherwise,
STAPLE replaces the state that has the smallest count with the new state. If several
states have the same count number, STAPLE chooses the oldest state for replacement.
This policy also zeros out the count of a state if the state’s timestamp is too old (i.e.,
larger than a given threshold).
When the table size is sufficiently large, the two policies should have no evident performance difference. However, if the table size is small, the downlink performance may not be
affected significantly because a station, as the receiver, always receives data solely from the
AP. The uplink performance of the station that transmits more data (than others) to the
AP may be boosted because the state of its packets can always be stored in the AP’s table.
Therefore, the AP should choose a larger table size than a station in practice. The impacts
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of state table parameter configurations and policy setups will be evaluated in experiments
in Section 2.6.
2.5

Configuring the STAPLE System
We have designed the major components in STAPLE. Another key question left is which

PHY/MAC fields constitute the state of a packet, which is standard-dependent. In this
section, we configure STAPLE for 802.11a/b/g/n/ac and 802.15.4 by specifying how to
construct the state of a packet in such networks.
2.5.1 Methodology for Configurations
The motivation to develop STAPLE is from the observation that there exist most frequently appeared values of PHY/MAC header fields in packets. Thus, we aim to select those
fields exhibiting little randomness to form the state of a packet. In particular, we use Shannon entropy [78] per bit to quantitatively measure the randomness of each PHY/MAC field in
packet trace data and choose those fields with low entropies. We choose the SIGCOMM04/08
datasets for 802.11b/g and our own datasets STAPLEn/STAPLEac for 802.11n/ac, respectively. These datasets can represent typical WiFi scenarios in a conference, a campus or a
residential place.
STAPLEn is a dataset collected from a campus WiFi network and STAPLEac from
a residential WiFi network. Unlike 802.11b/g packet capturing, it is not always possible
for a third-party to correctly capture and decode all 802.11n/ac data packets because of
beamforming between individual stations and the AP [79]. Hence, we place four laptops at
different locations and capture packets individually in the networks. We then aggregate all
packets to measure the entropy of each header field. We find that the 802.11ac network did
not run in the multi-user MIMO (MU-MIMO) mode because the GroupID field in all collected
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packets was set to 0. Thus, our collection and measurement can reflect how PHY/MAC fields
in packets are set up for routine WiFi use in a non-MU-MIMO 802.11ac network.
Note that wireless standards adopt different coding schemes for the PHY/MAC headers,
which can affect the complexity of the signal re-processing component in STAPLE. We
categorize a coding scheme into one of three types: plaintext (P), interleaving and coding
(I/C) data, and encryption (E). Type-P indicates no coding is used for a header field (e.g.,
PHY/MAC headers of 802.11b); Type-I/C means that data fields in a header are interleaved
and error-correction coded (e.g., MAC headers of 802.11a/g/n/ac); Type-E indicates that
data fields in a header are all encrypted (e.g., MAC headers of 802.15.4). Generally, we avoid
choosing Type-E fields and select Type-P or Type-I/C fields based on their entropy values
for our implementation.
Constructing the state of a packet is not unique. In our STAPLE configurations for
802.11a/b/g/n/ac and 802.15.4, we target a lightweight design that balances between performance benefits and costs of storage and computation in typical wireless networks with
normal usages. It is certainly feasible to add additional fields to (or remove existing fields
from) our configurations to optimize STAPLE along certain direction.
Because a newer 802.11 standard usually extends and relies on previous ones, we configure
STAPLE starting from 802.11b (legacy) to 802.11ac (state-of-the-art) for the sake of clear
presentation. Our implementation and evaluation are focused on 802.11ac in Section 2.6.
We also minimize the description of a wireless standard, which is well documented.
2.5.2 Configurations for Wireless Standards
2.5.2.1 Configurations for 802.11b
We start from 802.11b, which is a legacy WiFi standard but still backward supported
in many WiFi networks. Figure 2.8 shows a typical structure of physical protocol data unit
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(PPDU) for 802.11b, including the PHY Layer Convergence Procedure (PLCP) preamble,
PLCP header, and PLCP Service Data Unit (PSDU) that contains the MAC header and the
MAC payload.
MAC Header
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0.09

0.06

0.07

0.07

0.73

N/A

N/A

N/A

Frame Duration Address Address Address Sequence Address QoS
HT
Control
/ID
1
2
3
Control
4
control control

PPDU: PLCP Preamble PLCP Header
SYNC

SFD

PSDU

SIGNAL SERVICE LENGTH CRC

0.17

0

0.2

N/A

PHY Header

Figure 2.8. Typical format of an 802.11b data packet and measured entropies values.

As shown in Figure 2.8, the PLCP header represents the PHY header including four fields
of Type-P: SIGNAL, SERVICE, LENGTH, and CRC, where SIGNAL denotes the modulation
scheme, LENGTH is the payload length, SERVICE contains three bits to represent the PHY
configuration and the rest of bits are reserved and default to 0. The 802.11b MAC header
at the beginning of PSDU consists of a set of fields.
According to the measured entropy in each PHY/MAC field in Figure 2.8, we choose
SIGNAL, SERVICE, LENGTH at the PHY header and Frame Control, Duration/ID, Addr.1,
Addr.2, and Addr.3 in the MAC header to form the state of a packet because of their low
entropies. We also include CRC in the PHY header because CRC directly depends on other
fields. Once these fields are known, we can simply calculate the CRC. Including CRC increases
the length of the state of a packet, and accordingly can further improve the signal processing
reliability because more data is used for signal processing. Thus, for a packet P , its state
S(P ) is written as S(P ) = SIGNAL|SERVICE|LENGTH|CRC|Frame Control|Duration/ID|
Addr.1|Addr.2|Addr.3 in our STAPLE configuration for 802.11b.
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2.5.2.2 Configurations for 802.11a/g
802.11a/g uses OFDM to combat multipath fading. Figure 2.9 shows a typical format of
the PPDU including the PLCP preamble, PLCP header, PSDU and others. Different from
802.11b, all the data except for the PLCP preamble is of Type-I/C in an 802.11a/g packet.
PLCP Header

0.5
Rate

PPDU:

0

0.42 N/A

Reserved Length Parity

PLCP Preamble

SIGNAL

0
Tail

Service

PSDU

Tail

Pad Bits

Data

Figure 2.9. Typical structure of an 802.11a/g packet and measured entropies in SIGNAL.

The PLCP header includes the SIGNAL field that occupies one single OFDM symbol and
the Service field that exists in the next symbol. SIGNAL contains a number of fields of TypeI/C to represent packet information like the data rate and packet length. We measure the
entropy of each field in SIGNAL, also shown in Figure 2.9. All entropies are small therefore
we include the entire SIGNAL field in the state of a packet. Note that the Parity field can be
directly computed given other fields, therefore we do not need to measure its entropy.
The Service field is used to synchronize the descrambler shown in Figure 2.9. All bits in
Service are constantly set to 0. The MAC header at the beginning of PSDU follows Service.
The 802.11a/g MAC header structure is exactly the same as that of 802.11b. However,
Service and the MAC header together do not exactly occupy one OFDM symbol. This
means that they are interleaved and coded with other data then OFDM-modulated, which
can be difficult (if not impossible) for STAPLE’s signal re-processing to accurately extract
Service and parts of the MAC header from interleaved and coded OFDM symbols. Therefore,
Service and all MAC fields can be used for state association, but not for signal re-processing in
STAPLE. As we aim at a lightweight design, we avoid using any of these fields to reduce the
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size of the state table. Therefore, the state S(P ) for packet P in our STAPLE configuration
for 802.11a/g is S(P ) = SIGNAL.
2.5.2.3 Configurations for 802.11n/ac
802.11n and 802.11ac are the state-of-the-art WiFi standards leveraging MIMO technologies with more complicated packet formats.
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Figure 2.10. Typical packet format in 802.11n and measured entropies of field values.

Figure 2.10 depicts a typical packet structure of 802.11n which contains two portions:
legacy (L) and high throughput (HT). The L portion is for backward compatibility, and the
HT portion is specified to support MIMO communication. The L-SFT and L-LFT fields at
the beginning of the L portion are legacy preambles. The HT-SFT and HT-LFT fields in the
HT portion are preambles for MIMO training. The L-SIG of Type-I/C is exactly the same
as the SIGNAL field in 802.11a/g. Hence, we use the entire L-SIG field for STAPLE. HT-SIG
of Type-I/C is at the beginning of the HT portion and consists of 2 OFDM symbols with a
number of fields. We measure the entropy of each field from packet trace data, as shown in
Figure 2.10. Most fields have small entropies, therefore we include the entire HT-SIG field.
Note that the single-bit Aggregation field indicates whether multiple payloads are combined
together into a single packet with a unique PHY header, and it is almost random with
entropy close to 1. However, we cannot exclude this bit because it is interleaved and coded
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with other fields in exactly one OFDM symbol. We find that the high entropy of this single
bit always happens in the downlink. It does not have substantial impact on the performance
but the size of the state table needs to be slightly increased at the downlink. Therefore, we
still include it to represent the state of a packet. As a result, the state S(P ) for packet P in
our configuration for 802.11n is S(P ) = L-SIG|HT-SIG.
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Figure 2.11. Typical packet format in 802.11ac and measured entropies of field values

Figure 2.11 plots the typical packet format in 802.11ac, which has a very similar structure
to 802.11n: the HT portion becomes the very HT (VHT) portion. Similarly, based on the
measured entropies from packet trace data shown in Figure 2.11, we include L-SIG and VHTSIG to represent the state of a packet. In addition, we find the entropies of fields in the
VHT-SIG-B are also small. Thus, we set the state as S(P ) = L-SIG|VHT-SIG|VHT-SIG-B in
our configuration for 802.11ac.
2.5.2.4 Configurations for 802.15.4
IEEE 802.15.4 is the basis for ZigBee towards low-cost, low-speed ubiquitous communication. We configure STAPLE for offset-QPSK (O-QPSK) based ZigBee, whose typical
packet format is shown in Figure 2.12.
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Figure 2.12. Typical 802.15.4 packet format.

As shown in Figure 2.12, the PHY header (PHR) of 802.15.4 contains only two Type-P
fields: Length and Reserved, which indicate the length of the packet and reserved bits (set to
all 0s), respectively. The MAC header is contained in PSDU, which is however of Type-E.
To reduce the complexity, our STAPLE configuration avoids any Type-E data during signal
re-processing, therefore choosing to include only Length and Reserved for the state of a packet
P , i.e., S(P ) = Length|Reserved.
2.6

Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we implement STAPLE with adapted configurations for 802.11b/g/n/ac

and 802.15.4. We first describe our implementation and experiment setups, then focus on
presenting experimental evaluation of STAPLE in 802.11ac, and finally describe experimental
results on other standards.
2.6.1 Implementation and Setups
2.6.1.1 Platform and Implementation
STAPLE requires modifications of a conventional wireless receiver. We choose the X300
USRP with CBX daughterboards [80] as the implementation platform. We synchronize
multiple USRPs using OctoClock-G [80] when performing MIMO experiments with 2 - 8
antennas.
We implement a generic software radio platform that covers the basic designs of 802.15.4
and 802.11b/g/n/ac transceivers. We adopt BPSK, QPSK, and 16QAM for 802.11b/g/n/ac,
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and O-QPSK for 802.15.4. For 802.11n/ac, we implement the Alamouti code [81] based
MIMO transmission schemes. In 802.11g/n/ac implementations, the header and data payload of a packet use 1/2 and 3/4 convolutional coding schemes, respectively. We also implement a CSMA/CA scheme with uniform random backoff (i.e., the contention window for
random backoff is always fixed [82, 83]) at the MAC layer for all standards. Note that it
is challenging and time-consuming to implement a comprehensive USRP-based system fully
compatible with all 802.11 PHY/MAC standards. To balance the efficiency of fast prototyping and the cost of high-fidelity evaluation, our implementation is a proof of concept
one with a subset of fundamental STAPLE-related PHY functionalities, serving the purpose
of evaluating the benefits of STAPLE brought to practical wireless scenarios with different
system setups and conditions. As mentioned in Section 2.4.3, our STAPLE implementation
does not improve frequency offset estimation but improves the channel estimation in signal
re-processing.
Also note that we implement a subset of modulation and coding schemes. However, our
experiments generate packets according to packet trace data. This means the PHY field
that denotes the data rate in some generated packets may indicate a higher rate scheme
that we do not implement. In this case, we choose 16QAM as the scheme to modulate and
demodulate. This does not give an advantage to STAPLE during performance evaluation,
since we still allow all possible values in the data rate field of a packet, which affect state
association and state table update of STAPLE in practice.
2.6.1.2 Experimental Setups
We conduct experiments in a realistic indoor environment shown in Figure 2.13 as the
scenario reflects how STAPLE can help improve the wireless link performance in an office
environment with typical WiFi usages. Network nodes are placed at different locations for
performance evaluation with limited transmit power. In our network experiments, packets
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are generated with PHY/MAC field values according to the SIGCOMM04/08 and STAPLEn/ac datasets.
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Figure 2.13. Environment for experiments.

In STAPLE, the default threshold for state association (2.2) is set to 12. The default
size of the state table for a station in the downlink is set to 5; and that for the AP in the
uplink is 15. The default table update policy is frequency-based. In experiments, we change
table setups to evaluate the impact of STAPLE parameters on the performance. We use the
construction of the packet state for each standard given in Section 2.5.
2.6.1.3 Performance Metrics
Packet dropping due to decoding errors only happens at the PHY layer and STAPLE is
a method to improve the PHY layer performance. Thus, it is natural to use the performance
metric at the PHY layer to directly see the benefits of STAPLE without involving other
potential affecting factors at higher layers. In experiments, we measure the packet delivery
ratio (PDR) with and without STAPLE, where PDR is defined as the ratio of the number of
successfully decoded PHY packets at a node to the total number of PHY packets transmitted
to the node. We measure the benefit of STAPLE by using the performance gain ratio, which
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is defined as

Performance gain ratio =

PDR with STAPLE
− 1.
PDR with traditional design

2.6.2 STAPLE for 802.11ac Networks
We focus on performance evaluation on 802.11ac because it is a state-of-the-art WiFi
standard. We consider two types of scenarios in experiments: single-link evaluation, in
which a two-antenna transmitter sends packets to a receiver with 2 – 8 antennas; (ii) network
evaluation, in which we set up two clock-synchronized USRPs as a single 802.11ac AP, and
six USRPs as stations communicating with the AP.
2.6.2.1 Implementation Complexity for 802.11ac
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Figure 2.14. Implementation of 802.11ac.

Figure 2.14 shows the flowchart of our STAPLE implementation for 802.11ac. the extra
storage due to STAPLE is mainly the memory used for the state table, whose size is 5 states
for stations and 15 states for the AP as default values. In terms of extra processing complexity, if errors are detected in the PHY layer, extra procedures including state association,
preamble reconstruction, and CSI re-estimation are introduced by STAPLE. All these procedures are linear, which will not incur much overhead. If errors occur in the data payload,
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re-decoding the payload is needed. The re-decoding complexity is not linear and depends
on the decoding algorithm that is usually polynomial. However, thanks to the PHY payload
check, this case does not quite often happen in today’s WiFi networks.
Table 2.1. Complexity of STAPLE for 802.11ac.
Situation

Extra processing

Performance gain ratio (%)

1) No error in a packet
2) Error first detected
in PHY header
3) Error not detected in
header but payload

20
15

none
state association, preamble
reconstruction and CSI re-estimation
extra processing in 2), and redecoding of PHY payload

BPSK
QPSK
16QAM

10
5
0
0

3
4
Location index

5

Figure 2.15. Performance gain ratios under different locations.

2.6.2.2 Single-Link Performance Evaluation
In our single-link performance evaluation, we fix the modulation scheme for packets and
measure the link performance between two nodes to evaluate how STAPLE helps improve
the single-link performance.
For varying locations, we first compare the single-link performance between a traditional
receiver and STAPLE at different locations. We fix the transmitter at location 1 as shown in
Figure 2.13, and place the receiver at location 0, 3, 4, or 5, which represents the short-distance
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Figure 2.16. Performance gain ratios of uplink and downlink.
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Figure 2.17. Performance gain ratios of STAPLE for 802.11ac.

line of sight (S-LoS), short-distance Non-LoS (S-NLoS), long-distance NLoS (L-NLoS), or
long-distance LoS (L-LoS) channel condition, respectively. The transmitter and receiver are
both equipped with 2 antennas.
Figure 2.15 depicts the performance gain ratios at different locations under BPSK, QPSK,
and 16QAM. We can observe that the performance of STAPLE is uniformly better than the
performance of traditional signal reception for most cases. There is no performance improvement at locations 0 and 5 (both LoS cases) for the BPSK modulation because the packet
delivery ratio is 100%. We also find that at location 4 (L-NLoS), STAPLE substantially
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Table 2.2. Packet delivery ratios with different packet lengths (in bytes).
10

Traditional
STAPLE

99.9%
100%

1000

1500

99.9% 98.3% 93.5%
100% 99.9% 99.7%

100

500

91.5%
98.3%

improves the packet delivery ratio for 16QAM from 80% to 95% (a performance gain ratio
of 17.6% shown in Figure 2.15). This is because communication with higher data rate is less
error-tolerant, thus demanding more accurate CSI estimation, which STAPLE provides. We
can conclude from Figure 2.15 that STAPLE improves the performance in NLoS cases more
than that in LoS cases.
For varying packet lengths, we then evaluate the effect of packet length on the performance gain of STAPLE. During this experiment, the transmitter always sends packets with a
fixed length. Table 2.2 shows the packet delivery ratios on a 2×4 MIMO link from location 1
to location 5 with QPSK modulation for varying packet lengths. It is noted from Table 2.2
that transmitting shorter packets results in better packet delivery ratios. For example, traditional signal reception and STAPLE achieve almost 100% packet delivery ratio when the
packet length is no larger than 100 bytes. As the packet length increases, STAPLE gradually
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Table 2.3. Performance gain ratios from STAPLE under noisy MIMO channels at location 7.
2×4
2×6
2×8

BPSK

QPSK

16QAM

20.2%
16.6%
11.4%

N/A
20.4%
18.9%

N/A
N/A
20.8%

outperforms traditional signal reception, and improves the packet delivery ratio from 91.5%
to 98.3% (a performance gain ratio of 7.4%) when the length is 1500 bytes.
For varying numbers of antennas, we also measure the performance benefits from STAPLE for 2×2–8 MIMO links. Figure 2.16 plots the performance gain ratios of STAPLE on
2×2, 2×4, 2×6, and 2×8 MIMO links under different modulation schemes. The transmitter
and the receiver are placed at locations 1 and 4, respectively, as shown in Figure 2.13. We
can observe from Figure 2.16 that STAPLE generally improves the performance more as
the number of antennas decreases. For example, under 16QAM, STAPLE achieves a 17.6%
performance gain ratio in the 2×2 scenario and a 6.0% ratio for the 2×8 scenario. Similarly,
the performance gain ratio for QPSK reduces from 9.4% to only 0.6% when the number
of receive antennas increases from 2 to 8. This is due to more link reliability from more
antennas.
We then move the receiver to location 7 in Figure 2.13 to test the performance in an LNLoS MIMO channel. Table 2.3 shows the performance gain ratios of STAPLE on 2×4, 2×6,
and 2×8 MIMO links. We find that location 7 is beyond the limit of the 2×4 MIMO link
under QPSK and 16QAM, and beyond the limit of the 2×6 MIMO link under 16QAM. In
these cases, the receiver cannot reliably decode any packet with or without STAPLE. In other
cases, we always observe that STAPLE substantially improves the link reliability, with the
maximum gain ratio achieved at 20.8% for the 2×8 MIMO link under 16QAM. Consequently,
we conclude that STAPLE brings more benefits in noisy channel environments.
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2.6.2.3 Network Performance Evaluation
Next, we evaluate the performance gain of STAPLE in an 802.11ac network environment.
In our testing network, the AP and stations are equipped with 4 and 2 antennas, respectively.
In the single-link evaluation, we always fix the modulation scheme for a packet to test
the performance of a single link. In our network performance evaluation, all the values in
the PHY/MAC fields of a packet (e.g. packet size and modulation scheme) are generated
according to 802.11ac packet trace data. This creates a much more dynamic environment
especially in uplink scenarios. We place the AP at location 0, and also place other stations,
named nodes 1–6, at locations 1–6, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 2.13.
For the overall performance, Figure 2.17 shows the overall performance gain ratios under
uplink and downlink scenarios. Similar to the single-link case, STAPLE always improves the
packet delivery ratio. We find in Figure 2.17 that there are very slight performance gains
for nodes 1 and 2. This is because these two nodes have very good LoS channels to the AP
and corrupted packet at these nodes are mostly due to collisions in the network. STAPLE
is not a mechanism to resolve packet collisions. If there is no collision, the single-link packet
delivery ratios for nodes 1 and 2 are close to 100%. Thus, there is little room for STAPLE
to improve the performance.
As Figure 2.17 illustrates, the maximum performance gain ratios for the uplink and
downlink are 14.3% and 14.8%, respectively, both observed at node 4, which is the furthest
away from the AP in the network. This shows the capability of STAPLE to boost the link
performance under noisy conditions.
We also demonstrate the dynamics of state associations inside STAPLE at the AP. We
compute the number of successful state associations for every 2000 packets received. Figure 2.18 plots this number as a function of the total number of received packets at the AP.
It is seen that most of the time, STAPLE needs to perform signal re-processing on 30-60
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Figure 2.19. The impacts of (a) threshold in state association and (b) state table size.

packets for every 2000 packets, and packet corruption events are uniformly distributed over
time in our testing environment.
For the impacts of threshold in state association, in state association (2.2), a pre-set
threshold dth is needed to associate a corrupted packet with a previous state. We test
the impact of different thresholds on the performance gain ratio of STAPLE at node 4.
Figure 2.19(a) illustrates the uplink and downlink performance gain ratios with different
thresholds. We can observe that the performance gain ratio of STAPLE first increases then
remains approximately the same as the threshold dth keeps increasing. This means that a
larger dth is desirable to maximize the performance gain from STAPLE in practice. But a
larger dth may indicate that STAPLE tries to recover heavily corrupted packets that may be
not recoverable with signal re-processing, incurring more wrong associations and processing
overhead. Therefore, the optimal value of dth for STAPLE to balance the performance gain
and complexity is 12-20 bits, as observed in Figure 2.19(a).
For the impacts of state table setups, we also evaluate the impacts of the state table size
and update policy on the performance gain of STAPLE at node 4 in the network.
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Figure 2.19(b) shows the comparison of performance gain ratios of timestamp-based
and frequency-based table update policies for different table sizes. From Figure 2.19(b),
the frequency-based policy exhibits slightly better performance than the timestamp-based
policy. The difference is negligible for both uplink and downlink when the table size is large.
We also see from Figure 2.19(b) that the state table size has more impacts on the performance benefits of STAPLE. For the downlink, as a station only cares about the packets
from the AP, a small table maintaining 2-5 states is sufficient to increase the performance
gain ratio to approximately 15%. For the uplink, the AP requires a larger table size because
it has to communicate with a number of nodes. Figure 2.19(b) shows that a table with the
size of 12-15 states at the AP is sufficient for the testing network to achieve a nearly 15%
performance gain ratio.
2.6.3 STAPLE for Other Standards
During our experiments with 802.11ac, we find that STAPLE always improves the packet
delivery by up to 20.8% and 15% in single-link and network evaluations, respectively. In the
following, we show the benefits of STAPLE brought to 802.11b/g/n and 802.15.4.
• For 802.11b/g/n network setups, we use the previous network scenario and default
STAPLE parameters to set up the 802.11b/g/n testing network with the AP placed at
location 0, and nodes 1-6 placed at locations 1-6, respectively, as shown in Figure 2.13.
• For 802.15.4 network setups, the network topology is the same as the one in 802.11
scenarios: the network coordinator is placed at location 0, and nodes 1-6 placed at
locations 1-6, respectively. Nodes 1-6 are communicating with the coordinator in the
network. We obtain two ZigBee datasets [84] and [85]. The packets in [84] have 7
different lengths and packets in [85] always have the same length. We generate data
packets according to [84]. The state table size is set to 5 for all nodes.
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For experimental results, Figure 2.20 shows the performance gain ratios of STAPLE in
the uplink and downlink scenarios, respectively. Similar to Figure 2.17, nodes 1 and 2 gain
slight benefits from STAPLE because of their good LoS channels to the AP; and node 4 has
the highest performance gain ratios among all nodes.
It is observed at node 4 that the highest performance gain ratio (15.9% in uplink or
16.6% in downlink) is achieved under 802.11b and the lowest (4.9% in uplink or 5.8% in
downlink) is under 802.15.4. This is because the packet state sizes in 802.11b and 802.15.4
are the largest and smallest in our STAPLE configurations (in Section 2.5.2), respectively.
A large packet state size means that STAPLE can construct a longer preamble for signal
re-processing, therefore generally indicating better performance gain. The experimental
results from Figure 2.20 also demonstrate that STAPLE can benefit a wide range of wireless
networks.
2.6.4 Discussions and Limitations
2.6.4.1 Discussions
In our performance evaluation, the downlink performance is found always slightly better
than the uplink performance. This is because all nodes in the network transmit packets
with limited power, leading to a minor hidden terminal problem. For example, as shown
in Figure 2.13, with the AP being placed at location 0, node 1 (at location 1) has a small
probability of not accurately sensing the transmission from node 4 (at location 4), and vice
versa. This only results in minor asymmetric uplink and downlink performance, and does
not affect the evaluation of the performance gains from STAPLE.
During our experiments, the size of the state table in STAPLE is chosen and evaluated
empirically according to the distributions of PHY/MAC header fields in real-world 802.11
datasets. Therefore, the choice of 2-5 states for stations and 12-20 for the AP should be

47

15

Performance gain ratio (%)

Performance gain ratio (%)

20

802.11b
802.11g
802.11n
ZigBee

10
5
0
1

2

3
4
Node index

(a)

5

6

20
15

802.11b
802.11g
802.11n
ZigBee

10
5
0
1

2

3
4
Node index

5

6

(b)

Figure 2.20. Network-level performance gain ratios: (a) uplink and (b) downlink.

practically suitable for a normal WiFi network environment. The table size may have to be
increased in a network with a large number of users using data-intensive applications. An
under-designed table size may only reduce the performance gain of STAPLE, but does not
degrade the network performance. In addition, the advantage of STAPLE is that the downlink requires much smaller table size than the uplink, which significantly benefits network
users.
For 802.11ac, our packet collection and evaluation are based on the non-MU-MIMO
mode. The MU-MIMO mode does not affect the uplink and is for the downlink only [11].
In addition, MU-MIMO related PHY fields (e.g., GroupID) usually remain constant if a user
does not change his/her location dramatically. Thus, a low-overhead STAPLE design is
expected to be still effective when used for the MU-MIMO mode in 802.11ac.
2.6.4.2 Limitations
In this chapter, configurations for STAPLE are based on packet trace analysis for typical
wireless network scenarios (e.g., a typical residential WiFi network). When a network has a
large number of users, the size of the state table should be increased at least for the uplink
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in order to accommodate more users’ packet information. As a result, configurations for
STAPLE may need to be adapted accordingly for the scenarios with a large number of users
and intensive network usages.
STAPLE can be considered as a way to push the performance limit of signal processing
for wireless networking. Experimental results show that overall, STAPLE achieves moderate performance improvements in different evaluation scenarios. Thus, it is important
to minimize the complexity of the STAPLE implementation and configuration for a practical scenario to avoid excessive energy overhead, which is proportional to the processing
complexity.
STAPLE is designed as a general software radio architecture to improve the signal processing performance on a wireless link. STAPLE is shown effective to improve the link
performance under long-distance or severe channel fading scenarios. However, STAPLE cannot resolve any packet corruption due to collisions in wireless networks. This may limit its
use in the scenarios with congested network traffic under good channel conditions, where the
wireless packet collisions are the dominate performance bottleneck.
2.7

Related Work
In this section, we discuss existing works related to the research efforts in this chapter.

2.7.1 Wireless Signal Processing
Timing/frequency synchronization and channel estimation have been well explored in the
signal processing and wireless communication communities under a wide range of algorithmic
settings and channel conditions [2, 1, 4, 73, 86, 77, 87], thereby establishing a relatively
mature research area. Essential signal processing procedures for traditional packet reception
remain generally unchanged. STAPLE takes signal processing out of the traditional domain
and places it in the network domain, then demonstrates a new perspective of re-designing
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the signal processing procedure to improve the performance during packet reception at a
wireless receiver.
2.7.2 Partial Packet Recovery
STAPLE is related to partial packet recovery (PPR) that attempts to recover a corrupted
packet using a number of approaches, such as automatic repeat request (ARQ), forward
error correction (FEC) [88, 14, 8, 10, 89, 72, 7, 9, 6, 90]. In particular, hybrid-ARQ (HARQ)
[72, 7, 9] has become a widely-used technique to combine the information from multiple
packets to improve the wireless link performance. STAPLE differs from H-ARQ in the
following aspects: (i) H-ARQ focuses on repairing corrupted packets with the cooperation
from the transmitter. STAPLE is designed as a new architecture of signal processing only
residing at the receiver without any cooperation at the receiver; (ii) H-ARQ combines the
retransmitted packet (including the redundant code) with the originally corrupted packet for
error correction to help decoding. On the contrary, STAPLE does not directly touch upon
signal decoding, but leverages low-entropy packet header information to construct a longer
preamble to improve the signal processing accuracy, which in turn enhances the decoding
performance.
To the best of our knowledge, STAPLE is designed as a new way to provide better signal
processing performance, which is orthogonal to H-ARQ and other existing partial packet
recovery mechanisms. Therefore, STAPLE can be integrated with these mechanisms to
further improve the wireless network performance.
2.7.3 Link quality improvement
Research efforts [16, 91, 70, 90, 92, 93] have been devoted to improving the wireless link
quality. For example, [16, 91] focus on resolving the problem of packets collisions. Channel
prediction is proposed in [94] to facilitate rate selection in 802.11 networks. An architecture
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is designed in [95] to flexibly support multiple radio frequency link chains. In addition,
a few recent efforts focus on improving the MU-MIMO performance from various aspects
[96, 68, 97, 98]. STAPLE is also related to [70] that leverages protocol signatures to improve
the packet decoding performance based on modifications to the 802.11 PHY layer.
In contrast, STAPLE focuses on a different domain to improve the signal processing
performance during packet reception and does not modify any standard. Hence, STAPLE is
also complementary to these efforts and is broadly applicable to wireless networks.
2.8

Summary
This chapter presents STAPLE, which is a lightweight, efficient mechanism to improve the

signal processing performance for wireless networking. The core idea of STAPLE is to collect
common header information to form the state of a packet, and use state association to recover
a corrupted packet back to a previous state for constructing a longer preamble to further
enhance the reliability of signal processing. We implement STAPLE on USRP X300 devices
with adapted configurations for 802.11a/b/g/n/ac and 802.15.4. Experimental results show
that STAPLE improves the wireless network performance under various conditions.
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Chapter 3: Comb Decoding towards Collision-Free WiFi

3.1

Abstract
Packet collisions happen every day in WiFi networks. RTS/CTS is a widely-used ap-

proach to reduce the cost of collisions of long data packets as well as combat the hidden
terminal problem. In this chapter, we present a new design called comb decoding (CombDec) to efficiently resolve RTS collisions without changing the 802.11 standard. We observe
that an RTS payload, when treated as a vector in a vector space, exhibits a comb-like distribution; i.e., a limited number of vectors are much more likely to be used than the others due
to RTS payload construction and firmware design. This enables us to reformulate RTS collision resolution as a sparse recovery problem. We create algorithms that carefully construct
the search range for sparse recovery, making the complexity feasible for system design and
implementation. Experimental results show that CombDec boosts the WiFi throughput by
33.6% – 46.2% in various evaluation scenarios.
3.2

Motivation and Design Intuition
In this section, we introduce the motivation and key idea of reformulating the problem

of packet collisions.
3.2.1 Packet Collision and Resolution
We use a noise-free, flat-fading uplink scenario as a simple motivating example: Alice
and Bob send their packets to the AP at the same time. Alice’s and Bob’s packets consist of
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L time-domain baseband symbols, represented by vectors xA ∈ X and xB ∈ X , respectively,
where X ⊂ C L×1 denotes the set of all possible baseband symbol vector for xA and xB , and
C L×1 is the L-dimensional complex vector space. Note that throughout this chapter, a vector
is by default a column vector instead of a row vector, unless otherwise specified.
Then, the received signal at the AP can be written as

y = hA xA + hB xB ,

(3.1)

where hA , hB ∈ C (C denotes the complex plane) are the channel gains from Alice and Bob
to the AP, respectively.
If we look at the collision (3.1) and assume that Alice’s and Bob’s signals go through
similar channel conditions to the AP, Alice’s or Bob’s signal will have an SNR around 0dB
due to mutual interference. Simply given (3.1), the AP is less likely to recover Alice’s or
Bob’s signal due to two major reasons.
• If the AP adopts a traditional decoding design, it cannot decode a signal with SNR
around 0dB, because an acceptable SNR is usually 10dB or above [99] for WiFi.
• Although multi-user detection [100] has been developed as a vital solution to decode
multiple user’s signals, this technique in general requires that users employ distinct
spread spectrum codes [101] to differentiate themselves at the signal level. Nonetheless,
there is no such code design in WiFi.
Apparently, additional information is needed to resolve the collision (3.1). Our key
observation is that the RTS packet format itself provides valuable information for collision
resolution in a WiFi network.
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3.2.2 Anatomy of RTS in WiFi
The RTS/CTS mechanism lets a sender reserve the channel by sending an RTS packet
first. Once the receiver replies with a CTS packet, the sender transmits the data packet. The
RTS packet specifies a network allocation vector (NAV), which is the total time duration it
wants to reserve, including the time durations of the CTS, the data and the ACK.
The data payload in an RTS packet consists of 20 bytes or 160 bits, and we denote it as
an RTS data vector b ∈ [0, 1]160 , where [0, 1]160 is the space for all vectors with length 160,
whose element is either 0 or 1. At the PHY layer, the data vector b is interleaved, coded
and modulated into a signal vector x ∈ X , where X is the set of all values of x. These
processes together can be denoted as a one-to-one function mapping f : [0, 1]160 → X , which
converts the RTS data vector b to the RTS signal vector x = f (b). As f is one-to-one
correspondence, |X | = 2160 (| · | denotes the cardinality, or the number of elements, of a set).
We observe that all RTS data vectors in [0, 1]160 are not equally probable in the real
world because all data fields in RTS are well structured and specified.
• FrameControl contains 2 bytes specified in 802.11.
• Duration is the 2-byte NAV in microseconds. The last bit is set to 0 and thus it holds
up to 215 values.
• RA and TA (6 bytes each) are the destination and source addresses, respectively. As
today’s WiFi is widely used for Internet access, stations communicate mostly with the
AP. The AP knows that RA in an RTS packet sent to it is its own address and TA
should be the address of one of its stations. Suppose that a dense network can support
26 stations (e.g., Linksys EA8500 firmware supports up to 51 stations [102]) and the
number of possible values of TA in RTS is 26 .
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Figure 3.1. Example: distribution of RTS signal vectors.

• FCS (4 bytes) is for error detection and relies on other data fields. It provides no
additional information.
Thus, from the AP’s perspective, the number of RTS data vectors of interest is 215 (from
Duration) × 26 (from RA/TA) = 221 in the full RTS vector space [0, 1]160 . As a result,
the number of RTS signal vectors of interest is also 221 in the signal vector space X with
|X | = 2160 . If we index all vectors in X from 1 to 2160 and measure via the probability
distribution how each vector is likely to be seen in the real world, we will obtain a combshaped distribution similar to the example shown in Figure 3.1. We call an RTS signal
vector a tooth vector if the probability that it can be seen at the AP is positive. Although
the index goes from 1 to 2160 in Figure 3.1, the number of tooth vectors should be no less
than 221 according to our analysis. The comb-shaped distribution is in evident contrast to
the traditional decoding assumption (also illustrated in Figure 3.1) that all potential values
of a signal vector are equally probable [66]. This opens a door for us to go beyond traditional
decoding to resolve RTS collisions.
3.2.3 Idea of Collision Resolution
Based on the observation from Figure 3.1, we present the basic idea regarding how to
resolve an RTS collision.
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3.2.3.1 Problem Reformulation
Denote by M = {mi }i∈[1,M ] (M = |M|) the set of tooth vectors. Define the comb matrix
M = [m1 , m2 , · · · , mM ] (i.e., each column in M is a tooth vector). The AP can pre-construct
the comb matrix M by inserting all possible RTS to M to form the columns. The AP’s goal
is to find exactly which ones in M are actually involved in the collision.
Mathematically, we reformulate the collision problem to an equivalent one: assume that
all tooth vectors in M are transmitted to the AP, but they go through different wireless
channels. In particular, the tooth vectors involved in the actual collision go through the
wireless channels with realistic channel gains, but those not involved in the collision go
through the channels with zero channel gains. For example, in Figure 3.2, Alice, Bob and
other users have different tooth vectors. The received signal y is considered as the sum of all
these tooth vectors weighted by different channel gains. The channel gain weight of a tooth
vector is the realistic channel gain if it is indeed transmitted, and zero otherwise. If Alice’s
transmitted signal is m1 , the channel gain weight g1 for m1 is the real channel gain between
Alice and the AP, and the weights for the rest of Alice’s tooth vectors are all zeros (e.g.,
g2 = 0 as Alice transmits m1 not m2 ). As such, the received signal y can be reformulated as

y=

M
X
i=1

mi gi = [m1 , m2 , · · · , mM ] [g1 , g2 , · · · , gM ] T ,
{z
} |
{z
}
|
comb matrix M

(3.2)

channel gain weight vector g

where g is called the channel gain weight vector and ·T denotes the matrix transpose. Based
on (3.2), collision resolution is equivalent to solving for unknown g given y and M. Then,
the tooth vectors actually involved in the collision correspond to non-zero elements in the
solved g.
3.2.3.2 Solution Based on Reformulation
There are two key observations on the reformulation in (3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Reformulation of network collision.

• The unknown channel gain weight vector g is sparse in a real-world network because of
two reasons: (i) There is no self-collision. As shown in Figure 3.2, if Alice sends a tooth
vector m1 , we have g1 6= 0; and any other tooth vector belonging to Alice will have
a zero channel gain weight (e.g., g2 = 0) since there is no way Alice transmits both
m1 and m2 . (ii) Because of the random backoff in WiFi, a collision is likely caused by
only several users transmitting at the same time. Thus, g should include only several
non-zero elements.
• The comb matrix M should exhibit a nearly random matrix property. Each tooth
vector mi in M is mapped from an RTS data vector through interleaving and errorcorrection coding. Their main purpose is to scramble and re-map all bits into a larger
bit space in a (nearly) random way such that the error-correction performance approaches the random coding performance in Shannon’s capacity [78].
Given the sparse property and nearly random matrix property, the channel gain weight
vector g should be recovered with high probability by L1 -norm minimization according to
the theory of compressive sensing [103, 104, 105]. Thus, resolving an RTS collision leads to

57

the following optimization.
Given:
Objective:

comb matrix M and received signal y,

(3.3)

gsolution = arg minkgk1 , subject to y = Mg,

where kgk1 is the L1 -norm of g (i.e., kgk1 =

P

gi ∈g

|gi |).

The theoretical framework lays out a promising path towards resolving RTS collisions.
Although the L1 -norm minimization in (3.3) can be solved by many efficient algorithms
[106, 107, 108, 27, 26], directly applying (3.3) to collision resolution incurs an unbearable
cost because the comb matrix M consists of up to 221 = 2, 097, 152 tooth vectors according
to our initial analysis in Section 3.2.2. Thus, significant challenges exist to make collision
resolution meaningful and practical.
3.3

Construction of Comb Matrix
The initial step towards our CombDec design is to find a way to reduce the size of

the comb matrix M (that can include 221 tooth vectors) for a low-cost solution. In this
section, we analyze the 802.11 standard, firmware and packet traces to show that there is a
feasible way to significantly reduce the size of 221 . Then, we design two algorithms, (α, β)construction and γ-decimation, to reduce 221 to only a few hundreds, while maintaining the
high performance for collision resolution. The use of (α, β)-construction and γ-decimation
clears the major hurdle towards system implementation.
3.3.1 Standard and Firmware Based Analysis
As aforementioned in Section 3.2.2, M consists of 221 tooth vectors because of Duration
and RA/TA fields in RTS. The Duration field specifies the 15-bit NAV in microseconds with
215 = 32, 768 potential values, which largely contribute to the size of M. 802.11 specifies that
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the NAV is computed as one data packet duration, plus one CTS, one ACK, and three SIFS
durations. Given a network setup, SIFS, CTS and ACK durations are usually fixed (e.g.,
SIFS is fixed to be 16 µs in 802.11ac at 5GHz). Thus, the value space of the NAV depends
dominantly on the value space of the time duration of a data packet. In 802.11, the time
duration of a data packet is bounded by aPPDUMaxTime, the maximum time duration of
a data packet (in µs), and indirectly bounded by aPSDUMaxLength, the maximum payload
length of a data packet (in bytes). As aPPDUMaxTime for 802.11ac is 5, 484µs, the space
size of the NAV is reduced from 32,768 to at most 5,484 in the 802.11ac network.
Today’s WiFi chipsets may still avoid transmitting a long packet (close to 5, 484µs)
due to the cost consideration or hardware limitations. Hence, drivers implement their own
packet length constraints on a data packet, which is usually less than the standard-defined
aPSDUMaxLength or aPPDUMaxTime. We perform comprehensive code analysis on WiFi
drivers and find that different vendors indeed pose different constraints on their own chipset,
further limiting the value selection of the NAV. The detailed firmware analysis can be found
in Appendix A.
As a result, we can leverage these constraints to further reduce the value space of the
NAV in RTS. However, many WiFi drivers (in particular 802.11ac ones) are still proprietary
and distributed in the binary form. It is not practical to study every WiFi chipset/firmware
and optimally minimize the value space of the NAV in RTS packets. In what follows, we
analyze real-world packet traces to develop a generic way to narrow down the value space.
3.3.2 Packet Trace Based Analysis
The key to reducing the size of the comb matrix is through shrinking the value space
of NAV in RTS. We have shown that a WiFi driver can restrain the value space of NAV.
Moreover, implementation-dependent rate control and data aggregation in proprietary WiFi
drivers are not likely to produce uniformly distributed NAV values, but may be more biased
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Figure 3.3. Percentages of data packets protected by RTS.

towards certain selections and yield a NAV distribution similar to Figure 3.1. Our objective
is to collect massive packet traces to understand the NAV distribution. Then, we create
generic algorithms to select those NAVs that are the most likely to be seen for constructing
the comb matrix M.
The first step towards understanding the NAV distribution in real-world RTS packets is
to collect a substantially large number of packet traces for analysis. As no set of 802.11ac
packet data is publicly available, we conducted our own measurements and collected in total
1.3 TB packet trace data with 2.33 billion packets in realistic environments, including (i) a
public library (65.21 GB), (ii) three academic conferences (31.14 GB), (iii) five residential
communities (65.69 GB), (iv) three major-brand hotels (109.48 GB), (v) four major US
airports (88.5 GB), (vi) a university research lab (938.81 GB). The library, conference, and
airport data traces were measured only within the business hours (i.e., 9am–5pm). Note
that the payloads of all data packet were removed after the collection to avoid the privacy
concern.
Figure 3.3 shows the the percentages of data packets that are protected by RTS among
all data packets collected in different scenarios. Although a typical RTS threshold is set
to around 2300 bytes [17, 18, 19, 20, 21], we see from Figure 3.3 that data packets of less
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Figure 3.4. Distribution of NAVs from (a) the airport and (b) Belkin devices in all datasets.

than 2300 bytes are still likely to be protected by RTS. For example, in the hotel scenario,
78.55% data packets are initiated by RTS even when their lengths are less than 2300 bytes.
Moreover, around 70% - 90% data packets of over 2300 bytes are protected by RTS in
different scenarios. Overall, we observe from Figure 3.3 that RTS is still intensively used in
today’s Wi-Fi networks.
Looking into the NAV values in RTS packets, we observe that these values are unevenly
distributed. For example, Figure 3.4(a) shows the NAV distribution of RTS packets in the
airport dataset, which reveals that many NAV values (particularly around 230 µs) are much
more likely to be observed than the others. The NAV distribution also depends on a WiFi
driver. For example, Figure 3.4(b) plots the distribution of the Belkin WiFi driver measured
from RTS packets sent by Belkin devices (recognized by MAC addresses) in all datasets.
The figure shows that the distribution is quite patterned, indicating that the driver has
several NAV levels to construct payloads. We observe uneven or patterned distributions in
all datasets and offer a more detailed analysis in Appendix A.
Thus, if we only choose the most likely NAV values (instead of all possible values) to
construct the comb matrix M, the size of M should be substantially reduced. In addition,
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our design should not be device/firmware specific. For example, it may be possible to select
NAV values based on the pattern of Belkin devices in Figure 3.4(b). But this method is
too cumbersome because we have to examine the behaviors of all different WiFi devices.
Our strategy is to use an online algorithm that actively computes the NAV distribution of
a device, and then selects the most likely NAV values from the computed distribution to
construct the comb matrix M.
3.3.3 The (α, β)-Construction Algorithm
To select the most likely NAV values to construct M, a node (either the AP or a station)
should store the distribution of the NAV values in RTS packets from every other node in
a network. In addition, the node should keep updating the storage to account for nodes
joining or leaving the network. To this end, we propose the (α, β)-construction algorithm
running at individual nodes to construct M.
3.3.3.1 Algorithm Design
For a node that runs the algorithm, it records the frequency (i.e. the number of appearances) of a NAV value in RTS packets transmitted by every other node in the network.
When a new RTS packet with a NAV value is decoded, the node will increase the frequency
of that NAV value by one in its local storage. There are two key factors α and β in the
algorithm.
• For the coverage factor α, for every other node in the network, the algorithm selects
the α NAV values with the highest frequencies to form the tooth vectors and the comb
matrix.
• For the forgetting factor β, the algorithm decreases the frequencies of all NAV values by
β every minute. The minimum frequency is always set to be zero. And if the frequencies
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of all NAV values associated with a node become zero, the node’s information will be
all removed from the storage as it is considered no longer active or out of the network.
The (α, β)-construction algorithm works differently for the AP and stations. Figure 3.5
shows how it works at the AP: the AP stores the frequency of each possible NAV value from
each station. When a collision happens at the AP, it knows the collision must be due to
at least two stations (which could be Alice, Bob, or others) transmitting to it. Thus, the
AP selects the α most likely NAV values from Alice, constructs an RTS data vector using
each of these values, together with Alice’s MAC address as TA and its own MAC address as
RA, then maps each RTS data vector by function f (including interleaving, error-correction
coding, modulation, IFFT) in Section 3.2.2 to a signal vector (which is a tooth vector in the
comb matrix M). Then, the AP repeats the same process for Bob and all other stations to
finally obtain the full M.
A station’s construction of the comb matrix differs from the AP. For example, as shown
in Figure 3.6, Alice observes a collision (a) when two other stations Bob and Carol are
transmitting to the AP, (b) when one other station Bob is transmitting to the AP and
at the same time the AP is transmitting to a third station Carol, or (c) when the AP is
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Figure 3.6. Different collision scenarios in Alice’s view.

transmitting to Alice while Bob and Carol are transmitting to the AP. In all three cases,
collision resolution is only meaningful for Alice in case (c) because the collision in case (c)
includes the AP’s signal intended for Alice. Even when Alice successfully resolves cases (a)
and (b), Alice only knows that there is no signal of interest and then stops. Therefore, the
construction is sufficient for Alice as long as case (c) can be resolved by Alice. According to
case (c), a station should construct the comb matrix by using RTS signal vectors from the
AP to itself and other RTS signal vectors from other stations to the AP. The construction
process is similar to Figure 3.5.
3.3.3.2 Selections of (α, β) and Cost Evaluations
The size of the resultant comb matrix M depends on both α and β. In particular, α is
the number of tooth vectors from one node, and β in fact determines how many nodes will
be used in constructing M because (i) all frequencies are decreased by β every minute and
(ii) a node will be removed from the construction when all its frequencies become zero. The
algorithm with a larger β forgets nodes faster, thereby reducing the number of nodes used
for constructing M.
The performance of (α, β)-construction can be evaluated by the miss rate, defined as the
probability that when an RTS packet arrives at a node, M constructed by the algorithm at
the node does not include the NAV value in the RTS packet. A large α and a small β are
able to reduce the miss rate, but at the same time increase the size of M, incurring more
cost.
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Table 3.1. Miss rate and average size of the comb matrix.
α=600
β=10
Library
Conferences
Apartments
Hotels
Airports
Lab

Miss rate
6.9
3.6
1.5
0.7
8.8
5.7

%
%
%
%
%
%

Ave. # of
nodes
12.8
11.6
6.5
10.3
18.8
6.3

# of tooth
vectors in M
7680
6960
3900
6180
11280
3780

Our objective is to find the pair of (α, β) to balance the miss rate and the complexity
for general WiFi scenarios. To this end, we simulate a WiFi network in each of the packet
datasets, replay all collected packets to simulate RTS arrivals at each node, and measure the
miss rate of the algorithm with different values of α and β. Table 3.1 shows one selection of
(α, β)=(600, 10) for all scenarios that achieves a good balance between the miss rate and the
size of M (measured by α multiplying the average number of nodes used for constructing
M). We can see that all miss rates are below 9% with around 4,000–12,000 tooth vectors in
M.
3.3.4 The γ-Decimation Algorithm
Through 802.11 standard analysis, firmware analysis, packet trace analysis and (α, β)construction, we have dramatically shrink the size of M from the initial 2,097,152 tooth
vectors to 12,000 or fewer vectors. All these push the optimization in (3.3) to the practice.
However, finding the L1 -norm minimization with 12, 000 vectors in (3.3) still incurs a substantial cost. We propose γ-decimation to further reduce such a cost while maintaining the
high performance.
Denote by M the number of tooth vectors in M constructed by (α, β)-construction. The
basic idea of the γ-decimation algorithm (γ > 1 is called decimation rate) is to select, based
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on the received signal vector y, M/γ vectors out of all M tooth vectors in M to form a
decimated comb matrix M′ .
The design intuition is that the received signal y contains only several tooth vectors in M
that we aim to find out. If we compute the correlation between y and each tooth vector mi
H
in M, defined as C(y, mi ) = kmH
i yk2 (· denotes conjugate transpose and k · k2 denotes the

L2 -norm), we then obtain M correlation values. Due to the property of correlation, we should
observe a high correlation value if a tooth vector is indeed included in y, and a low correlation
value otherwise. However, due to channel noise and limited length of tooth vectors, some
tooth vectors not in y may also exhibit high correlation values. But it is not necessary to
exactly identify which tooth vectors with high correlation values are indeed in y at this stage,
γ-decimation just chooses M/γ tooth vectors that have the highest correlation values to form
the decimated comb matrix M′ . It is very likely that tooth vectors involved in the collision
are included in M′ as long as M/γ is sufficiently large. We provide theoretical analysis for
the performance of γ-decimation and show that all RTS signals involving a collision will
survive the decimation and be included in M′ with high probability in Appendix A.
As a result, the final comb matrix for (3.3) is constructed as follows: (i) (α, β)-construction
constructs the comb matrix M with M tooth vectors (this steps ensures a low miss rate), (ii)
γ-decimation decimates M into the decimated comb matrix M′ with only M/γ tooth vectors
(this steps ensures that tooth vectors involving the actual collision are preserved with high
probability), and (iii) the decimated comb matrix M′ is used in (3.3) for collision resolution
to finally identify which tooth vectors are included in the collided signal y.
To make (3.3) feasible for today’s systems, M′ should have only hundreds of tooth vectors.
As (α, β)-construction maintains up to around 12, 000 vectors (shown in Table 3.1), the
decimation rate γ should be around 12 or more.
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3.3.5 Complexity Analysis
In the following, we estimate the computational complexity and storage complexity of
CombDec.
3.3.5.1 Computational Complexity
We evaluate CombDec’s complexity by comparing it with a benchmark, which is the
complexity to decode a typical 802.11 data packet with 40MHz bandwidth, 3/4 convolutional coding, and 64QAM. We describe the major computational operations involved in the
benchmark and CombDec.
• The benchmark complexity is proportional to the data payload length, denoted by N
bytes. Decoding a data packet requires the FFT and Viterbi algorithms. The packet
contains 0.0247N OFDM symbols plus 4 PHY headers symbols. The FFT on each
symbol requires 64 log(128) complex multiplications and 128 log(128) complex additions [109]. In addition, the Viterbi algorithm incurs 4K (10.67N + 252) real additions
and 2K (10.67N +252) real comparisons, where K is the constraint length of convolutional code [110].
• In CombDec, suppose (α, β)-construction maintains M tooth vectors of length L, the
correlation of the received signal with each of the tooth vector in γ-decimation needs
a total of ML complex additions and multiplications. Among all correlation values,
selecting the M/γ largest values incurs M + M log(M)/γ comparisons by using the
max heap tree approach [111]. The complexity of L1 minimization depends on an
iterative algorithm and is bounded by the cubic polynomial complexity [107]. In order
to estimate an exact computational cost, we use simulations to run the primal-dual
interior-point algorithm [25] to solve the L1 -norm minimization in M/γ tooth vectors
and compute the average numbers of additions, multiplications and comparisons.
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Figure 3.7. Number of cycles: CombDec vs benchmark.

As the complexity involves different types of operations, including additions, multiplications and comparisons. We need to have a unified cost utility metric to measure the overall
costs of CombDec and the benchmark. We use the number of general CPU cycles as the
utility metric [112]. In particular, one real addition or comparison is counted as one cycle
and one multiplication is 4 cycles [112]; and a complex operation is 4 times the number of
cycles incurred by its real counterpart [109]. Note that an algorithm or a computational
operation can be specifically optimized on a particular signal processing software or hardware platform. Our estimation using CPU cycles is not intended to be exactly accurate
for an implementation platform, but serves as an approximate way to demonstrate what
computational complexity level CombDec is at when compared with the benchmark.
Figure 3.7 shows the total numbers of cycles incurred by CombDec and the benchmark.
In Figure 3.7, we let (α, β)-construction form M = 12, 000 tooth vectors to accommodate
the airport scenario in Table 3.1 and set a typical constraint length K = 7 in the Viterbi
Algorithm. It is observed from Figure 3.7 that choosing γ to be in [20, 50] leads to the
complexity of CombDec roughly equivalent to decoding a packet with 1000–3000 bytes,
which makes CombDec ready for system implementation.
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3.3.5.2 Storage Complexity
CombDec also incurs a storage cost. First, CombDec for a device must store the frequency
of each NAV value for any other active device in the network. The cost of storing all NAV
frequencies is equal to the NAV space size multiplying the average number of active devices.
There are 5,484 possible NAV values in 802.11ac and around 18.8 active nodes under (α, β)
construction for the airport scenario (shown in Table 3.1). Hence, the storage cost is 5484
× 18.8 × 1 = 101 KB when the frequency value is a one-byte integer. Second, after γdecimation, all tooth vectors should be stored for L1 -minimization. The storage cost is the
number of tooth vectors multiplying the length of a tooth vector. When γ ∈ [20, 50], the
number of decimated tooth vectors in the airport scenario is 240 to 600. If a typical RTS
packet is transmitted at 12 Mbps (4 64-subcarrier OFDM symbols) and the element in tooth
vector is a 4-byte complex number, the length of a tooth vector is 64 × 4 × 4 = 1 KB. Thus,
the cost of storing all these tooth vectors is in the range of [240, 600] KB.
Overall, the major storage cost is around [341, 701] KB. This cost is also reasonable for
today’s WiFi systems. For example, Qualcomm’s 802.11ac chipset IPQ4018 has an on-chip
memory of 256 MB [113] and related APs cost as low as tens of dollars [114, 115].
3.4

CombDec System Design
The (α, β)-construction and γ-decimation algorithms pave the way for a feasible system

solution to (3.3). In this section, we present CombDec system design. We first introduce the
system architecture, then describe each key component.
We design CombDec as an independent decoder in addition to the traditional 802.11
decoder. Figure 3.8 shows four major components in CombDec: the prologue module, (α,β)construction, γ-decimation, collision resolution, and the epilogue module. As shown in Figure
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Figure 3.8. Architecture of CombDec decoder.

3.8, CombDec is triggered only when decoding of either the PHY header or the PHY payload
fails. In the following, we present the designs of individual CombDec Components.
3.4.1 The Prologue Module
The prologue module does all pre-processing before collision resolution.
3.4.1.1 Combining Multi-path Signal Components
The received signal may include a number of multi-path components with different time
offsets. To improve the performance of CombDec under multi-path fading, we use the maximum ratio combining (MRC) [66] to combine the multi-path signal components. Specifically,
denote by s(n) the n-th time-domain symbol in the received signal. Based on the 802.11
packet preamble, we use a matched filer [16, 116] to detect the time offset and estimate the
channel gain of each signal component. Given K components found, we use the MRC [66] to
P
∗
coherently sum all K time-shifted copies of s(n) and obtain s′ (n) = K
k=1 hk s(n + δk ), where

k-th component having time offset δk and channel gain hk , and h∗k is the complex conjugate
of hk . Note that signal components may be from different senders in a collision, CombDec
does not differentiate them in the prologue module.
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3.4.1.2 Collision Recognition and Early Stop
Next, CombDec decides if s′ (n) can be potentially resolved. There are three types of
collisions: RTS-only, RTS-data (involving at least one RTS packet and one data packet),
and data-only collisions. CombDec will stop if the collision belongs to data-only collision.
Note that the recognition does not need to be 100% accurate, it simply provides a way to
exclude obvious data-only collisions that cannot be resolved by CombDec.
In WiFi networks, the beginnings of collided packet transmissions are roughly aligned
because of CSMA/CA (if we do not consider the hidden terminal problem). Thus, we
measure the time durations of different power levels of the received signal to identify the
type of a collision. According to 802.11, the data rate for RTS is selected by a station from a
limited set of basic rates defined by the AP (e.g., 12 Mbps and 24 Mbps are widely observed
in our packet traces). Thus, a RTS time duration can be measured by a very limited number
of OFDM symbol durations, e.g., 3 (or 4) OFDM symbol durations for 24 (or 12) Mbps. We
record the time duration li , from the beginning of the signal s′ (n), to the position in s′ (n)
where the i-th signal power change happens and is larger than a threshold ∆. When the
power level reaches the noise floor, we stop and obtain a set of time durations L = {li }i∈[1,|L|].
We consider a collision as (i) RTS-only if each value in L is close to one of the RTS durations
corresponding to the basic rate set defined by the AP, (ii) RTS-data if one value is close to
an RTS duration and any other value is not close to any of the RTS durations, and (iii) dataonly otherwise. Figure 3.9(a) shows an example of RTS-only collision, where two measured
time durations occupy 3 and 4 OFDM symbol durations, respectively, which is recognized
as the collision of two RTS packets with different rates.

71

Power (dB)

Device 1
10

l2=4 symbols

Short
tooth
vector

l1=3 symbols

5
1
2

padding

0
0
1000
2000
Position in Received Signal

(a)

Device 2

...
...
...

...
...
...
0 0

0

Long
tooth
vector

...

Comb matrix M

(b)

Figure 3.9. Power level changes in the received signal and padding in matrix construction.

3.4.2 The Collision Resolution Module
The prologue module outputs either RTS-only or RTS-data signals for collision resolution,
(α, β) construction will construct every tooth vectors for the comb matrix. As devices in a
network may use different basic rates to transmit RTS packets (leading to different lengths
of tooth vectors), CombDec zero-pads the shorter tooth vectors with higher data rates to
form the complete comb matrix M used for collision resolution. Figure 3.9(b) shows an
example of constructing the comb matrix M by zero-padding shorter tooth vectors. Then,
M is γ-decimated to M′ , which is used in the primal-dual algorithm [25] that solves the L1 minimization in (3.3). Note that if a collision is RTS-data, the module resolves the collided
RTS signal vectors by treating any data signal as the noise, and then leaves the potential
decoding of data for the epilogue module.
3.4.3 The Epilogue Module
The collision resolution module yields a small set of potential RTS signal vectors involved
in the collision, denoted by R. There are still important questions left: (i) Which RTS in R
a receiver should choose to reply with CTS? (ii) Can we decode the data in the presence of
an RTS-data collision? (iii) Moreover, we also need an error detection mechanism to ensure
the collision is correctly resolved because errors may happen in CombDec. We first describe
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how CombDec chooses data or RTS. The AP and stations have different decision making
processes.
3.4.3.1 Decision Making at AP
The AP observes a collision when multiple stations transmit to the AP at the same time.
• Choosing the RTS with the largest NAV: if the collision is RTS-only, the AP chooses
the RTS of the largest NAV to reply with CTS. Note that we intend to maximize
the channel utilization in this way. A more advanced policy (e.g., considering the
utilization and fairness) can be designed and adopted going beyond the main scope of
this chapter.
• Choosing data over RTS: If the collision is RTS-data, the AP first decodes all RTS
packets in the collision resolution module, then proceeds to decode the data. If the
data is successfully decoded, the AP chooses data over RTS and sends back the ACK
to the sender of the data. This is because data packets are usually longer than RTS
packets. Giving priority to data should improve the channel utilization.
3.4.3.2 Decision Making at Stations
A station observes a collision when multiple other nodes (either other stations or the AP)
transmit at the same time. As shown in Figure 3.6(c), a station only cares about the AP’s
signal transmitted to it.
• If R includes an RTS vector from the AP to the station, the collision is due to the AP
transmitting to the station and at the same time at least one other station transmitting
to the AP, the station always sends CTS to the AP.
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• Otherwise, there is no RTS in R intended for the station. If the collision is RTSdata, the station proceeds to decode the data because the data may be intended for it;
otherwise, the station stops.
3.4.3.3 Error Checking and Data Decoding
Once a decision is made (choosing RTS or data), we must ensure there is no error with the
chosen RTS or we must proceed to decode the data. How to proceed with error checking and
data decoding? We find that a traditional 802.11 receiver, as shown in Figure 3.8, already
has a PHY payload decoder with the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) mechanism. Thus,
we should leverage the existing architecture to perform the decoding and error checking to
minimize the complexity of CombDec.
As a result, if CombDec decides to act on a particular RTS signal or to decode a data
signal, it uses interference cancelation to remove all other signals from the collided signal.
Specifically, if a decision is to decode the data, CombDec removes all RTS signal vectors in R
P
from the received signal s′ (n) and write the resultant signal as s′c (n) = s′c (n) − |R|
i=1 ri (n)gi ,

where ri (n) and gi are the n-th element and the channel gain weight of the i-th RTS tooth
vector in R, respectively. Similarly, if the decision is to act on the j-th RTS vector (i.e.,
choose the j-th RTS in R to reply with CTS), CombDec removes all other RTS tooth vectors
P|R|
from the s′ (n) and the resultant signal becomes s′c (n) = s′c (n) − i=1,i6=j ri (n)gi .

Finally, the signal s′c (n) goes from CombDec into the traditional PHY payload decoder,

which performs decoding and error checking, then passes the correct RTS or data to the
MAC layer for protocol processing (e.g., replying with CTS). In addition, the MAC address
and data rate information of a correct RTS packet is stored and its NAV value is also updated
in (α, β)-construction as shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.10. Environment for experiments.

3.5

Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of CombDec. We first introduce the experi-

mental setups, then measure the performance benefits CombDec brings to WiFi networks.
3.5.1 Setups
3.5.1.1 Testbed Implementation
We have implemented the prototype of CombDec on 20 USRP X310/300 devices. Each
device is equipped with two UBX-160 daughterboards and two VERT 2450 antennas. We
implement a basic 802.11ac PHY-MAC architecture with 20-MHz settings: 64 OFDM subcarriers (including 48 data subcarriers), BPSK, QPSK, 16QAM, and 64QAM modulations,
Alamouti code based MIMO, and convolutional coding at the PHY layer, and CSMA/CA
scheme with an initial contention window size of 8 [11] at the MAC layer. Control packets
including RTS, CTS, and ACK are also implemented.
3.5.1.2 Experimental Settings
We aim to measure the performance of CombDec in a realistic indoor environment inside
a campus building shown in Figure 3.10. Network nodes are placed at various locations and
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transmit packets whose contents are generated according to our collected 802.11ac packet
traces.
Note that we do not implement the 256QAM modulation as we found no single packet
using a data rate associated with 256QAM in all collected packet traces. This does not
severely affect the performance evaluation since 256QAM is intended only for very high SNR
conditions.
We use the following default settings for experiments (unless otherwise specified): (i) all
nodes are saturated; i.e., they always have packets to transmit; (ii) α=600, β=10, and γ=20
for CombDec; (iii) the airport dataset is used to generate packets as it represents the most
crowded condition in all datasets; (iv) all nodes have the same transmit power.
3.5.1.3 Evaluation Metrics
We use the following metrics to evaluate the real-time performance of CombDec.
• Success probability of collision resolution is defined as the probability that CombDec
recovers exactly all collided RTS signals. The recovery will be considered as a failure if
CombDec recovers only a subset of collided RTS signals or mis-identifies an RTS signal
not involved in the collision.
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• Normalized throughput (or utilization efficiency), is defined as the percentage of the
time duration on the wireless channel that is used to deliver data packets. An ideal
network should have a normalized throughput of 1. However, control signals (e.g.,
RTS/CTS) and collisions deteriorate the throughput. We aim to show how much
channel utilization efficiency CombDec can improve via resolving RTS collisions.
• Throughput gain ratio, defined as the ratio between the increased normalized throughput from traditional 802.11 decoding to CombDec and the normalized throughput
under traditional decoding. Throughput gain ratio can directly reflect how CombDec
improves the network performance.

3.5.2 Success Probability
We first evaluate the success probability of CombDec for collision resolution. In this
evaluation, multiple nodes only transmit RTS packets to the AP placed at location 0 in
Figure 3.10, where the success probability is measured.
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3.5.2.1 Impact of Number of Transmissions
We evaluate CombDec’s ability to resolve collisions due to two and more transmissions.
To this end, we place multiple transmitters at location 1, which send RTS packets at the
same time to the AP at location 0. Figure 3.11 shows the success probabilities that the AP
resolves the collision under 2–6 transmitters. The success probability is computed for every
1,000 packets received. It is noted from Figure 3.11 that as the total number of received
packets at the AP increases, CombDec gradually gains the NAV information in RTS packets,
and thus the success probability also increases and finally remains stable. It is also observed
that CombDec is able to resolve 98% of two-node collisions and 86% of three-node collisions.
The performance degrades when the number of transmitters increases. However, a collision
caused by 5 or more WiFi nodes is much less frequent because of the random backoff in
CSMA/CA.
3.5.2.2 Values of α and β
We evaluate the impacts of α and β on the success probability. We place two nodes at
location 1 that transmit RTS packets at the same time to the AP at location 0. Figure 3.12
shows that as α goes from 200 to 600, the success probability increases from 0.28 to 0.98;
and further increase of α will not substantially improve the success probability. Figure 3.13
shows the impact of β on the success probability. We observe that when β increases from 10
to 60 (i.e., CombDec forgets the history faster), the success probability reduces from 0.98 to
0.77. From both figures, we can see that the uniform selection of α = 600 and β = 10 yield
very high performance for the airport scenario, and accordingly are also suitable for other
less crowded scenarios.

79

0.4
0.3

0 5 10 15 20 25 30
RTS Threshold ( 100 bytes)

One-network
Two-network

CombDec
decoder

0.6
0.5

Traditional
decoder

0.4
0.3

2300

0
2300
RTS Threshold (bytes)

0

0.6
0.5

Best case of CombDec
Best case of Traditional

0.4
0.3
Lib.

Normalized Throughput

0.5

0.7

Normalized Throughput

0.6

Traditional
CombDec

Normalized Throughput

Normalized Throughput

0.7

Lab Apt. Air. Conf. Hot.
Scenario

0.5
0.48
0.46
0.44
200

Not store other info
Store other info

400
600
Coverage Factor

800

Figure 3.19. Through- Figure 3.20. Through- Figure 3.21. Through- Figure 3.22. Storing
puts with different puts in collocated net- puts in collocated net- information of other
thresholds
works.
works.
network.
3.5.2.3 Value of γ
We adopt the same setup in Figure 3.13 to evaluate the impact of γ. Figure 3.14 illustrates
that gradually increasing γ does not severely decrease the success probabilities. For example,
when γ becomes 30, the success probability reduces to 0.831. This indicates that adjusting
γ can smoothly balance the performance and the implementation cost.
3.5.2.4 Impact of Zero-Padding
In each of our packet datasets, we find that a majority of RTS packets are transmitted
at the same data rate; however, RTS packets with different rates do exist. These packets
have different lengths of 2, 3, or 4 OFDM symbols. Therefore, a minority of collisions
involving RTS packets with different rates. CombDec uses zero-padding to solve this issue
as discussed in Section 3.4. We measure the ability of CombDec to resolve such a type
of collisions. Hence, we place two nodes at location 1 sending RTS packets with different
lengths to the AP. Figure 3.15 shows that the success probabilities remain approximately the
same when RTS packets have different lengths in a collision. From Figure 3.15, we conclude
that CombDec has no difficulty in resolving this type of collisions.
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3.5.2.5 RTS-Data Collisions
CombDec also attempts to resolve an RTS-data collision via canceling the RTS signal
from the received signal and then performing decoding. To evaluate such an ability, we place
one node (node 1) at location 1 to send RTS to the AP, and place another node (node 2) at
one of locations 1–8 to send data to the AP for the first round of experiments, and then let
node 1 send data and node 2 send RTS for the second round. The first and second rounds
represent the scenarios in which the receiving power of RTS is greater than and less than that
of data, respectively. We consider the collision is resolved when both RTS and data packets
are decoded successfully. Figure 3.16 depicts the success probability of collision resolution as
node 2’s location changes. The figure shows that generally, the success probability is higher
when the receiving power of RTS is higher than that of data. This is because CombDec first
treats any data packet as the noise to recover any RTS packet from the receiving signal.
The results demonstrate that CombDec, primarily designed to handle RTS-only collisions,
is capable of resolving RTS-data collisions in some scenarios.
3.5.3 Network Performance Evaluation
We then evaluate the benefits of CombDec for the network performance. Note that it is
impossible to measure the network performance with CombDec under different setups at the
same time because the resolution of a collision directly affects follow-on network dynamics.
We have to measure the performance under different setups over non-overlapping measurement periods. Therefore, we conduct experiments during off-business hours to minimize the
impact of environmental factors on different measurement periods.
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3.5.3.1 Single Network Scenario
We first consider a single-network scenario where 12 nodes are placed at locations 0–11,
in which the AP is at location 8, as shown in Figure 3.10. The network does not run in the
MU-MIMO mode (i.e., the AP does not transmit data via MU-MIMO to multiple stations
in the downlink). The RTS threshold is set to be 2,300 bytes for all nodes (i.e., RTS is
triggered only when a data packet to be transmitted has a length over 2,300 bytes). The
value of 2,300 is typical for today’s WiFi products (e.g., the default value in Cisco APs is
2347 [17]).
For the throughput improvement, Figure 3.17 demonstrates the comparisons of normalized throughputs under traditional 802.11 decoding and CombDec. Note that the throughput
performance is always measured at the AP. We can see that CombDec is able to uniformly
boost the performance of traditional 802.11 decoding. For example, the normalized throughput for the airport scenario increases from 0.43 to 0.53, leading to a throughput gain ratio of
(0.53 - 0.43)/0.43 = 23.3%. In all different scenarios, we observe that the throughput gain
ratio under CombDec is 11.6%–23.3%.
For the improvement by tuning α and γ, we aim to find if we can improve the performance
by tuning α and γ, which are important factors to balance the performance and complexity.
Figure 3.18 shows the normalized throughputs for various α and γ values in the airport
scenario. The figure shows that keeping increasing α and decreasing γ do not always lead to
evident improvement. For example, when α goes from 600 to 800 and γ decreases from 20
to 10, the throughput under CombDec only increases from 0.491 to 0.494.
For the improvement by reducing RTS threshold, it is still possible to further improve
the network performance. Our observation is that traditionally, an RTS collision is considered not resolvable; therefore, many WiFi devices are conservative to set the RTS threshold.
The transmission of a data packet triggers an RTS transmission only when its data size is

82

greater than the threshold. In all previous experiments, the threshold is set as a typical
value of 2,300 for today’s networks. Now CombDec has the capability of decoding RTS
collisions; therefore, it can be beneficial to encourage more RTS transmissions by reducing
the threshold. Figure 3.19 compares the normalized throughputs under traditional 802.11
decoding and CombDec for different RTS thresholds. The figure shows that reducing the
threshold generally decreases the throughput performance under traditional decoding; however and interestingly, it substantially boosts the performance under CombDec. The best
case for traditional decoding is to set the threshold as 2000–2500, resulting in a normalized
throughput of 0.456. By contrast, the best case for CombDec is to remove the threshold
and let everyone always send RTS before data, yielding a higher throughput of 0.657. The
throughput gain ratio is computed as (0.657-0.456)/0.456 = 44.08%. This encouraging result shows that CombDec has an immediate impact on today’s practice of setting the RTS
threshold, and significantly reducing this threshold can push WiFi towards a collision-free
environment.
3.5.3.2 Collocated Networks
Next, we place a new network close to the single network used in previous experiments.
In the new network, 8 nodes are placed at locations 12–19 and the AP is at location 15, as
shown in Figure 3.10. The two networks use the same frequency and thus interfere with each
other. We call the APs in the original and new networks AP 1 and AP 2, respectively.
Figure 3.20 shows the throughput performance under different settings in the airport
scenario. In Figure 3.20, the one-network performance is the performance measured at
AP 1 in the previous single-network scenario (without the new network); and the twonetwork performance is measured as the average of the throughputs measured at AP 1
and AP 2. We can observe from Figure 3.20 that when the new network is placed, the
throughput performance degrades due to mutual interference. CombDec still performs better
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than traditional 802.11 decoding. In the two-network scenario, the best case for CombDec
is setting the RTS threshold to 0 (which is also beneficial to solving the hidden terminal
problem), yielding a throughput of 0.579; and the best case for traditional decoding has a
throughput of 0.396. The throughput gain ratio is thus (0.579 - 0.395)/0.395 = 46.6%, which
is also a substantial throughput improvement. Figure 3.21 compares the best case throughput
performance between CombDec (removing the RTS threshold) and traditional coding (setting
the threshold to 2,300) in different scenarios. It can be seen that the throughput gain ratio
of CombDec is 33.6% – 46.2%.
As discussed in Section 3.3, CombDec is designed to only store information of its own
network. In the two-network scenario, it is possible to enhance the performance of CombDec
by letting (α, β)-construction store the information (including MAC addresses, NAVs, and
RTS rates) of the other network. Figure 3.22 shows that storing other network information
can further yet slightly improve the throughput performance of CombDec with a fairly large
α.
3.6

Related Work

3.6.1 Interference Cancelation and Mitigation
In the literature, successive interference cancelation (SIC) has been proposed to decode
collisions by using either pre-coded signatures or different receiving powers [117, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 123, 124]. The time offsets in different packet collisions (e.g., in the presence
of hidden terminals) has also been leveraged to resolve collisions [16, 125, 91]. In addition,
interference cancelation was widely studied in the full-duplex mode [121, 126, 127, 128, 129].
In cross-technology communication, corrupted packets may also be decoded by detecting the
interference type [130, 131]. A number of studies have also proposed interference alignment
and nulling with or without channel state information [132, 133]. These approaches cannot
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be readily adapted to regular WiFi scenarios considered in this chapter, where RTS packets
collide at the beginning of each transmission.
3.6.2 Multi-user Detection
CombDec is related to multi-user detection that attempts to decode multiple users’ signals
from the overlapped signal [134, 135, 136]. In cellular networks, CDMA has been widely
used to assign distinct spread spectrum codes to different users [101]. However, there is no
such code design in RTS packets. Constructive interference [135] is able to receive multiple
synchronized transmissions. Nevertheless, it requires all packets have the same content,
which is impossible for RTS signals. The work in [137] applied the time division technique to
the byte level such that multiple users can share the same packet. This method needs a strict
coordination among all users. A multi-user system is built in [134] through sharing multiple
channels to users who are allowed to duplicate the signal into these channels. Applying these
designs to WiFi requires modification of the standard; in contrast, CombDec is a non-invasive
design.
3.6.3 Improving WiFi Performance
Substantial efforts have been devoted to improving the WiFi link performance [138, 139,
140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146]. For example, [138, 139, 141] focused on optimizing the user
selection algorithm in MU-MIMO and [147, 146, 142] aimed to improve the beamforming
related techniques. Different algorithms were also investigated to improve the rate adaptation
in WiFi [143, 144]. Recently, a rapid picocell switching has also been proposed for wireless
transit networks [145]. CombDec is orthogonal to these studies that aim to improve WiFi
performance in different aspects. We show that CombDec makes it possible to resolve RTS
collisions and pushes WiFi towards a collision-free environment.
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3.7

Summary
This chapter provides a systematic study to resolve RTS collisions in WiFi networks.

Our core contribution is a new decoding system CombDec that uses (α, β)-construction,
γ-decimation and sparse recovery to resolve RTS collisions. CombDec does not require
changing the 802.11 standard and redefines the role of the RTS functionality in WiFi. We
show via system implementation and extensive evaluation that CombDec has a beneficial
impact on WiFi networks and substantially improves the throughput performance by 33.6%
– 46.2% in various scenarios.
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Chapter 4: Measurement Integrity Attacks against Network Tomography

4.1

Abstract
Network tomography is an important tool to estimate link metrics from end-to-end net-

work measurements. An implicit assumption in network tomography is that observed measurements indeed reflect the aggregate of link performance (i.e., seeing is believing). However,
it is not guaranteed today that there exists no anomaly (e.g., malicious autonomous systems
and insider threats) in large-scale networks. Malicious nodes can intentionally manipulate
link metrics via delaying or dropping packets to affect measurements. Will such an assumption render a vulnerability when facing attackers? The problem is of essential importance
in that network tomography is developed towards effective network diagnostics and failure
recovery.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that the vulnerability is real and propose a new attack
strategy, called measurement integrity attack, in which malicious nodes can substantially
damage a network (e.g., delaying packets) and at the same time maliciously manipulate
end-to-end measurement results such that a legitimate node is misleadingly identified as the
root cause of the damage (thereby becoming a scapegoat) under network tomography. We
formulate three basic attack approaches and show under what conditions attacks can be
successful. We also reveal conditions to detect and locate such attacks in a network. Our
theoretical and experimental results show that simply trusting measurements leads to measurement integrity vulnerabilities. Thus, existing methods should be revisited accordingly
for security in various applications.
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4.2

Models and Problem Statement
In this section, we first review network tomography and introduce the basic idea behind

measurement integrity attacks. Then, we state our research problems. All notations are
defined in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Notations used throughout the chapter.
AT
A−1
kak1
xy
0
|A|

The transpose of matrix A.
The inverse of matrix A.
P
The L-1 norm of vector a = [a1 , a2 , · · · , an ]T , i.e., kak1 = ni=1 |ai |.
Componentwise larger than or equal to, i.e., xi ≥ yi for every index
i and pair of xi ∈ x and yi ∈ y.
All-zero vector.
The cardinality of set A.

4.2.1 Network Models and Assumptions
We consider a connected network with a known topology denoted by graph G = (V, L),
where V = {vi }i∈[1,|V|] and L = {li }i∈[1,|L|] represent the sets of nodes and links, respectively.
There is at most one link between nodes vi and vj for i 6= j and no link for i = j (i.e.,
no self-loop). Link li is associated with a link metric xi . We assume that link metrics are
additive, i.e., the overall measurement metric of an end-to-end path is the sum of individual
link metrics over the path. For example, delay metrics are additive; and packet delivery or
loss ratios are also additive in the logarithmic form [31, 148, 47].
Throughout this chapter, we adopt similar assumptions in the literature for network
tomography (e.g., [45, 46, 47]): (i) a network operator chooses a number of nodes in the
network as monitors, which send probe packets between each other to monitor the additive
metric of each individual link; (ii) the network operator will collect all measurement results
from monitors, and then perform network tomography for monitoring and diagnosis purposes.
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In addition, we adopt the assumption that the monitors can control the routing of probe
packets over a path as long as the path starts and ends at different monitors. Although end
nodes usually have no control of the routing path of a common IP packet, network tomography relies on such a controllable routing assumption (e.g., [45, 46, 47]). It is known from
existing studies (e.g., [149, 150]) that controllable routing served for network measurement
can be generally supported in (i) networks under common administration, (ii) networks with
strict (or loose) source routing, such as wireless networks with ad-hoc on demand distance
vector (AODV) routing, or (iii) certain software-defined network (SDN) scenarios where
monitors, with the help of the SDN controller, can decide paths of measurement packets.
How exactly controllable routing is designed for network tomography is complementary to
the work in this chapter that focuses on exploiting the network tomography process and
launching measurement integrity attacks.
4.2.2 Network Tomography and Formulation
Network tomography [36] is an algorithm to estimate link metrics from end-to-end measurements. Theoretically, we form the link metrics as a column vector x = [x1 , x2 , · · · , x|L| ]T .
To efficiently estimate x, monitors first select a set of measurement paths between each other,
denoted by P = {Pi }i∈[1,|P|]. Then, they send probe packets over the paths in P to obtain
the path measurement metrics, which are denoted as a column vector y = [y1 , y2 , · · · , y|P| ]T .
As a path measurement metric in y is usually the sum of multiple link metrics in x (e.g., a
path delay is the sum of multiple link delays), it has been shown [44] that the linear relation
between x and y can be represented as

y = Rx,

(4.1)
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where R = (Ri,j ) is called the routing or measurement matrix whose entry Ri,j has value
1 if link lj ∈ L is present on path Pi ∈ P, and value 0 otherwise. Network tomography in
essence inverts the linear system in (5.1) to solve for x given R and y. Existing studies on
selecting or placing monitors (e.g., [46, 45]) ensure that R is revertible (or full column rank)
and the solution to (5.1) can be obtained as

x̂ = (RT R)−1 RT y.

(4.2)

The estimate x̂ is expected to have values close to the real link metric vector x, and will
be used as decisive information for link status monitoring, network diagnostics or further
failure recovery.
4.2.3 Motivation and Basic Idea
Network tomography does not directly measure network link performance, but deduces
such performance from the aggregate measurements observed by monitors. Therefore, the
reliability of network tomography relies on an implicit assumption that measurements over
end-to-end paths indeed reflect the real performance aggregates over individual links. However, such probe packets may go through malicious autonomous systems [48, 49], intentional
bandwidth throttling systems [151], backdoor-infected routers [50] or attack-captured nodes
[51, 52] that can intentionally or maliciously cause negative impacts on end-to-end measurements. Thus, such an assumption may not always hold in today’s complicated network
environments.
Suppose that some nodes in the network are malicious and intend to cause damage. A
straightforward attack is that they delay or drop all packets routed to them. However, it is
easy for the network operator to detect that the links connecting to these nodes suffer long
delay or high loss under network tomography. Therefore, a much more important question
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Path 1 ( M 1  M 2 ) : links 1, 2
Path 2 ( M 1  M 3 ) : links 1, 3
Path 3 ( M 1  M 4 ) : links 1, 4
Path 4 ( M 2  M 4 ) : links 2, 4

Figure 4.1. A simple network example, where M1 − M4 are monitors, and M1 is malicious.
is whether it is possible for these malicious nodes to launch attacks and at the same time
mislead network tomography.
To demonstrate the idea of such an attack, we consider a naive scenario shown in Fig. 4.1,
where nodes M1 , M2 , M3 and M4 are monitors that perform network tomography to estimate
link metrics, and the number on each edge denotes the link index. These monitors choose
4 paths listed in Fig. 4.1 for end-to-end measurement. Assume that node M1 is malicious,
which means that it can adversely affect the performance of link 1 to damage the network,
such as delaying packets passing through link 1. Note that monitors do not need to enumerate
all possible paths between them. They only need to choose a sufficient number of paths to
ensure identifiability in network tomography (e.g., [46, 47]). Fig. 4.1 shows such an example
with 4 paths chosen.
From Fig. 4.1, the attacker M1 associated with link 1 presents on paths 1-3. If the attacker
M1 simply delays or drops all packets going through link 1, it is very easy to be identified
by network tomography as the root cause. Instead, our proposed attack strategy is that the
attacker can try to delay or drop packets along certain directions to mislead tomography.
Specifically, in Fig. 4.1, the attacker M1 is on all measurement paths containing link 3 (i.e.,
path 2). If the attacker M1 only does the damage on path 2, and do nothing on other paths
(e.g., paths 1, 3), the induced measurements under the network tomography algorithm (4.2)
will show that path measurements containing link 3 always suffer long delay or high loss,
while the others appear to be normal.
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For example in Fig. 4.1, we have the system (5.1) as
Path 1 : y1 = x1 + x2
Path 2 : y2 = x1 + x3

(4.3)

Path 3 : y3 = x1 + x4
Path 4 : y4 = x2 + x4 .
Clearly, the routing matrix R in (4.3) satisfies the full column rank requirement. Now
suppose an ideal case that the network is congestion free (i.e., almost 0ms delay on every
link), and the attacker only damages path 2 by inflicting extra 1000ms delay on link 1. Then,
we have the observed path measurement vector y = [0, 1000, 0, 0]T . According to (5.1), the
estimated link metrics become x̂ = [0, 0, 1000, 0]T . Such result indicates that
1. The estimated link vector x̂ shows that no anomaly happens on link 1; therefore, the
anomaly of link 1 due to attacker M1 can be successfully concealed by such an attack
strategy against the network tomography.
2. This unavoidably misleads the network operator to believe that link 3 or its end-node
M3 must have some issues.
Therefore, we call such an attack strategy measurement integrity attack and call link 3 or
nodes M3 a scapegoat in the case.
4.2.4 Problem Statement
From the example in Fig. 4.1, we can consider the measurement integrity attack as a
potential attack to hide the real identities of attackers and make some legitimate nodes or
links the scapegoats. Many questions can be raised concerning the feasibility of such an
attack strategy in the above example: How can M1 damage the network to launch a feasible
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attack? Can M1 make other links, such as link 2, the scapegoat? Is it possible to detect or
locate such an attack?
Before theoretically addressing these issues, we first introduce several necessary definitions. Considering a network G = (V, L), we define Vm ⊆ V as the malicious nodes set
(called attackers), which control a set of links Lm ⊆ L. Then the attackers can launch the
attack by inconsistently inflicting damage on particular paths Pm ⊆ P, where every entry
Pi ∈ Pm travels at least one link lj ∈ Lm .
According to previous definitions, we unfold our major problems into two aspects as
follows.
1. For the attack strategy, network tomography infers the link metrics based on (4.2).
Therefore, in order to mislead network tomography, the routing matrix R is necessary to be known by attackers. However, for most networks, the path information is
generally encrypted in network or higher layers, so that the attacker cannot obtain it.
Therefore the first challenge is how to launch measurement integrity attacks to delay or
drop packets on paths from Pm in a way such that another set of links Ls is identified
as the root cause and Ls ∩ Lm = ∅ (where ∅ denotes the empty set).
2. For the detection strategy, from the defenders’ perspective, they know the global routing matrix R and the manipulated path measurement vector, but they do not know the
true malicious links Lm . Therefore, another challenge is how to detect if measurement
integrity attacks exist and how to localize which links have real problems.
We assume all nodes, including norm nodes and monitors, can be malicious in Vm , because
they are not dedicated nodes with special protection, but normal nodes representing sources
and destinations on measurement paths in the network. A large number of nodes are usually
required to be chosen as monitors to ensure identifiability in network tomography [47, 46].
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4.3

Attack Strategies
In this section, we formally address the measurement integrity problem. In particular,

we categorize measurement integrity attacks into three basic strategies, and then formulate
them and discuss their impacts.
4.3.1 Network Link States
The network operator uses network tomography to identify an abnormal link by checking
its link metric exhibiting long delay or high loss. Under measurement integrity attacks,
a normal link may be misleadingly identified as abnormal. To facilitate formulating such
attacks, we first define the normal and abnormal states of a network link.
Definition 2 Define the state space of a link as S = {normal, abnormal, uncertain}. Let the
state of link li ∈ L be a function S : L → S such that S(li ) = abnormal if li ’s link metric
xi is larger than an upper bound bu (i.e., xi > bu ), and S(li ) = normal if xi is less than a
lower bound bl (i.e., xi < bl ), and S(li ) = uncertain otherwise (i.e., when xi ∈ [bl , bu ]). In
particular, the state S(li ) satisfies



normal
xi < bl ,



S(li ) =
uncertain bl ≤ xi ≤ bu ,




 abnormal xi > bu .

Remark 1 The state of uncertain indicates that some links may be in an intermediate state
that cannot be clearly classified to abnormal or normal. There is no standardized definition
to clarify all problematic conditions in practical network diagnostics. For example, in an
enterprise network, a link can be considered abnormal if the link delay is larger than a few
seconds, and considered normal if the delay is tens of milliseconds (ms). However, when the
link delay is hundreds of milliseconds (e.g., 150ms), it really depends on the network operation
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rules in the organization to decide the state of the link. As a result, we introduce the state of
uncertain to accommodate this intermediate state. We also note that our three-state scenario
can be easily transitioned into the two-state scenario by setting a single threshold b = bu = bl
in Definition 2.
With Definition 2, we can say that one of the goals for measurement integrity attacks is
to make sure that the links associated with attackers are identified as normal; at the same
time, some innocent links are, however, identified as abnormal.
4.3.2 Attack Manipulation Vector and Inflicted Damage
Apparently, except for generating misleading results, a major goal of attackers is to cause
damage to the network. Therefore, we also need to measure the damage due to the attacks.
The first thing towards measuring the attack damage is to determine what attackers can
manipulate. By nature, attackers can affect any end-to-end path that goes through them,
accordingly manipulating the end-to-end measurement vector observed at monitors. For
example, in Fig. 4.1, node M1 can obviously affect any data flow going through links 1(e.g.,
delaying or dropping packets).
Denote by y′ and y the end-to-end measurement vectors with and without the attack,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we can always write
y′ = y + m,

(4.4)

where y reflects the real end-to-end performance, and m is called the attack manipulation
vector that denotes the damage (e.g., intentional delay or packet dropping ratio) inflicted
by attacks over all paths. For example, when an end-to-end path has a delay of 10ms, an
attacker on the path can incur an extra delay of 1000ms for every packet, making the observed
end-to-end measurement 1010ms; and the extra delay of 1000ms can be controlled by the
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attacker and will be an entry in m to represent the damage to the network. Accordingly,
each entry in m reflects the performance degradation induced by the attacker on each path
in the network.
All entries in m should be non-negative in that attackers should not boost, but degrade
the network performance, i.e., m  0, where  means “componentwise greater than or
equal to” defined in Table 4.1. For example, attackers can intentionally postpone forwarding
packets on paths going through them, thus incurring more delay on those paths. But they
are never expected to reduce the delay, because it is in contrast to the attacker’s goal to
damage the network and it may be technically infeasible for them to further reduce the delay
at will. In addition, for the measurement paths that contain no attacker, the corresponding
entries in m must be zero, indicating that attackers cannot manipulate the measurements
on these paths. For example, in Fig. 4.1, attacker M1 is not on path 4, and thus cannot
manipulate the measurement of path 4. We formally define these constraints of m as follows.
Constraint 1 The attack manipulation vector m = {mi }i∈[1,|P|] satisfies (i) m  0; and
(ii) mi = 0 when there exists no such node v ∈ Vm that is on path Pi ∈ P, where Vm and P
denote the sets of malicious nodes and measurement paths, respectively.
Under the Constraint 1, attackers will attempt to maximize the damage to the network.
In the following, we define the damage as total performance degradation over all paths.
Definition 3 The damage of the measurement integrity attack is measured by kmk1 , i.e.,
the L1 norm of attack manipulation vector m.
Remark 2 Definition 3 defines the damage metric of the attack as the total sum of all
entries, representing the total performance degradation over all paths. The larger the value
of kmk1 , the more damage the attack brings. We can also change the damage metric to the
average performance degradation or to any other form. For the sake of simplicity, we always
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use the damage metric in Definition 3 for formulation and analysis, and note that the change
of the damage metric (e.g., to accommodate the metrics of packet loss or delivery ratios) is
a straightforward extension in mathematical manipulations.
4.3.3 Partial Information
According to (4.2), in order to manipulate the inferred link metrics x̂, the global routing
information lying in the routing matrix R and the original overall path measurement vector
y should be known by attackers. For example, in Fig. 4.1, if M1 knows the linear system
(4.3) and y = [0, 0, 0, 0]T , then M1 can scapegoat link 3 by introducing m = [0, 1000, 0, 0].
However, in practice, from the security perspective, both R and y are less likely open to
every node in most networks. Therefore, before introducing the attack strategy, we need to
clarify what information that attackers know while launching attacks.
Definition 4 Attackers know the routing information and path measurement vector on paths
that go through them (i.e., paths in Pm ). Specifically, for each path Pi ∈ Pm , the routing
information ri (i.e., ith row of the routing matrix R), and the true path measurement metric
yi ∈ y are known by attackers. The partiality factor β is defined as the ratio between the
number of paths in Pm and the total number of paths, i.e., β = |Pm |/|P|.
Remark 3 The partiality factor β is a ratio indicating how much information that attackers
know. β = 1 denotes attackers completely know R and y, and 0 < β < 1 means attackers
only know several rows of R and associated several entries of y . In fact, β is also positively
related to the number of attackers in a network. For example, β = 1 denotes attackers are
present on all paths in a network, and β = 0 means there is no attacker in the network.
Remark 4 In many networks, attackers may acquire the path measurement vector and the
routing information of paths that go through them. For example, in AODV, the routing
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information is available during the routing discover process, and the path measurement vector
can be obtained if the attacker is the source or destination node of a path.
According to Definition 4, to clearly model the partiality, we split R and y into two parts,
i.e., R = [RTd , RTr ]T and y = [ydT , yrT ]T , where Rd and yd denote the parts that attackers
know, and Rr and yr are unknown to attackers. Similarly, according to Constraint 1, we also
divide the attack manipulation vector as m = [mTd , 0T ]T , where mTd denotes the inflicted
damage on paths in Pm . Then, the linear system (4.4) can be written as
 
 
md 
Rd 
yd 
y′ =   + m =   x +   .
0
Rr
yr




(4.5)

Attackers have no knowledge on entries in Rr and yr , therefore we consider Rr and yr as
a random matrix and a random vector, respectively. If the partiality factor β = 1, then yr
and Rr will vanish and md = m, indicating attackers know and can control all paths. If
β = 0, md will vanish, meaning that this network cannot be damaged by attackers, therefore
in order to investigate the malicious behaviors, in this chapter, we only consider the scenario
0 < β ≤ 1.
4.3.4 Attack Strategy
Given the partial knowledge Rd and yd , one major goal of attackers is to find an attack
manipulation vector m, such that inferred link metrics x̂ can scapegoat victim links as
the root cause. However, the unknown information in Rr and yr renders uncertainties for
attackers to find m. Therefore, we need a deterministic rule to guide attackers to address
such uncertainties.
According to Definition 2, the scapegoating purpose represents that the estimated metric
x̂i for link li ∈ L must meet certain conditions to be in normal, abnormal, or uncertain state.
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This means that we can write the goal as

sl  x̂  su ,

(4.6)

where su and sl are called the upper and lower bound vectors. By controlling su and sl , we
can accommodate various scapegoating purposes. Inserting (4.2) and (4.4) into (4.18), we
have
sl  (RT R)−1 RT (y + m)  su .

(4.7)

The normal link delay in a network is usually small (e.g., several or tens of milliseconds).
By contrast, an attacker should significantly delay packets (e.g., by more than thousands of
milliseconds) to cause damage to the network. Therefore, the true path measurement vector
y should be of lesser magnitude than the attack manipulation vector m (i.e., y + m ≈ m).
Then (4.7) can be approximated by





 md 
(Rd T Rd + Rr T Rr )sl  RTd RTr    (Rd T Rd + Rr T Rr )su .
0

(4.8)

Obviously, if attackers know the routing matrix R completely, md can be solved from (4.8)
through standard linear programming [152]. However, with the random matrix Rr , it is
infeasible to solve md directly. Therefore, we need a constraint to convert such random
matrix Rr to a deterministic one. By considering the worst case, we have the following
constraint.
Constraint 2 Given the upper bound su and lower bound sl of x̂, the partial routing matrix
Rd and vector md in the attack manipulation vector m satisfies
T

T

T
+
T
−
−
(Rd T Rd + R+
r Rr )sl  Rd md  (Rd Rd + Rr Rr )su ,

(4.9)
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where
T
+
1. R+
r = arg sup(Rr Rr sl ), and Rr does not contain two identical rows and all 0 row.
Rr

T
−
2. R−
r = arg inf(Rr Rr su ), and Rr does not contain two identical rows and all 0 row.
Rr

Remark 5 Constraint 2 converts the random matrix Rr into deterministic matrices R+
r and
T
R−
r , which maximize and minimize Rr Rr sl , respectively. Constraint 2 can be considered as

the worst case of (4.8) because it shrinks the solution space of md , i.e., it is easy to know
that for any solution m∗d satisfying (4.9), it must also satisfy (4.8).
4.3.5 Formulation of Measurement Integrity Attacks
Measurement integrity attacks aim to bring damage to a network, and at the same
time hide the attacker-controlled link set Lm but expose another set of victim links Ls as
scapegoats to network tomography. The basic idea to implement measurement integrity
attacks is that attackers cooperatively inflict damage on paths which contain victims, and
do nothing on other paths. Based on this idea, attackers can choose different strategies
to launch the attacks. Specifically, we consider three basic strategies: (i) chosen-victim
attacks, where the victim link set Ls is already chosen and targeted, (ii) maximum-damage
attacks, where attackers aim at finding the best victim link set Ls to maximize their damage,
(iii) obfuscation, where attackers attempt to make network tomography show no evident
performance outliers but uniform degradation over a substantial number of links.
Fig. 4.2 shows an illustrative example of how different attack strategies affect the link
delay metrics obtained by network tomography. In Fig. 4.2, solid lines represent the values
of end-to-end delay metrics and each dotted line denotes the envelope of the solid line under
the same scapegoating strategy. We see from Fig. 4.2 that there are 10 links, and links 1 and
2 are controlled by attackers. Under chosen-victim scapegoating, the attackers choose links
5 and 6 to be scapegoats that exhibit much higher delays than other links. Under maximum100
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Figure 4.2. Examples of link metrics under tomography for three strategies.
damage scapegoating, the attackers found that links 8 and 10 can be the scapegoats with
highest delays. Under obfuscation, the attackers can make most links exhibit similarly delays,
which can confuse the network operator to find which links are truly problematic.
In the following, we mathematically formulate these attack strategies.
4.3.5.1 Chosen-Victim Scapegoating
When the victim set Ls is already given, this strategy can be formulated as choosing the
best attack manipulation vector m to maximize the attack damage, at the same time satisfying the constraints for m, Lm , and Ls . According to Constraint 1 and 2 and Definitions 2
and 3, we can formulate this basic scapegoating strategy as

maximize

kmk1 ,

subject to

m satisfies Constraint 1 and 2,

m

(4.10)

S(l) = normal, ∀ l ∈ Lm ,

(4.11)

S(l) = abnormal, ∀ l ∈ Ls ,

(4.12)

Lm ∩ Ls = ∅,

(4.13)
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where constraints (4.11) and (4.12) mean that all links associated with the attackers should
appear normal, and all links in the victim set should be abnormal, respectively. These two
together, combined with constraint (4.13), achieve the goal of scapegoating under network
tomography.
4.3.5.2 Maximum-Damage Scapegoating
If the attackers aim to bring maximum damage to the network, they may do so by searching the best victim set in the set of all links. Therefore, maximum-damage scapegoating can
be written as

maximize

kmk1 ,

subject to

m satisfies Constraint 1 and 2,

m,Ls ⊂L

(4.14)

Constraints in (4.11), (4.12), and (4.13).

4.3.5.3 Obfuscation
Different from the chosen-victim and maximum-damage attacks, the idea behind obfuscation is to make every link look mostly similar without evident outliers. Obfuscation does
not necessarily lead to a unique strategy. As long as a strategy makes a substantial number of link metrics look approximately similar, and at the same time incurs damage to the
network, it should be considered as a successful obfuscation one. We leverage the state of
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uncertain in Definition 2 to define obfuscation as follows.

maximize

kmk1 ,

subject to

m satisfies Constraint 1 and 2,

m,Ls ⊂L

(4.15)

S(l) = uncertain, ∀ l ∈ Lo = Ls ∪Lm ,

(4.16)

Ls 6= ∅, |Lo | > γ|L|

(4.17)

where Ls is the set of victim links that attackers want to find such that any link l ∈ Lo
is manipulated under network tomography to be in the uncertain state defined in (4.16). γ
is a predefined threshold ratio indicating the lower bound of the number of infected links.
As we have mentioned, the uncertain state represents an intermediate state, in which a link
cannot be clearly classified into either normal or abnormal. Hence, a substantial number of
links (i.e., more than γ|L|) in the uncertain state result in obfuscation.
Given these formally defined basic strategies, attackers are able to launch scapegoating
attacks against network tomography to maximize the damage, make scapegoats, or obfuscate
the network operator. In addition, attackers may also develop more sophisticated strategies
based upon these three ones.
4.4

Feasibility and Detectability
After we formulate measurement integrity attack strategies, two questions naturally fol-

low: (i) Whether these attacks are indeed feasible (i.e., whether feasible solutions exist in the
optimization-based strategies)? (ii) Can we detect or locate such an attack if it is successfully
launched? In this section, we answer these two questions by first analyzing the feasibility of
the attack, then describing how to detect it. The method to locate attacks is discussed in
Section 4.5.
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4.4.1 Feasibility Analysis
Whether an attack is feasible depends on the network connectivity, selections of measurement paths, and where attackers are. Consider a simple example in Fig. 4.3(a): Attackers
A1 and A2 aim to manipulate the end-to-end measurements to scapegoat the link between
nodes C and D. They should be able to succeed if they are on all the measurement paths
that go through the link between C and D. We say it is a perfect cut case, in which for
any measurement path P ∈ P containing a victim link, there always exists a malicious node
v ∈ Vm present on that path P . Fig. 4.3(b) illustrates an imperfect cut case, in which the
path M1→B→ C→ D→M4 contains neither A1 nor A2 .
M1

M1

B

A1
C

D

C
A2

E

(a) Perfect Cut

M4

B

M2
M3

E

A1

M2

A2

M3

D

(b) Imperfect Cut

Figure 4.3. Perfect and imperfect cuts by two attackers.

4.4.1.1 Perfect Cut
We show in the following that a perfect cut always leads to a successful attack in any
strategy.
Theorem 1 A measurement integrity attack is always feasible if the set of malicious nodes
Vm can perfectly cut the set of victim links Ls from all measurements paths.
Proof: We do not need to prove the feasibility of all three strategies because the maximumdamage scapegoating (4.14) must be feasible if chosen-victim one (4.10) is feasible. Then, we
write (4.10) and (4.14) into a generic form, which is (4.18), i.e., sl  x̂  su ,. By adjusting
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su and sl , we can accommodate either chosen-victim scapegoating or obfuscation because
constraints (4.11), (4.12) and (4.16) indicate the estimated x̂ must meet certain conditions.
Then we need to show that for a given manipulated metric vector x̂∗ satisfying (4.18),
there exists a resultant vector m∗ that meets Constraints 1 and 2. Because Constraint 2 is
derived from (4.18) in Section 4.3.4. According to (4.7) and (4.8), it is clear that m∗ satisfies
Constraint 2. Thus we only need to show the proof under Constraint 1.
We have developed three strategies, but do not need to prove the feasibility individually.
It is easy to know that if the chosen-victim scapegoating (4.10) is feasible, the maximumdamage one (4.14) is also feasible. Then, we write the chosen-victim scapegoating (4.10)
and obfuscation (4.15) into a generic form, and show that a feasible solution exists in the
generic form when the set of malicious nodes Vm can perfectly cut the set of victim links Ls
from all measurements paths.
According to Definition 2, the constraints in (4.12), (4.13) and (4.16) represent that the
estimated metric x̂i for link li ∈ L must meet certain conditions to be in normal, abnormal,
or uncertain state. This means that we can write these constraints as

su  x̂  sl ,

(4.18)

where x̂ is link metric vector estimated by network tomography, su and sl are called the upper
and lower bound vectors. By controlling su and sl , we can accommodate either chosen-victim
scapegoating or obfuscation.
Therefore, we only need to show that for a given manipulated metric vector x̂∗ satisfying
(4.18), there exists a resultant vector m∗ that meets Constraint 1 for successful scapegoating.
To this end, we can first write the measurement model (5.1) as
y′ = y∗ + m∗ = Rx̂∗ ,

(4.19)
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where y′ is the observed measurement vector under scapegoating, and y∗ is the true measurement vector if there is no scapegoating and satisfies
y∗ = Rx∗ ,

(4.20)

with x∗ being the true link metric vector.
It follows from (4.19) and (4.20) that
m∗ = R∆x̂∗ ,

(4.21)

where ∆x̂∗ = x̂∗ − x∗ . For the i-th entry m∗i in m∗ , we have
m∗i =

X

Ri,j ∆x̂∗j ,

(4.22)

j

where Ri,j is the (i, j)-th entry in routing matrix R and ∆x̂∗j is the j-th entry of ∆x̂∗ .
Because Vm is a perfect cut, if there is no attacker on path Pi ∈ P, there will be no
victim link on path Pi as well. This indicates that Ri,j = 0 if link lj ∈ Lm ∪ Ls . In addition,
if link lj ∈
/ Lm ∪ Ls , ∆x̂∗j = 0 as the attackers do not manipulate the metric of link lj .
Combining the two observations, we obtain m∗i = 0 if there is no attack on path Pi , which
satisfies Constraint 1 thus completes the proof.



4.4.1.2 Imperfect Cut
If attackers only form an imperfect cut of the victim links, the formulation of an attack
strategy may not always yield a feasible solution, which depends on specific network settings.
We are interested in understanding the attack success probability under generic random
assumptions (i.e., we do not use specific distribution models such as power-law network
connectivity, but only assume that network connectivity, placement of monitors, and selection
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of measurement paths are random in the network). We show that it increases with the
increasing of the number of measurement paths that include at least one victim link and at
least one attacker.
Theorem 2 The success probability of a measurement integrity attack is defined as the probability that an attack strategy yields a feasible solution. Under generic random assumptions,
the success probability is an increasing function of the number of measurement paths that
include at least one victim link and at least one attacker.
Proof: Let L = |P| be the total number of measurement paths in network tomography.
Assume that attackers Vm are present on k < L measurement paths. Define a vector space
MLk = {v | v ∈ RL×1 , and L − k entries in v are always zeros}, where RL×1 denotes the
L-dimensional vector space. It is clear that for any s ≥ k, it always holds that
MLk ⊂ MLs .

(4.23)

It is clear that the attack manipulation vector mk ∈ MLk . The success probability p can
be denoted as

p(mk ) = P (E(mk )) ,

(4.24)

where E(mk ) denotes a set satisfying

E(mk ) = m|m ∈ MLk , and m is a feasible solution .

(4.25)

Now, consider the scenario that the total number of paths used in tomography is still fixed
to L, but increase the total number of infected end-to-end measurement paths. Specifically,
there are s > k paths that include the victim links and at least one attack link, i.e., less
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entries in the new manipulation vector ms are always zeros. The success probability becomes

p(ms ) = P (E(ms )) ,

(4.26)


E(ms ) = m|m ∈ MLs , and m is a feasible solution .

(4.27)

where

Therefore, it suffices to prove p(mk ) < p(ms ), or equivalently to prove

a ∈ E(ms ), ∀ a ∈ E(mk ),
which immediately follows from (4.23), (4.25), and (4.27).

(4.28)



4.4.2 Detecting Measurement Integrity Attacks
We have analyzed the feasibility of measurement integrity attacks. If an attack is successfully launched, we should never trust the result obtained by network tomography. It is
necessary to know how to detect such an attack in a network. Our insight is that attackers
have to manipulate packet delivery in certain directions to make scapegoating possible in
the network. This means that if we verify the estimated link metric vector x̂, which can be
obtained by (4.2), with observed measurement vector y′ in all entries, it is likely to observe
the inconsistency under the measurement model (5.1) in the presence of a measurement integrity attack. In other words, verifying x̂ and y′ according to (5.1) results in our detection
method



 exists,
if Rx̂ 6= y′ ,
scapegoating

 does not exist, if Rx̂ = y′ .

(4.29)

with the following detectability.

108

Theorem 3 Under the detection mechanism (4.29), a measurement integrity attack is undetectable if attackers Vm can perfectly cut victim links Ls from measurement paths or R is
a square matrix; and is detectable otherwise.
Proof: The proof is partly based on the proof for Theorem 1.
First, if R is a square matrix, it is easy to verify that Rx̂ = y′ always holds. Therefore,
it is not possible to detect scapegoating under the linear model (5.1).
Then, we consider that R is not a square matrix. If attackers Vm can perfectly cut victims
Ls , the attackers can always choose an attack manipulation vector m∗ such that Rx̂ = y′ as
shown in (4.19). Therefore, no inconsistency can be found in the detection method (4.29).
If attackers Vm do not perfectly cut victims Ls , there always exists at least one path on
which there is no attacker but at least a victim link with metric manipulated. This means
that the observed measurement on this path in the sum of all true link metrics because there
is no attacker on the path. However, because the metric of the victim link is manipulated by
attackers, the observed measurement will be inconsistent with the sum of the manipulated
link metrics. Consequently, Rx̂ 6= y′ , meaning the existence of scapegoating.



Remark 6 Theorem 3 shows that if attackers Vm can perfectly cut victim links from measurement paths, there is no way to detect them based on the inconsistency check. This is
intuitively true. For example, in Fig. 4.3(a), attackers A1 and A2 cut the victim link between
nodes C and D completely from the measurement paths M1 → M2 and M1 → M3 . Any
information about the victim link is from these two paths whose measurements can be surely
manipulated by the attackers to evade the detection.
Remark 7 In practice, even when there is no attack, Rx̂ may not exactly equal to y′ in
(4.29) due to randomness in packet delivery and measurement error. Therefore, the attack
detection can be slightly modified to test kRx̂ − y′ k1 > α, where α is a given threshold that
can be empirically determined.
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4.5

Locatability Analysis
According to the detection mechanism (4.29), if an attack is successfully launched and it

is also detected, the inferred link performance x̂ obtained by network tomography becomes
untrusted. Therefore, it is necessary to know which nodes or links are the attackers. In this
section, we discuss how to locate the real attackers in the network. We first present the
design motivation, then present the method of locating attacks.
4.5.1 Motivation and Example

M3
2
1
M2

4

M4
M5

12
13
14
23
...

M1

3

1: M1-M3:
2: M1-M4:
3: M1-M5:
4: M3-M4:

Figure 4.4. A simple network consisting of 5 nodes and 4 links.

The key idea of the measurement integrity attack is that attackers only damage the paths
that contain victim links and do nothing to other paths. Therefore, a malicious link used by
attackers to cause damages should be present on multiple paths, i.e., some of them contain
victim links and others do not. However, if the link controlled by a attacker is the only
shared link in a network, then the only explanation for the inconsistency in (4.29) is that
this shared link is malicious, because it is the only link that can really inflict the traffic
differentiation among different paths.
For example, in a simple network consisting of 5 nodes and 4 links (shown in Fig. 4.4), we
consider three paths (i.e., path 1: M1 → M3 , path 2: M1 → M4 , and path 3: M1 → M5 ), the
only shared link among them is link 1. Assume link 1 is malicious and controlled by attacker
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M1 , aiming to scapegoat links 3 and 4. Suppose if the presence of an attacker is detected
among these three paths, we can pinpoint that link 1 is malicious. However, according to
Theorem 3, only using paths 1-3 is insufficient to detect the attacker link 1 since link 1 can
perfectly cut both links 3 and 4.
In order to detect the attacker, knowledge of extra paths is needed. Our design is based
on the concept of path pairs in network neutrality inference [40]. A path pair {Pi , Pj } is
a single path which includes all links traveled by at least one of path i or path j. For
example, path pair {P2 , P3 } is formed by links 1, 3 and 4. In the real world, this path pair
is measurable if M2 is a monitor such that we can measure link 4 and path 2 in a same time
period and then combine them together. Note that we are able to detect the attack by using
other normal paths, such as path 4: M3 → M2 → M4 , however, if so, we cannot put the
blames only on the link 1.
Now we use the path pair {P2 , P3 }, combined with paths 1-3 to locate link 1. Considering
the existence of the attacker, the measurement model (5.1) can be expressed as
Path 1 : y1′ = x1 + x2
Path 2 : y2′ = x1 + x3

(4.30)

Path 3 : y3′ = x1 + x4
Path Pair {P2 , P3 } : y4′ = x1 + x3 + x4 .
Without loss of generality, and to clearly show the inconsistency, we assume the network,
shown in Fig. 4.4, is congestion free, thus delays only come from the attacker. To scapegoat
links 3 and 4, link 1 introduces extra delays (e.g., 1000ms) on paths 2 and 3. Then the
measurements of these four paths are y′ = [0, 1000, 1000, 1000]T . It is easy to observe that a
contradiction happens among these measurements: y1′ indicates that x1 = 0, whereas y2′ , y3′
and y4′ indicate x1 = 1000 and x3 = x4 = 0. If we apply the detection mechanism (4.29) into
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the system (4.30), this contradiction will definitely lead to the inconsistency. Then link 1
can be located because it is the only reason for the inconsistency under network neutrality
inference.
From this example, we have three observations to locate measurement integrity attacks
leveraging network neutrality inference:
1. To locate the malicious link, we should be able to find a path set, in which the malicious
link is the only shared link. For example, link 1 is the only shared link among paths 1-3.
2. Path pairs formed by the paths in the path set should be measurable. For example, the
path pair {P2 , P3 } is measurable and it is necessary because it guarantees the unique
solution to the last three equations.
3. If the shared link is malicious, to observe the contradiction, at least two paths should
contain different victim links, and at lease one path should not contain a victim link.
For example, path 1 does not contain victim links, and paths 2 and 3 contain links 3
and 4 respectively. Then, we can use path 2, path 3 and their path pair {P2 , P3 } to
conclude link 1 is malicious, and use path 1 to contradict that link 1 is congestion free.
The basic idea in the previous example is to use inconsistency to locate a malicious
link. However, inconsistency may occur regardless of the presence of an attacker. There
are two types of inconsistency: (i) inconsistency resulted by measurement noise; and (ii)
inconsistency incurred by attackers. For the first type, even when there is no attacker in a
network, inconsistency is still possible to occur since random measurement noise is inevitable
while probing the network. However, this type of inconsistency is slight, so it can be solved
by setting a threshold of measurement according to [40].
For the second type, if the inconsistency is larger than the threshold, we consider that the
inconsistency is resulted by attackers. According to Theorem 3, once inconsistency occurs,
we can detect attacks happened in the network. But not all inconsistencies can be used
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to locate malicious links. Therefore, in the following, we elaborate how to locate malicious
links when attackers exist. Note that the locating process is triggered only when an attack
is detected by (4.29).
4.5.2 Locating Measurement Integrity Attacks
From the example in Fig. 4.4, we iteratively inspect the maliciousness of each link
throughout the entire network to locate attackers. For any link lα ∈ L in a network G,
to judge whether link lα is malicious, we first create a path set Pα ⊆ P based on the link lα .
Then, we use Pα to form a new system, such as the example shown in (4.30), and apply
the detection mechanism (4.29) to this new system, to check if link lα is malicious. Therefore, our attack-locating mechanism consists of two parts: (i) path set generation, and (ii)
maliciousness discrimination. In the following, we elaborate each part in detail.
4.5.2.1 Path Set Generation
Directly applying the detection mechanism (4.29) to the overall path set P will only yield
a binary result to show whether attacks exist or not, and cannot locate which links or nodes
are really malicious. The purpose of creating a new path set is that we can attribute the
inconsistency in (4.29) to a certain link. Specifically, to locate link lα , the path set Pα can
be formed as follows:
1. Find all path pairs {Pi , Pj } where Pi , Pj ∈ P, such that the shared link between Pi
and Pj is lα .
2. Add Pi and Pj and their corresponding path pair {Pi , Pj } to the path set Pα , i.e.,
Pα = Pα ∪ {Pi , Pj , {Pi , Pj }}.
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Figure 4.5. Examples of unlocalizable scenarios.
4.5.2.2 Maliciousness Discrimination
After obtaining the path set Pα , we can only focus on inspecting the measurements of
paths in Pα . Then we write the measurement model as
y′ = Rα x,

(4.31)

where Rα is the routing matrix formed with respect to the path set Pα .
Theorem 4 Given a link lα and its measurement model (4.31), the link lα is malicious if
scapegoating exists in (4.31) based on the detection mechanism (4.29).
Proof: If scapegoating is detected by the detection mechanism (4.29) in (4.31), it is clear
that Rα x̂ 6= y′ . This indicates that directly solving (4.31) as a linear equation system will
yield no solution. Then, according to Lemma 2 in [40], link lα must have different link rates
for different paths. Therefore, link lα is malicious.



4.5.3 Locatability
In the following, we present the network condition to indicate when an attack link can
be located in the network.
Theorem 5 For an attack link lα , and its path set Pα , if the following conditions hold:
114

1. for any path Pi ∈ Pα , nodes between link lα and other links must be monitors;
2. the path set Pα should contain at least three individual paths and two path pairs, in
which both paths in one path pair contain victim links and the other path pair must
contain at least one path which does not travel any victim links;
then lα is localizable.
Proof: First, if condition 1) holds, it is easy to verify that all path pairs in the path
set Pα are measurable. Then in the following, we prove this theorem by showing that if
condition 2) holds, inconsistency exists in the measurement model (4.31). Considering an
arbitrary path pair {Pi , Pj } ∈ Pα , the measurable model can be written as
Path Pi : yi′ = xα + x∗iα
Path Pj : yj′ = xα + x∗jα

(4.32)

Path Pair {Pi , Pj } : yij′ = xα + x∗iα + x∗jα ,
where x∗nα is the adjacent link of xα on the path Pn , which is resulted from deleting the link
lα from path Pn , and n ∈ {i, j}. It is easy to know that (4.32) has the unique solution
xα = yi′ + yj′ − yij′ .

(4.33)

Then we consider three scenarios: (i) both Pi and Pj contain victim links; (ii) only one path
(e.g., Pi ) contains victim links; and (iii) neither Pi nor Pj includes victim links.
The ground truth metric x̃α of link lα can always be the solution to scenarios (ii) and
(iii). It is easy to verify for scenario (iii) since there is no extra damage on all paths. For
scenario (ii), x̃α still can be the solution because the extra damage is inflicted to the adjacent
link x∗iα . The proof of Lemma 3 in [40] shows that the solution to scneario (i) is exactly
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Figure 4.6. The success probabilities versus partiality factor β for three types attackers
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Figure 4.8. The success probabilities versus the obfuscation threshold γ in both wireline and wireless networks.

distinct from the ground truth metric x̃α . Therefore, if condition 2) holds, we get different
solutions from different paths, thus the inconsistency exists and lα can be located.



Remark 8 Theorem 5 shows two sufficient conditions to locate a malicious link. The violation of any one or both of them will lead to the failure of locating. Fig. 4.5 shows two
typical examples in which the malicious link is not locatable. In Fig. 4.5, nodes M1 − M5 are
monitors, where M1 is the attacker aiming to scapegoat links between M2 and D, M2 and C
(only exists in Fig. 4.5(a)). In Fig. 4.5(a), the malicious link does not satisfy condition 1
in Theorem 5 because node A is not a monitor and we cannot add the path pair between
path M1 → M3 and path M1 → M5 to the path set. One question may raise if node A is
a monitor: Can we directly locate the malicious link by using M1 and A without following
the previous attack-locating mechanism? The answer is no because the path between M1 and
A does not contain any intended victim by the attacker. If we directly send probe packets
on this path, the obtained result will not be affected as the attacker does not manipulate the
packets traversing. In Fig. 4.5(b), there are only two paths, thus the path set formed by this
network does not satisfy condition 2), which needs at least two different path pairs.
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4.6

Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we use simulation experiments to evaluate the feasibility of measurement

integrity attacks and effectiveness of attack detection and locating methods based on realworld and simulated network topologies.
4.6.1 Experimental Setups
4.6.1.1 Network Topology
We consider two types of network scenarios.
• Wireline networks. We use the Rocketfuel datasets [153] as the topologies for wireline
networks. Rocketfuel models the topologies of autonomous systems of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), such as AT&T and Ebone. In the following, we only show the
results from the AS1221 system, consisting of 108 nodes and 152 links, due to similar
experimental results.
• Wireless networks. We use the random geometric graph to generate wireless network
topologies because it has been widely used to model multi-hop wireless networks (e.g,
[154, 155]). We adopt the extended network generation mode, and randomly distribute
p
100 nodes on region [0, 100/λ]2 according to node density λ = 5 such that each node
has 5 neighbors on average.

4.6.1.2 Parameter Setting
In experiments, we use delay as the performance metric. There is a routine traffic on
each link with random delay performance from 1ms to 20ms. We consider a link normal if
its delay is less than 100ms, and abnormal if the delay is greater than 800ms.
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The objective of malicious nodes is to delay packets going through them as much as
possible, and at the same time make network tomography yield a misleading result. For
practical considerations, we also impose a limit on attackers that they should not delay the
delivery of a packet on a measurement path for more than 2000ms.
We choose monitors and measurement paths according to a random selection algorithm
based on the minimum monitor placement rule in [47]. We also randomly select nodes to be
malicious in a network.
For the obfuscation attack, we set the default threshold γ = 10%, i.e., the obfuscation
attack is successful if more than 10% of total number of links are in the uncertain state.
4.6.2 Feasibility
In our experiments, in order to show the impact of measurement integrity attacks, we
define the attack success probability as the ratio between the number of successful attacks
and the total number of runs for a network topology. Then, in the following, we measure the
feasibility of chosen-victim scapegoating, maximum-damage scapegoating and obfuscation
by changing the partiality factor β and the obfuscation threshold γ in both wireline and
wireless networks.
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4.6.2.1 Varying the Partiality Factor
A straightforward way to show the feasibility is to measure the success probability as a
function of the partiality factor β in the network. This is because, as shown in Theorems 1
and 2, an essential condition for scapegoating is the number of paths in |Pm |, which is closely
related to the partiality factor β. It is obvious that the β = 100% if attackers present on all
measurement paths, which can perfect cut any victim link.
Fig. 4.6 depicts the success probabilities of three attack strategies in wireline network. It
is easy to find that the success probability increases as the partiality factor β increases. For
example, when β goes from 70% to 80%, the success probability increases accordingly from
28% to 67% for the chosen-victim scapegoating as shown in Fig. 4.6. When β = 1, the success
probability becomes 100% for all attack strategies since attackers can perfectly cut all victim
links. We also notice that obfuscation is less likely to succeed, compared with chosen-victim
and maximum-damage scapegoating as it has to manipulate a number of victim links. In
addition, maximum-damage attacks are always more likely than chosen-victim attacks. This
is because the attacker does not specifically target a given victim; as long as it can find such
a victim among all the nodes, it will be successful.
Fig. 4.7 shows the success probabilities under the wireless network topology. We can
see from Fig. 4.7 that when β is less than a threshold, scapegoating is unlikely to succeed,
because attackers know too little information about the network to launch the attacks. For
example, the obfuscation always has 0 success probability when β ≤ 60%.
4.6.2.2 Varying the Threshold of Obfuscation
For obfuscation, the success probability is also related to the threshold γ since attackers
must make at least γ|L| victim links exhibit the uncertain status to be considered successful.
Therefore, we also evaluate how γ can affect the success probability.
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Fig. 4.8 depicts the success probabilities of obfuscation in both wireline and wireless
topologies when β = 90. We can see from both types of networks, the success probability
decreases as γ increases. This is because a larger γ means that attackers need to affect
more links at the same time, which is less likely to succeed. In addition, we notice that
obfuscation is less successful in the wireless topology. For example, when γ = 10%, the
success probabilities are 48% and 60% in wireless and wireline networks, respectively. This
is because the wireless topology is sparser and our monitor placement algorithm results in
shorter measurement paths, which are more difficult to be affected by attackers from our
observations in experiments.
4.6.3 Detection
We then use the detection method proposed in Section 4.4.2 to detect measurement
integrity attacks. According to Theorem 3, there is no way for the method to detect an
attack if attackers perfectly cut a victim. We separate experiments into the perfect cut and
imperfect cut cases. We set the threshold α = 200ms in all experiments.
Fig. 4.9 shows the detection ratios over all three attack strategies in the perfect cut and
imperfect cut cases, respectively. From Fig. 4.9, the detection ratio in the presence of all
three attacks is 100% when attackers can perfectly cut victim links, and 0% otherwise, which
verifies the theoretical predictions in Theorem 3. We also find that the detection method
yields no false alarm in all attack detection experiments.
4.6.4 Locating Attacks
We locate malicious links by leveraging the method in Section 4.5.2. According to the
condition 1 in Theorem 5, a malicious link is not locatable if both end nodes of the link
are not monitors. Therefore, locatability of a link in a network is directly related to the
monitor presence ratio. We conduct our experiments by showing the relationship between
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the monitor presence ratio and the locating ratio, which is defined as the probability that a
malicious link can be located.
Fig. 4.10 shows the locating ratio under different attack strategies, where 5% nodes are
malicious. In Fig. 4.10, we see that the locating ratio increases when we place more monitors,
since more paths can meet the condition 1 of Theorem 5. However, even when all nodes are
monitors, we still cannot guarantee to locate every malicious link since locating attack links
is also related to the network topology. For example, the case shown in Fig 4.5(b) is not
locatable even if all nodes are monitors. In addition, the locating ratio of the maximumdamage scapegoating is larger than the chosen-victim attacks because the size of the victim
link set Ls of the maximum-damage scapegoating is usually larger than the size of Ls for the
chosen-victim attacks, thus providing more chances to satisfy the condition 2. Note that we
do not evaluate the locating ratio for the obfuscation strategy because the success probability
of the obfuscation attack is very low with 5% attackers. In other words, it is very unlikely
to launch a feasible obfuscation attack with such a limited number of attackers, thus we do
not need to locate it.
Fig. 4.11 shows the relationship between the locating ratio and the attack presence ratio
(defined as the ratio of the number of measurement paths including at least one victim and at
least one attacker over the number of total measurement paths including any victim) where
75% nodes are monitors. We can see a slight fluctuation of locating ratios when the attack
presence ratio increases from 20% to 80%. But when the attack presence ratio reaches 90%,
the locating ratio decreases sharply, since almost all links are controlled by attackers, and
the numbers of normal links and victim links decrease dramatically, which are necessary to
locate attack links.
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4.7

Discussions and Future Work
In this section, we discuss our results associated with the feasibility and defense of mea-

surement integrity attacks, as well as the potential impacts on other related work. Then we
provide our future work.
To launch measurement integrity attacks, the attackers must have the information about
the measurement paths, which the network operator can definitely attempt to hide. For
example, the operator can avoid publishing such information or avoid using some protocols
containing path information, such as AODV routing for wireless networks, to prevent attackers from inferring such information from probe packets in the network. This can constitute
the first line of defense. Nevertheless, from a security point of view, it should not be assumed
that attackers can never get such information. Moreover, measurement integrity attacks do
pose a threat to affect the trustiness of the measurement results. Follow-up actions, such as
fault recovery, do rely on such results. Our results indicate that instead of simply assuming seeing-is-believing, we should always be cautious of malicious manipulation in network
measurement.
Our future work includes both monitor placement and hiding routing information to
combat measurement integrity attacks against network tomography.
• For the monitor placement, existing monitor placement methods mainly focus on minimizing the number of monitors or enhancing the robustness. The theoretical results
in Theorem 3 and experimental results in Figs. 4.6 and 4.7 reveal that a measurement
integrity attack becomes more likely as the number of attackers increases. Hence, we
aim to design a new monitor placement algorithm to first ensure identifiability under network tomography, then minimize each node’s presence ratio on measurement
paths such that when it is compromised, its impact to measurement manipulation is
minimized.
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• For hiding routing information, routing information, existing in the routing matrix,
is necessary for launching the attacks. Therefore, defenders can leverage anonymous
routing protocols to hide the routing information, to prevent attackers from inferring
the link metrics. We aim to understand how to hide routing information to minimize
the impact of measurement integrity attacks against network tomography.
4.8

Related Work

4.8.1 Network Tomography
Network tomography is a generic way to compute network component (usually network
link) metrics from measurements on end-to-end paths in a network. In essence, network
tomography can be considered as an algorithmic process to transfer end-to-end measurements into link metric estimates. Existing work mainly focused on algorithm design and
applications (e.g., [33, 34, 35, 32, 36, 37, 38]); and some recent papers also considered the
problem of placement of monitors and identifiability of link metrics (e.g., [44, 45, 46, 47]).
Network tomography has been proposed for measurement, fault diagnosis and localization
in both wireline networks (e.g., [32, 36, 37, 38]) and wireless networks (e.g., [33, 34, 35]).
In general, these papers implicitly assume that individual link metrics can be inversely
derived from the path measurements that indeed reflect the real link performance aggregate.
In fact, it is not guaranteed that there exists no anomaly or malicious behavior in today’s
large-scale networks. However, potential security vulnerabilities in network tomography have
not yet been investigated in the literature.
4.8.2 Packet Dropping and Delaying Attacks
There are various malicious attacks against a network, such as passive eavesdropping,
active interfering, leakage of secret information, data tampering, impersonation, message dis-
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tortion and denial-of-service attacks (e.g., [156, 157, 158, 159, 160]). Measurement integrity
attacks drop or delay packets to damage a network, which is related to packet dropping
attacks, such as black hole attacks that attract and drop all packets routed to malicious
nodes and grey hole attacks (also called selective forwarding attacks) that only drop certain
selected packets [161].
However, such traditional attacks can be discovered by finding out the links which always
suffer long delay or high loss under network tomography [160]. In contrast, our measurement integrity attack strategy can not only hide the real identities of attackers in network
tomography, but also make some legitimate nodes or links the scapegoats. Therefore, the
proposed attack strategy is a new one that is able to deteriorate the network performance,
while misleading network tomography based diagnostics.
4.8.3 Attack Detection and Defense
Existing network defense approaches are usually deployed in individual host systems
(e.g., end nodes or edge routers). These mechanisms can directly detect anomalies on some
particular victims. For example, the process of tracing back the forged IP packets to their
true sources rather than the spoofed IP addresses that was used in the attack is called
traceback. There are various IP traceback mechanisms that have been proposed to date
(e.g., [162, 163]). Packet marking and filtering mechanism aims to mark legitimate packets
at each router along their path to the destination so that victims’ edge routers can filter the
attack traffic (e.g., [164, 165]).
There are a few studies to detect network neutrality violations [40, 166, 167, 168, 169].
For example, the strategy in [166] relies on detecting whether traffic on specific ports is
blocked. Authors in [167, 168] proposed a system to detect neutrality violations by inferring
whether an ISP discriminates traffic based on performance data obtained passively.
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There are also studies related to monitoring and analyzing network traffic to protect
a system from network-based threats. For instance, route-based packet filtering system
uses routing information to distinguish if a traffic flow at a router is valid and ensure that
resources are made available only for legitimate use (e.g., [170, 171]). The work in [172]
designed a strategy to detect misbehaving routers that absorb, discard or misroute packets.
Such mechanism usually requires explicit communication among routers. The work in [173]
presented a heuristic data structure to monitor traffic characteristics of network devices like
routers to detect and eliminate attacks. In addition, traffic monitoring can also be leveraged
for detecting anomalous packet forwarding [174].
Network tomography is performed by the network operator to obtain the global picture
of the healthiness of a network. Therefore, the detection proposed in this chapter is a
network-wide approach that should follow immediately the network tomography process
to detect whether such a process is manipulated or exploited by malicious behavior. Our
network-wide attack detection approach to protect network tomography can be regarded as
complementary to defense strategies deployed in individual host systems (e.g., end nodes
and routers).
4.9

Summary
In this chapter, we have provided theoretical and experimental results to analyze the

feasibility of measurement integrity attacks against network tomography. We consider three
basic strategies: chosen-victim, maximum-damage and obfuscation attacks, and show that
malicious nodes can substantially damage a network and at the same time manipulate endto-end measurements to make legitimate nodes scapegoats. We also present the conditions to
detect and locate these attacks. The results in this chapter indicate that the current seeingis-believing assumption in network tomography renders a security vulnerability. Instead of
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simply trusting measurements, we should be always aware of measurement integrity attacks
and carefully revisit existing designs for security in various applications.
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Chapter 5: Anonymity Analysis of Randomized Routing Protocols

5.1

Abstract
Preventing the source-destination network flow information from being disclosed is pivotal

for anonymous wireless network applications. However, the advance of network inference,
which is able to obtain the flow information without directly measuring it, poses severe
challenges towards this goal. Randomized routing is capable of hiding the flow information
by injecting substantial errors to the network inference process.
In this chapter, we systematically study the behavior of randomized routing protocols, and categorize them into three templates, k-random-relay, k-random-neighbor and krandom-path based on their routing behaviors. We propose technical models to characterize
these templates in terms of their induced inference errors and their delay costs. We also use
simulations to validate the theoretical results. Our work provides the first systematic study
on understanding both the benefit and the cost of using randomized routing to hide the flow
information in wireless networks.
5.2

Preliminary and Problem Statement
In this section, we first present the network model and the preliminary of network infer-

ence. Then, we state our research problems. The notations of this chapter are summarized
as follows. (i) f (n) = O(g(n)) denotes there exists a constant c such that f (n) ≤ cg(n);
f (n) = Ω(g(n)) means g(n) = O(f (n)); f (n) = Θ(g(n)) means f (n) = O(g(n)) and
qP P
n
m
2
f (n) = Ω(g(n)). (ii) Given a m × n matrix A with entry xij , then kAkF =
j=1 xij ,
i=1
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and tr{A} is the trace of A. (iii) For a vector v = [v1 , · · · , vn ], kvk2 =
denotes the cardinality operator.

pPn

i=1

vi2 ; | · |

5.2.1 Network Model
We model the wireless network by using a random geometric graph (RGG) [175] denoted
by G = (V, L), where V is the node set and L is the undirected link set. Let N = |V| and
p
L = |L|. In this network, N nodes are randomly placed in a region Ω = [0, N/λ]2 , where
λ denotes the node density. We assume that λ is sufficiently large such that the network is

connected asymptotically almost surely [175]. Denote by r the transmission range of each
node.
In the network, packet exchange occurs in node pairs, yielding multiple end-to-end data
flows. We denote by F the end-to-end flow set consisting of the potential flow for each node
pair. Obviously, |F | = N(N − 1)/2, which is the number of node pairs. Each flow fi ∈ F is
associated with a metric xi denoting the data rate on flow fi . Denoted by a column vector
x = [xi ]i∈[1,|F |] the flow rate vector for the network. We consider xi = 0 if flow fi does not
exist (i.e., there is no communication).
The flow rate vector x contains two types of information:
1. who is communicating with whom in the network;
2. how much data rate a pair of communicating parties has.
The disclosure of such information is undesirable or even prohibited in many network security
scenarios [176, 177, 178].
5.2.2 Attack Model and Network Inference
What kind of methods an adversary can use to obtain x? Note that x is not generally
available to the adversary because flow information is indicated at network or higher layers
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(a) Network topology.
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(b) A routing matrix A.

Figure 5.1. Example network topology (a) and the routing matrix (b).
[11], whose data is usually encrypted at the physical or link layer. Therefore, the adversary
has to infer such information based on physical/link-layer activities, which is called network
inference [58]. In this chapter, we consider an omniscient adversary who (i) knows the
network topology and (ii) knows the routing protocol used in the network, and (iii) is capable
of monitoring each link li ∈ L in the network. This strong attack model enables us to clearly
compare the benefits of different randomized routing protocols under the worst-case standard.
By letting column vector y = [y1 , y2 , · · · , yL ]T (where yi denotes the rate of link li and
·T is the matrix transpose operator), the goal of the adversary is written as obtaining the
estimated value of x, denoted by x̂, from the measured link rate vector y. Network inference
is an approach to achieve the adversary’s goal. In particular, the relationship between flow
rate vector x and the link rate vector y can be captured by the following linear system.

y = Ax,

(5.1)

where A is the routing matrix with size L × |F |, whose entry

aij =




1, if flow fj goes through link li ;

(5.2)



0, otherwise.
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The routing matrix A demonstrates how a flow is concatenated by links, which is the
function of routing protocols. Therefore, given a network, the routing matrix can be usually
determined by the routing protocol. Fig. 5.1 shows an illustrative example of a network
topology and its corresponding routing matrix A. In this network, we have the link set
L = {l1 , · · · , l4 } and flow set F = {f1 , · · · , f6 }, where each flow fi ∈ F is determined by
the shortest path routing protocol. For example, flow f1 only goes through link l1 because
this path, with length 1 (the length is measured by the number of hops), is the shortest one;
and the entry corresponding to f1 and l1 is therefore 1 in the routing matrix A as shown in
Fig. 5.1(b).
In order to estimate x, the adversary must know the routing matrix A in (5.1), which
is usually an under-determined system. If the adversary indeed knows such information, it
can use standard network inference methods (e.g., L1 -norm minimization [63]) to obtain x̂,
the estimated version of x. The inference error can be denoted as

IR = kx̂ − xk2 .

(5.3)

For example, in Fig. 5.1, only flow f3 has data steam with rate 10bps, i.e., x = [0, 0, 10, 0, 0, 0].
Then the attacker can obtain the link rate vector y = [0, 10, 0, 10], indicating that links l2
and l4 have data transmission with rate 10bps. If the routing matrix A is also available,
the attacker can obtain the estimated flow rate vector x̂. Note that we do not confine the
adversary to any particular inference method. If we know what method the adversary uses,
we may provide a method-specific defense. In this chapter, we assume the worst case that
the network inference approach used by the adversary is unknown to us.
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Figure 5.2. The relationship between link and flow rates.
5.2.3 Randomized Routing Protocols: Benefit and Cost
In general, the routing matrix A is not immediately available to the adversary. However,
as the adversary is assumed to know what routing protocol is used, it can build the routing
matrix by itself given the network topology. If a deterministic routing protocol (e.g., shortest
path) is used, it can be very likely that the adversary builds the routing matrix Â in close
value to the true routing matrix A, then obtains an accurate estimate of x.
Randomized routing protocols make the behavior of routing packets unpredictable and
accordingly incurs more inference error than deterministic ones to the adversary. To illustrate how a randomized routing protocol may work, we consider a simple network topology
in Fig. 5.2(a). The network consists of 8 links (i.e., links l1 − l8 ) and one traffic flow fSD
between nodes S and D, which contains three potential routing paths (i.e., paths p1 , p2 and
p3 ). Because there is only one flow, the routing matrix A only has one column representing
the flow fSD . We define a path set PSD = {p1 , p2 , p3 } for flow fSD , and two routing protocols R1 and R2 for the shortest path routing protocol and a randomized routing protocol,
respectively.
Under protocol R1 , flow fSD deterministically uses path p2 to forward packets because it
is the shortest path, leading to no randomness to choose a path. Aware of the shortest-path
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routing, the adversary can immediately reconstruct a routing matrix Â which is exactly the
same as the ground-truth matrix A. Then, the adversary can use it to accurately recover x.
Under protocol R2 , a path is selected uniformly at random from the path set PSD . Then,
the adversary’s estimation Â equals to A with probability 1/3, as shown in Fig. 5.2(b).
This extra error due to the routing matrix mismatch will be introduced to the network
inference, offering higher protection of the network flow information. Note that for this
illustrative example in Fig. 5.2, the adversary may further determine which path is chosen
by observing which links are active. However, simply observing which links are active cannot
be applied to a multi-hop wireless network, where a large number of node pairs exchange
packets simultaneously in the network.
On one hand, protocol R2 causes more inference error to the adversary. On the other
hand, however, R2 incurs more delay during the data transmission because packets are not
always be forwarded along the shortest path. Therefore, the cost of R2 is the increase of
delay. To provide formal models, we define the benefit (the inference error) and the cost (the
delay) of randomized routing as follows.
Definition 5 Within a network G with N nodes under a routing protocol R, the inference
error for the adversary is measured by IR = Ekx̂ − xk2 , where x̂ and x are the adversary’s
estimated flow rate vector and true flow rate vector, respectively. The delay between a node
pair is the average number of hops for data delivery between the pair. Given a routing protocol
R, the average delay hR , is obtained by averaging the delays over all node pairs.
The adversary cannot directly observe the end-to-end flow information, and the flow
information can be obtained only through inference. This is why we use the inference error
as the benefit of different randomized routing strategies. The benefit does not confine to
protecting the flow information. For example, it can also be applied to balance the traffic load
or mitigate the wireless link failures. However, the goal of this chapter is how to provide
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defense against network inference, and we find that randomized routing can achieve this
goal. Therefore, we explore the randomized routing strategy from the security perspective,
and characterize the benefit as the inference error, which is directly related to the defense
performance.
In addition, we use the number of hops as the cost since it is directly related to the
inference error. The number of hops is easily available and widely used information serving
as the cost for routing discovery in many wireless network protocols, such as AODV [179]
in MANET. Therefore, in our chapter, we also use the number of hops as the cost metric
to measure the performance of each template, and focus on analyzing protocols using the
number of hops as the performance cost.
5.2.4 Templates and Problem Statement
To formally characterize randomized routing protocols, we propose three templates to
analyze the benefit and cost of randomized routing in wireless networks.
1. T1 : k-random-relay: for each packet, the routing path is formed by selecting k nodes
(called relays) uniformly at random from V excluding the source and destination nodes.
Then, the packet is transmitted through these relays. The shortest path routing is
used between two consecutive relays. Onion routing used in the Tor [64] or Crowds
[180] networks are popular real-world applications of this template although they are
currently used in wireline networks.
2. T2 : k-random-neighbor: for each packet, at each hop, one neighbor is selected with
equal probability from k neighbors with shortest distances to the destination. The random grid routing [181] and greedy forwarding routing [182] are two simplistic versions
of this template.
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Figure 5.3. Examples of three routing templates for k = 2.
3. T3 : k-random-path: each packet is transmitted through one path selected uniformly
at random from k shortest paths. This template is available when the overall path
information is available. The template can be considered as a randomized version of
the k-shortest-path routing protocol [62].
The examples for the three templates is shown in Fig. 5.3, which has one flow fSD between
nodes S and D with k = 2. Under k-random-relay, two relays v1 , v2 ∈ V are randomly
selected, then a packet can be transmitted through these two relays (i.e., the green line),
where the paths between the source and the first relay, between the two relays, and between
the second relay to the destination are all the shortest paths. Under k-shortest-neighbor,
the source S randomly picks one neighbor v4 from two neighbors v3 and v4 which have the
shortest distance towards the destination D. Then, v4 adopts the same rule for the second
hop, and so on. The path for the k-random-path template is randomly selected from 2
shortest paths p1 and p2 .
In these template, k is an independent variable of N and is determined by practical
applications or the real-world scenarios. For example, in the Tor network, k is fixed to 3
no matter how many nodes in the network. In this chapter, to provide randomness, we
assume k > 1 is a constant independent of N. The proposed templates cover a wide range of
randomized routing behaviors. However, which template is more suitable for a network and
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how to choose the routing template are based on several factors such as node density and
communication rage of each node. The template selection for a particular network scenario
is orthogonal to the research in this chapter that focuses on performance and cost analysis.
Our objective in this chapter is to model and analyze the inference error and delay of each
template to offer a fundamental basis or guideline for designing practical randomized routing
protocols.
5.3

Theoretical Modeling and Strategy
In this section, we provide a theoretical metric to measure the inference error induced by

randomized routing. Then, we discuss our strategy to model routing templates.
5.3.1

Genie Bound

It is expected that randomized routing increases the inference error IR , which is related
to a particular inference method used by the adversary to derive x̂ in (5.1). To remove such
a dependency, we use the genie bound [183] to measure IR as it is a generic metric regardless
of the inference method. Specifically, for the under-determined linear system (5.1), the genie
bound, serving as a lower error bound of all possible inference methods, can be obtained in
three steps:
1. form a new deterministic linear system with the assistance of a genie, which is expressed
as
y = Ag xg ,

(5.4)

where xg denotes the flow rate vector for node pairs that indeed have real traffic flows,
obtained by removing zero entries (e.g., non-existing flows) from x. Ag is the routing
matrix presenting the relationship between real flows and links;
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2. derive the least square estimation of xg as
x̂g = (ATg Ag )−1 ATg y;

(5.5)

3. obtain the genie bound by deriving the minimum mean square error between x̂g and
xg , i.e.,

G(xg ) = E kx̂g − xg k22 .

(5.6)

Note that in step 1, with the help of the genie, the under-determined linear system
(5.1) is converted into a determined system (5.4). This removes the effect of the choice
of the inference method used by the attacker. The genie bound is a general and methodindependent bound, and is widely used in solving under-determined system to provide a
lower error bound for any inference method.

Formally, we define the genie bound as a

generic metric to quantify the inference error IR as follows.
Definition 6 Given the link rate vector y, and routing matrix A determined by the routing
template T , the inference error IT can be rewritten as
IT = E kx̂g − xg k22



,

(5.7)

where x̂g and xg are derived in the three-step genie bound procedure.
5.3.2 Routing Template Modeling
The inference error is due to the randomness in selecting an end-to-end path for a flow.
In a real network, it is very likely that there are multiple paths for a flow, and how to select
a path is based on the routing protocol. For example, in Fig. 5.2, the shortest path protocol
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simply selects path p2 whereas random routing selects one randomly from paths p1 , p2 and
p3 .
Fundamentally, these three templates provide different behaviors to select a path from the
total path set of a flow. For example, in Fig. 5.2, under the template T3 , flow fSD randomly
selects a path from PSD if it is available. However, if only the neighbor information is
available and the template T2 is used, T2 will randomly choose a link from the link set
{l1 , l4 , l6 } for the next hop to forward packets, leading to a different manner to choose a path
from fSD . All these random factors eventually lead to a random path selection for a flow.
Therefore, our strategy is to use a general path-selection model to capture all behaviors of
different randomized routing templates.
Before modeling the difference among different routing templates, we first define Pi as the
path set consisting of all potential paths for the flow fi ∈ Fg . Denoted by PΠ = {Pi }i∈[1,F ]
the path set for all source-destination pairs in the network. To build the relationship between
a path and its corresponding vector in the routing matrix, we define a function mapping J
which maps paths to their corresponding columns in the routing matrix. For example, in
Fig. 5.2, J(p1 ) = [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]T .
Based on the previous definitions, we introduce three matrices as follows.
1. The overall routing matrix M = [m1 , · · · , mF ] consisting of all potential paths. It
means that each entry mi = J(Pi ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ F , and M = J(PΠ ).
2. The template matrix T = diag(t1 , · · · , tF ) ∈ R|PΠ |×

P

gi

is a rectangular diagonal ma-

trix. Each entry ti is a |Pi | × gi matrix, where 1 ≤ gi ≤ |Pi | denotes the number of
paths selected by the routing template for the flow fi . Each column in ti has only one
entry with value 1 denoting which path is selected and the remaining entries are all
zeros.
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3. The selection matrix C = diag(c1 , · · · , cF ) ∈ R

P

gi ×F

, where each ci is a gi × 1 all

zero column vector except one 1 indicating which path is selected for the actual packet
transmission.
In the following, by leveraging the above three matrices, we propose a technical model
to separate different factors in performance modeling for randomized routing.
Model 1 Given a network topology G, and the routing template T , the routing matrix Ag
can be modeled as Ag = MTC, where matrices M, T, and C are defined as above.
We use the network topology in Fig. 5.2(a) as an example. Assume the routing protocol
is T3 : k-random-path with k = 2, and there is only one flow fSD in the network. Then, the
routing matrix Ag ∈ R8×1 can be expressed as
T







 
 1 0
 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
  1






Ag = 
 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 ×  0 1 ×   .




0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
|{z}
C
|
{z
} | {z }
M

(5.8)

T

Three columns in M denote all possible paths between nodes S and D. Thus, M only
relies on the network topology and is independent of routing behavior. There are two columns
in T, meaning two possible path selections (i.e., p1 and p2 ) in k-random-path with k = 2.
The last matrix C denotes the path p1 is finally used. Hence, the routing behavior decides
T and C.
Remark 9 We decompose the routing matrix Ag into MTC such that each matrix represents one factor to affect the values in Ag . The overall routing matrix M only depends on
the network topology. The template matrix T relies on a randomized routing template, and
which template to be used is based on many factors such as the link capacity constraints or
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wireless interference. The selection matrix C indicates which path is used to send packets.
Each of its column vector has only one entry with value 1, meaning that only one path is
selected for a source-destination pair. Note that this model does not consider the scenario
that one packet is sent over multiple paths, which is not typical in wireless networks due to
the broadcast nature of the wireless channel.
5.4

Theoretical Results
In this section, we first present the theoretical results of the inference error and delay of

each randomized routing template. Then, we provide the proofs of the results.
5.4.1 Main Results
5.4.1.1 Inference Error
We consider a network G with N nodes and F flows. For the network, without loss of
generality, we assume the flow rate xi ∈ xg of each flow is a random variable with mean µ
and variance σ 2 . Then, we have the following results on the inference error for each template.
Theorem 6 The inference errors (in terms of the genie bound in Defition 6) of templates
T1 − T3 satisfy
1. for the template T1 : k-random-relay,


F 2 µ2
Θ √
N /(k + 1) + F




≤ IT1 ≤ Θ 2F 2 (µ2 + σ 2 ) ;

(5.9)

2. for the template T2 : k-random-neighbor,

Θ



F 2 µ2
N/ϕ(N, k) + F




≤ IT2 ≤ Θ 2F 2 (µ2 + σ 2 ) ;

(5.10)
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3. for the template T3 : k-random-path,

Θ



F 2 µ2 (k − 1)2
√
k2( N + F )



≤ IT3



2F 2 (µ2 + σ 2 )
≤Θ
k/(k − 1)

where ϕ(N, k) = max{N log(k−1) log(k − 1) ln(N),

√



,

(5.11)

N}

Remark 10 Theorem 6 shows the impact regions of three routing templates. We note that
only the upper bound of k-random-path is positively related to k, indicating that when k
is small, k-random-relay and k-random-neighbor templates are possible to induce a higher
inference error than k-shortest-path. In addition, we find that the bound is an approximately
linear (quadratic) function of the number of flows F in the network. This interestingly reveals
that increasing the number of flows in the network (i.e., making the communication scenario
more complex) in fact incurs more errors than trying to actively creating randomness in
routing behavior. A reasonably small k should be chosen in practice due to the sub-linear
relationship between the error and k.
5.4.1.2 Delay
We have the following theorem to analyze the costs of delay for three randomized routing
templates.
Theorem 7 The delays of templates T1 − T3 satisfy
1. for the template T1 : k-random-relay,
√
hT1 = Θ((k + 1) N);

(5.12)

2. for the template T2 : k-random-neighbor,

Θ(ϕ(N, k)) ≤ hT2 ≤ Θ(N ln(N));

(5.13)
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3. for the template T3 : k-random-path,
√
hT3 = Θ( N ),

where ϕ(N, k) = max{N log(k−1) log(k − 1) ln(N),

√

(5.14)

N }.

Remark 11 Theorem 7 shows the delay impacts of the three randomized routing templates.
It is noted that the delay of k-random-relay increases linearly with k. When k is small, the
√
lower bound of k-random-neighbor is the same as k-random-path (i.e., N); thus they are
generally better than k-random-relay in terms of the delay cost. When k is larger, the delay
cost of k-random-neighbor becomes substantially large. This is because when k increases to
the average degree of the network, all neighbors can be selected randomly, leading to a random
walk behavior of packet forwarding with the N log N delay cost.
Remark 12 Theorems 6 and 7 show that there is no uniformly best template among the
templates in terms of both security and cost. However we notice that k-random-neighbor
with a large k is not a good choice for a practical randomized routing design in that (i) it
has the highest delay cost compared with others, (ii) the inference error is still on the same
order with others; and (iii) for a packet with a limited lifespan (e.g., it can be controlled by
Time-to-Live parameter), it cannot guarantee to deliver packets to the destination.
Our results also indicate that k-random-path achieves the inference error with the same
order of the other two templates while maintaining the lowest delay cost. But it requires
knowing the global path information of the network. For k-random-relay, both the inference
error and the delay is larger than k-random-path by a constant order of magnitude.
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5.4.2 Proofs of Results
Now we prove the theoretical results. With Model 1, we first provide a lemma regarding
the generic result of the inference error which depends on the delay overhead.
Lemma 1 For a routing template T satisfying Model 1, in which the average number of
columns of its template matrix is denoted by gT and the delay is denoted by hT , the inference
error IT induced by T satisfies

Θ



F 2 µ2 (gT − 1)2
gT2 (N/hT + F )



≤ IT ≤ Θ



2F 2 (gT − 1)
gT /(µ2 + σ 2 )



.

Proof: See Appendix.

(5.15)



Remark 13 Lemma 1 provides a generic impact region of the inference error of any routing
template T . We notice that the inference error IT = 0 when gT = 1, meaning that the
deterministic routing protocol has no inference error.
Next, we prove Theorem 7 to obtain the delay costs for three templates, then prove
Theorem 6 which requires some results in the proof of Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7: We first prove 3): hT3 and 1): hT1 , then we prove 2): hT2 .
3) In the network G, we assume the distance of flow fi is di (the number of hops on
the shortest path). For k-random-path template, the average delay for flow fi is given by
P
hfi = di + k1 kj=1 cij , where cij is a positive constant denoting the extra number of hops for

jth path compared with the shortest one for flow fi . Then the average is given by

hT3

F
F
k
1 XX
1 X
di +
cij .
=
F i=1
F k i=1 j=1

(5.16)

√
P
According to Lemma 6, we have F1 Fi=1 di = Θ( N). In addition, it is easy to know
√
PF Pk
1
j=1 cij = Θ(1), then we can obtain hT3 = Θ( N ).
i=1
Fk
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1. For k-random-relay, we randomly select k relays to forward each packet and each path
between two consecutive relays adopts the shortest path. Then the average delay can
√
be directly written as hT3 = Θ((k + 1) N).
2. The routing path of k-random-neighbor is discovered hop by hop, which is similar with
the random walk (or Markov chain) model [184, 185, 186, 187]. In the following, we
first briefly introduce the difference between the random walk model and k-randomneighbor, then we state how to use the random walk to model the k-random-neighbor
template.
In a network G, for an arbitrary node pair vi , vj ∈ V, denote hi,j as the delay for the flow
between vi and vj . Denote by Ni the node set containing all neighbors of node vi . Then the
delay cost of the flow between vi and vj satisfies the following recursive function

hi,j =



P

1 + w∈N piw hw,j , if i 6= j
i


0,

(5.17)

otherwise,

where piw is the transfer probability that the link between vi and vw is selected. In the
random walk model, every neighbor in Ni has the same probability to be selected, i.e,
piw =

1
, for ∀vw ∈ Ni .
|Ni |

(5.18)

For k-random-neighbor with source and destination nodes vi and vj , we define a new
neighbor set Ki ⊆ Ni for node vi containing k neighbors which have the shortest distances
to the destination vj . Then, the transfer probability piw can be given by

piw =

1
, for ∀vw ∈ Ki .
k

(5.19)
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Intuitively, if we can remove all neighbors that belong to Ni but not to Ki , then Ki = Ni ,
and k-random-neighbor becomes the same as the random walk model. To do so, for the
original network G, given a source-destination pair vi and vj , we generate a new network
Gijk = {Vijk , Lkij }, where Vijk is obtained by removing nodes that the source node vi will
never go through under k-random-neighbor for the node pair vi and vj . Denote by Lkij the
corresponding remaining link set for the node set Vijk . Then, k-random-neighbor can be
modeled as a random walk for the network Gijk .
Considering the new generated network Gijk , according to (5) and (6) from [188], the
expected delay (5.17) over all node pairs is given by
 
q 
k
E(hi,j ) = Θ E Nij ln
Nijk
,

(5.20)

where Nijk = |Vijk |. For the upper bound, we have E(Nijk ) ≤ N. For the lower bound, krandom-path has the smallest delay overhead because it is obtained by averaging k shortest
√
paths, then according to (5.12), we have that E(hi,j ) ≥ Θ( N). Furthermore, according to
Lemma 9, we have

 



k−1
k−1

Θ N logδ−1 ln N logδ−1 /2 , if k > 2
E(hi,j ) ≥

p



Θ log(N) ln
log(N) , if k = 2.

(5.21)

Combining them together, we obtain

E(hi,j ) ≥ max{N log(k−1) log(k − 1) ln(N),
which completes the proof.

√

N },

(5.22)
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Proof of Theorem 6: From the generic result (5.15) in Lemma 1, hT and (gT − 1)/gT
depend on routing templates. Note that hT is available in Theorem 7. Therefore, in the
following, we derive (gT − 1)/gT under different routing templates.
For k-shortest-relay, we randomly select k relays from the remaining N − 2 nodes (excluding source and destination nodes). When the node density λ is sufficiently large such
that any node pair is connected, we have gT1 = Θ(N k ), yielding (gT1 − 1)/gT1 = Θ(1).
For k-shortest-neighbor, at each hop, one neighbor is selected uniformly at random from k
possible neighbors. Assume the average distance for a node pair is d, which can be expressed
as a function d = f (N). Then, the total number of paths gT2 can be approximated by k f (N ) .
Since f (N) is an increasing function of N, gT2 increases exponentially in N. Therefore, we
have (gT2 − 1)/gT2 = Θ(1).
For k-shortest-path, it is obvious that gT3 = Θ(k). Then, inserting it into (5.15) completes
the proof.
5.5



Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we use simulations to show the inference errors and delay performance

under routing templates.
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5.5.1 Experimental Setups
5.5.1.1 Network Configuration
In experiments, we use RGG to simulate wireless network topologies, where N ∈ [20, 100]
p
nodes are randomly placed on region [0, N/λ]. The node density and transmission range
√
are λ = 5 and r = 2, respectively. In this network, we randomly select F = N node
pairs to have real flow, in which the flow rate of each node pair xi subjects to the normal
distribution with mean µ = 10 and variance σ 2 = 2.
5.5.1.2 Performance Metrics
Under the worst case that the adversary’s inference is unknown, we use the genie bound
to measure the inference errors of different routing templates. The method to derive the
genie bound is described in Definition 6. The delay is measured by averaging the number of
hops for all flows in the network.
5.5.1.3 Routing Template Scenarios
The randomness of each routing template depends on the variable k. Therefore, in our
experiments, with respect to k, we consider two different scenarios: (i) fixed k and (ii)
dynamic k.
5.5.2 Fixed k Scenario
We first consider the scenario that three templates adopt the fixed k = 3. Specifically, For
each packet, template T1 : k-random-relay randomly selects 3 relays to forward the packet.
For template T2 : k-random-neighbor, each packet is forwarded to one of the 3 neighbors
which have the shortest distance to the destination. Template T3 : k-shortest-path directly
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selects one path from 3 shortest paths for each flow. We apply F =

√

N into Theorem 6, and
√
obtain that under any routing template, the inference error satisfies Θ( N ) ≤ I ≤ Θ(N).
Fig. 5.4 depicts the inference error under three randomized routing templates as we
change the number of nodes N from 20 to 100. First of all, we see that for every routing
template, the inference error increases when the number of nodes increases, which verifies
Theorem 6. For instance, the interference error is 718.1 for the k-random-neighbor template
when there are 40 nodes. Since each flow on average has the rate 10, we know the attacker
has the wrong estimation on at least 718.1/102 ≈ 7.18 flows, and this number increases to
8.77 flows when the number of nodes becomes to 100. In addition, we also notice that the
difference between templates does not change as we increase N, implying that the difference
of induced errors among different templates is on a constant order.
Fig. 5.5 shows the delay overhead of different routing templates. From Fig. 5.5, we
observe that the slope of the curve of the k-random-relay template is around 4 times that of
the shortest path protocol (e.g., when N = 100, the delay of k-random-relay and the shortest
path is 5.97 and 1.45 respectively). Note that, under the scenario k = 3, N log k ln N <
√
(k + 1) N , therefore, the delay performance of k-random-neighbor is less than k-randomrelay.
5.5.3 Dynamic k Scenario
For the dynamic k scenario, we fix the number of nodes N = 50. The total number
of paths increases exponentially for k-random-neighbor as k increases. Fig. 5.6 depicts the
relationship between the inference error and k. We notice that the inference error increases
as k increases for all templates. However, as k keeps increasing, the error starts to increase
slightly and remains approximate the same value, which verifies Theorem 6 that reveals the
inference error increases sub-linearly in k and a large k will not increase the error significantly.
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Fig. 5.7 shows that delay cost of three routing templates with different k. From Fig. 5.7,
we observe that the delay increases linearly for k-random-relay because increasing k results in
adding extra paths and linear increase of the delay according to Theorem 7. It is also observed
that k-random-neighbor and k-random-path have similar delays, because their delays are on
√
the same order Θ( N) when log k is small.
5.6

Related Work

5.6.1 Random Routing
Due to the dynamics in the wireless environment, network nodes are usually subject
to sleep modes [184], channel fluctuation [188], mobility [189, 190], interference [191] from
neighbors. Therefore, to account for such stochastic and asymmetric natures, random routing
strategies and their performance have been widely studied in wireless networks [181, 186, 184,
188, 187, 185]. For example, [184, 188, 187, 185, 186] leveraged the random walk to model
randomized routing strategies and evaluate the delay and packet delivery ratio. Recently,
the work in [61] presents the initial results that being randomized can help security and
cause substantial errors in malicious network inference. However, there is still a lack of
study regarding how exactly a randomized protocol should be designed to protect network
flow infomration from being disclosed. In this chapter, we categorize randomized routing
into three templates k-random-relay, k-random-neighbor and k-random-path, and carefully
analyze the inference error and delay cost of each template.
5.6.2 Security of Network Inference
Network flow based attack and defense strategies have been explored in a line of works
[64, 180, 192, 193, 194, 176, 177, 178, 195, 196, 197]. However, in the wireless network, the
PHY or MAC layer activities are public, therefore the flow information is still achievable
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through the network inference, which is a family of network monitoring techniques that
build the network characteristics from indirect measurements [57, 39, 40, 41, 42]. Existing
studies on the network inference mainly focused on optimizing inference methods to obtain
more information from given measurements. For example, authors in [41, 58] proposed new
ways to detect anomaly links. In [196], authors proposed a faster and practical interference
method by combining the tomography and gravity; and a more accurate interference method
is investigated in [197] when the measurement frequency is changing. The improved inference
methods in fact open up an opportunity for the adversary to obtain the flow information.
For example, the work in [43] proposed an attack strategy to retrieve the traffic pattern
by using interatrial based traffic analysis.

Therefore, in this chapter, we investigate the

fundamental reason of such vulnerability and find the randomized routing protocol can lead
to more inference errors, so that protect the real flow information against leakage.
5.7

Theoretical Results Analysis
In this section, we first prove Lemma 1, then we introduce and prove other necessary

lemmas.
5.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: From Model 1, considering the worst case that both M and T are available to the
adversary, for real flows, we have the linear system

y = RCxg ,

(5.23)

where R = MT is the routing matrix under the template represented by the matrix T.
As aforementioned, the selection matrix C is unknown by the adversary, then we let D =
{di } ∈ R

P

gi ×F

be the selection matrix of the adversary, that randomly selects a path for
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any flow. Considering the worst case that the ground-truth matrix C and D have the same
dimension, then from the adversary perspective, the linear system (5.23) can be written as

y = RDxg .

(5.24)

Taking the least square estimation of xg , we obtain x̂g = [(RD)T RD]−1 (RD)T y, then
putting it into the genie bound metric (5.7), we have that

G(xg ) = E kx̂g − xg k22




= E k[(RD)T RD]−1 (RD)T (RCxg ) − xg k22

= E k[(RD)T RD]−1 (RD)T (RC) − I]xg k22

= E kU[RC − RD]xg k22 ,

(5.25)

where U = [(RD)T RD]−1 (RD)T . Then by leveraging Lemma 3, the following inequality
holds with high probability.
λmin (UT U)k∆xg k22
≤kU[RC −

RD]xg k22

(5.26)
T

≤ λmax (U

U)k∆xg k22 .

T
From Lemma 4, λmin (UT U) and λmax (UT U) can be replaced by λ−1
max (RD(RD) ) and
T
λ−1
min (RD(RD) ) respectively, then (5.25) can be expressed as the following inequality with

high probability


k∆xg k22
E
λmax (RD(RD)T )


k∆xg k22
,
≤G(xg ) ≤ E
λmin(RD(RD)T )


(5.27)
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where ∆ = RC−RD. Then leveraging Lemma 5, we can derive the following asymptotically
solution
Ek∆xg k22
Ek∆xg k22


.
≤
I
≤
T
)2
Θ(h(N))
Θ h(N) + F h(N
N

(5.28)

Now we derive the numerator. Denote entries in ∆ as {δij }i∈[1,L],j∈[1,F ], where each entry
δij ∈ {1, −1, 0}. Because the adversary randomly select one path for each flow, we have that
Pr{δij = 1} = Pr{δij = 1|cj 6= dj } Pr{cj 6= dj }

gj − 1
Pr{δij = 1|cj 6= dj }
gj




h(N)
h(N)
gj − 1
1−Θ
.
Θ
=
gj
N
N

=

(5.29)

Furthermore, it is easy to know Pr{δij = −1} = Pr{δij = 1}. Since all nodes are uniformly
distributed in a region Ω. Then for routing template T , E(gi ) = gT for 1 ≤ i ≤ F , and we
have the following two equations:
E{δij } = Pr{δij = 1} − Pr{δij = −1}


gT − 1
h(N)
=
,
Θ
gT
N

(5.30)

and
E{δij2 } = Pr{δij = 1} + Pr{δij = −1}
(5.31)
=

2(gT − 1)
Θ
gT



h(N)
N



.

Then, we have the lower bound as

151



Ek∆xg k22 = E 

L
F
X
X
i=1

j=1



F
X

= Θ(N)E 

j=1

F
X

≥ Θ(N) E
=Θ



!2 
δij xj 

!2 
δij xj 
δij xj

j=1

(5.32)

!!2

[F µ(gT − 1)h(N)]2
gT2 N



.

On the other hand, by using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the upper bound is


Ek∆xg k22 = Θ(N)E 
≤ Θ(N)E
=Θ



2

F
X
j=1

F
X

!2 
δij xj 

δij2

j=1

!

E
2

F
X
j=1
2

x2j

!

2F (gT − 1)(µ + σ )h(N)
gT

(5.33)


Replacing (5.32), (5.33) into (5.28), we complete the proof.

.



5.7.2 Proof of Necessary Lemmas
Lemma 2 The probability that each element in the matrix R is

Pr{rij = 1} = Θ



h(N)
N



.

(5.34)

Proof: From Model 1, we have that

Pr{rij = 1} = Pr{path pj traverses link li }.

(5.35)
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We assume there are u links in the network and path pj contains uj links, then (5.35) can
be rewritten as
Pr{flow fj traverses link li |u, uj } = uj /u.

(5.36)

Take the expectation to u and uj , we have that


Pr{rij = 1} = Euj Eu

u

j

u

|uj



.

(5.37)

From Taylor series at E(u|uj ), we have

Eu

u

j

u

|uj



uj
=
+f
Eu (u|uj )


 
Varu (u|uj )
.
O
E3 (u|uj )

(5.38)

By leveraging Lemma 7, (5.37) can be derived as

Pr{rij = 1} = E



uj
N(λπr 2 − 1)/2



=

E(uj )
.
Θ(N)

According to Definition 5, E(uj ) = h(N), then we complete the proof.

(5.39)



Lemma 3 For a matrix A, it satisfies
λmin(A)kαk22 ≤ kAαk22 ≤ λmax (A)kαk22,

(5.40)

where λmin (A) and λmax (A) is the minimum and maximum eigenvalues of matrix A.
Proof: Clearly, we know
kAαk22 = kαT AT Aαk =
According to [198],

kαT AT Aαk
αT α

kαT AT Aαk
kαk22 .
αT α

(5.41)

has the minimum value λmin (AT A) and the maximum value

λmax (AT A), then we can complete the proof.
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Lemma 4 For a matrix A ∈ Rm×n where m > n, let G = (AT A)−1 AT , then λmax (GT G) =
T
T
−1
T
λ−1
min (A A) and λmin (G G) = λmax (A A).

Proof: Based on the singular value decomposition, for the matrix A ∈ Rm×n , there exists
a couple of unitary matrices U ∈ Rm×m and V ∈ Rn,n , such that A = UΛVT where Λ =
√
diag(s1 , · · · , sn ) ∈ Rm×n is a rectangular diagonal matrix. The numbers si = λi ( AT A) for
i = 1, · · · , n are singular values of A. If one sees the diagonal matrix D := diag(s21 , · · · , s2n ) ∈
Rn×n , we have
AT A = VDVT .

(5.42)

Then (AT A)−1 = VD −1 VT , and G can be derived as
G = (AT A)−1 AT = VD −1VT VΛUT = VΛ−1UT ,

(5.43)

−1
n×m
where Λ−1 = diag(s−1
. Similarly,
1 , · · · , sn ) ∈ R

GT G = U(Λ−1 )2 UT = UD −1 UT .

(5.44)

Comparing (5.42) and (5.44) we know that λ(GT G) = λ−1 (AT A), which completes the
proof.



Lemma 5 For a random binary matrix A with size L × F , where the expectation of each
entry of A is E(aij ) = Θ(h(N)/N) for h(N) = O(N) and L = Θ(N). Then if F → ∞ with
limL→∞ F/L < ∞, then the following two statements are satisfied with high probability,
1. for the minimum eigenvalue, λmin (AT A) = Θ(h(N))
2. for the maximum eigenvalue,


F h2 (N)
λmax (A A) ≤ Θ h(N) +
N
T
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Proof:

For the statement (1), from Lemma 8, we have a function f such that the

Var(f A) = 1. Then statement (1) can be rewritten as
λmin(AT A) =

L
λmin (L−1 (cA)T (cA)).
f2

(5.45)

From [198], we have λmin (L−1 (cA)T (cA)) = Θ(1) with high probability. Then (5.45) can be
further derived as
λmin(AT A) =

Θ(N)
L
Θ(1) =
= Θ(h(N)).
2
f
Θ(h(N)/N)

(5.46)

For the statement (2), we define two matrix U and V where V is an all-one matrix and
each entry in ui ∈ U satisfies E(ui ) = 0. Then we have A = U + Vh(N)/N. Applying to
AT A, we have that
λmax (AT A) = λmax ((UT + VT h(N)/N)(U + Vh(N)/N))
≤ λmax (UT U) + 2h(N)/Nλmax (UT V)

(5.47)

+ (h(N)/N)2 λmax (VT V).
For the second term in (5.47), since V is an all-one matrix with rank 1, then we have
that
λmax (UT V) = tr{UT V} =

X

uij .

(5.48)

uij ∈U

According to the large number law, λmax (UT V) = o(NF )1/p for 1 < p < 2. Then similarly,
λmax (VT V) =

X

1 = Θ(F N)

(5.49)

vij ∈V
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From [198], the first term satisfy λmax (UT U) = Θ(h(N)). Replacing λmax (UT V), λmax (VT V),
λmax (UT U) into (5.47), we can complete the proof.



Lemma 6 For network G with N nodes, the average delay over all flows by leveraging the
√
shortest path protocol is d = Θ( N ).
Proof: The delay is positively related to the distance between the source and destination
nodes. Let ei be the Euclidean distance for flow fi . Since each hop covers a distance of Θ(r),
the delay of flow by using the shortest path is fi is Θ(ei /r). The average delay over all flows
p
P
is Θ( N1 N
N/λ]2 , for
i=1 ei /r). Since all nodes are randomly distributed in a region Ω = [0,
p

P
e
=
Θ
N/λ
. Therefore the average delay can be derived as
a large N, we have N1 N
i=1 i
√ 
√
N/λ
d=Θ
=
Θ(
N), which completes the proof.

r
Lemma 7 In a RGG with N nodes, L links, and density λ and transmission range r, then
L is on the order of N with high probability, i.e., Pr{L = Θ(N)} = 1 − Θ(e−Θ(1)N ).
Proof: In RGG, the degree of an arbitrary node equals to the number of nodes dropping
into the transmission range of this node, then the degree of an arbitrary subjects to Poisson
distribution with parameter λπr 2 − 1, and thus the distribution of the total number of link
is also Poisson distribution with parameter N(λπr 2 − 1)/2. Then based on the Chernoff
bound, for a small constant c1 < (λ − 1)πr 2 and a large constant c2 > (λ − 1)πr 2, we have
the following upper and lower bounds
e
Pr{L ≥ c1 N} ≤ 1 −
=1−e



−N(λπr 2 −1)
2

eN λ(πr 2 −1)
2

(c1 N)c1 N
−N(λπr 2 −1)
2

c1 N log

e



c1 N

eλ(πr 2 −1)
2c1



(5.50)

= 1 − Θ(e−Θ(1)N )
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and
e
Pr{L ≤ c2 N} ≥ 1 −

−N(λπr 2 −1)
2



eN λ(πr 2 −1)
2

(c2 N)c2 N

c2 N

(5.51)

= 1 − Θ(e−Θ(1)N )
where ξ = Θ(e−Θ(1)N ). Then we complete the proof.



Lemma 8 For the routing matrix R in Lemma 2, there exists a function f =
such that each entry in R has finite mean and invariance 1.

p
N/h(N)

Proof: Denote each entry in f R as eij , then the mean of eij can be derived as

E(eij ) = E(f rij ) = f Pr{rij = 1} = f Θ

r

h(N)
N

!

= Θ(1),

(5.52)

and the variance is
Var(eij ) = E(e2ij ) − E2 (eij ) = f 2 E(rij2 ) − Θ(1)


h(N)
2
− Θ(1) = Θ(1).
=f Θ
N

(5.53)

Then we can complete the proof.



Lemma 9 For a network G with N nodes and its corresponding generated network Gijk with
k−1

Nijk nodes in the proof of Theorem 7. We have the lower bound E(Nijk ) > Θ(N logδ−1 ) if k > 2
and E(Nijk ) > Θ(log(N)) if k = 2.
Proof: For source node vi , we define node set Mdi containing nodes which have distance d
with the source node vi , and M0i = {vi }. Similarly, Kid be the corresponding node set after
removing nodes from Mdi based on the rule in the proof of Theorem 7. Let |Mdi | = Mid and
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Figure 5.8. Examples of two network topologys, where (a) δ = 3, and k = 2, and (b) δ = 4,
and k = 3, and dotted lines indicate removed links and dotted circles denote removed nodes.
|Kid | = Kid . Since the network is connected, then we have that
l
X
d=0

Mid = N,

l
X

Kid = Nijk ,

(5.54)

d=0

where l is the maximum distance.
To derive the low bound of E(Nijk ), we should remove the most nodes from N nodes. To
do so, we consider an extreme case satisfies two requirements:
1. the destination node is located at the maximum distance l away from the source node
vi ,
2. the network is a tree structure, i.e., except for the source node, for any node vd ∈ Mdi ,
it connects with only one node vd−1 ∈ Md−1
(as shown in Fig. 5.8).
i
Under this case, once a node vd ∈ Mdi is removed, all nodes that are connected with this
node in Md+j
for j ≥ 1 will be removed. Then the expected number of nodes with distance
i
d can be given by




E(Mid ) = δ(δ − 1)(d−1) , for the network G

(5.55)



E(Kid ) ≥ k(k − 1)(d−1) , for the network Gijk .
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Then we sum all distances together. For networks G and Gijk , according to (5.55), we obtain
two equations
l
X
d=1

and

l
X
d=1

E(Mid ) = N − 1 =

E(Kid )

=

E(Nijk )

l
X
d=1

−1≥

δ(δ − 1)(d−1) ,

l
X
d=1

k(k − 1)(d−1) .

(5.56)

(5.57)

Combining (5.56) and (5.57) together, we can derive the lower bound of E(Nijk ). Note that
according to (5.57), k = 2 is a special scenario, therefore we split our results into two
scenarios, i.e., k = 2 and k > 2 . Fig. 5.8 shows an illustrative example of k = 2 and k = 3.
Then after jointly manipulating (5.56) and (5.57), we complete the proof.
5.8



Summary
In this chapter, we revisited the network inference and found that the inference accuracy

depends on routing protocols. We categorized randomized routing protocols into three templates, k-random-relay, k-random-neighbor and k-random-path, and theoretically analyzed
the inference errors and incurred delay costs of them. We conducted simulations to confirm
that randomized routing templates can inflict different inference errors and delays, yielding
different capabilities to prevent the flow information leakage.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this dissertation, we proposed four data-oriented approaches that renovate or calibrate
current mobile network and security designs.
For the mobile network design, we found that due to the broadcast nature of wireless
channel, the intensive traffic environment can always jeopardize the performance within a
mobile network. To cope with this issue, we revisited the fundamental part within wireless
mobile networks, and deal with two main aspects to improve mobile network system performance: packet corruption and packet collision. The first one is due to the unpredictable
wireless fading, and the second one is resulted from concurrent transmissions. We discovered
that the inter-packet data and RTS data can be leveraged to further improve mobile network
efficiency and reliability.
For the network security design, we revisited network tomography from a data-driven
perspective, and found that there are two vulnerabilities. The first one is of the measurement
integrity. By taking advantage of this vulnerability, we developed an attack strategy, called
measurement integrity attack, which not only destroys the measuring system, but it can
even mislead the system to scapegoat other innocent users. The second vulnerability is of
the measurement confidentiality. In particular, To prevent disclosing the flow information
by network inference, we found that random routing strategies are capable of hiding the
flow information. Then, by leveraging the measurement data, we systematically studied the
behavior of different randomized routing protocols, and explore the fundamental reason why
randomized routing strategies can prevent information leakage against network inference.
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Appendix A: Supplementary Evidences of Chapter 3

In this appendix, we provide the detailed evidences and proofs of Chapter 3.
A.1

Firmware Analysis

We analyze popular WiFi drivers and AP firmware to understand these practical constraints: (i) Linux kernel drivers: ath9k (Qualcomm/Atheros 802.11n chipsets), brcmsmac (Broadcom 802.11n chipsets), and iwlwifi (Intel 802.11n/ac chipsets); (ii) 802.11ac AP
firmware in Linksys EA8500, EA9500, TP-Link AC1200, C5400, and AD7200.
In particular, ath9k allows the maximum length of a data payload to be either 8,192
or 65,535 bytes (aPSDUMaxLength for 802.11n is 65,535) based on its version number (as
shown in Listing A.1); brcmsmac uses the maximum duration of 5,000 µs (aPPDUMaxTime
for 802.11n is 10,000 µs) (as shown in Listing A.2); iwlwifi allows the maximum duration to be
4,000 µs (aPPDUMaxTime for 802.11ac is 5,484), as the excerpted code shown in Listing A.3.
In addition, Linksys EA8500, EA9500, and TP-Link AC1200, C5400 and AD7200 share the
same code: the maximum length of a data payload is 65,535 bytes (aPSDUMaxLength for
802.11ac is 4,692,480)(as shown in Listing A.4).
Listing A.1. Source code in Qualcomm/Atheros ath9k (802.11n)
/* hw.h */
...
#define ATH_AMPDU_LIMIT_MAX
(64 * 1024 - 1)
...
/* hw.c */
...
if (AR_SREV_9160_10_OR_LATER(ah) || AR_SREV_9100(ah))
pCap->rts_aggr_limit = ATH_AMPDU_LIMIT_MAX;
else
pCap->rts_aggr_limit = (8 * 1024);
...
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Listing A.2. Source code in Broadcom brcmsmac (802.11n)
/* ampdu.c */
...
/* max dur of tx ampdu (in msec) */
#define AMPDU_MAX_DUR
5
...
ampdu->dur = AMPDU_MAX_DUR;
...

Listing A.3. Source code of Intel iwlwifi (802.11ac)
/* mvm/constants.h */
...
#define IWL_MVM_RS_AGG_TIME_LIMIT
4000
...
/* mvm/rs.c */
...
lq_cmd->agg_time_limit =
cpu_to_le16(IWL_MVM_RS_AGG_TIME_LIMIT);
...

Listing A.4. The same source code in Linksys EA8500/EA9500 and TP-Link
AC1200/C5400/AD7200.
/* include/linux/ieee80211.h */
...
/*
Maximum length of AMPDU that the STA can receive.
Length = 2 ^ (13 + max_ampdu_length_exp)-1 (octets)
*/
enum ieee80211_max_ampdu_length_exp {
...
IEEE80211_HT_MAX_AMPDU_64K = 3
};
...

A.2

Statistical Results of Packet Traces

Our comprehensive data collections capture WiFi packet traces under a diversity of traffic
load conditions over long time periods. For each transmitter in the packet traces, we compute
the NAV distribution in its RTS packets. We find that the NAV distribution is highly
patterned or uneven in its value space. Figure A.1 shows the NAV distributions of top five
devices that send the largest numbers of RTS packets in different measurement environments.
We observe from Figure A.1 that each device’s NAV values almost concentrate in the small
value regions. For example, in the lab scenario, 92.1% NAV values in RTS packets from
device 3 is 156.
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Figure A.1. NAV distributions at different locations.
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We also notice that, interestingly, WiFi devices from the same manufacturer (identified
by their MAC addresses) do exhibit similar NAV distribution in their RTS packets. Figure A.2 illustrates the distributions of all NAV values in RTS packets transmitted by devices
from 15 common manufacturers. It is seen from Figure A.2 that the distributions exhibit
different patterns by manufacturers, mainly due to their distinct firmware designs. Similar
to Figure A.1, Figure A.2 shows the NAV distributions are highly uneven and patterned
with a small number of NAV values much more likely to show up in RTS packets than the
others.
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In addition to NAV, we also measure the data rates of RTS packets. Figure A.3 depicts
the distribution of RTS dta rates in different environments. We can see that a large number of
devices adopt 12 Mbps and 24 Mbps data rates to send RTS. Furthermore, in the conference
and hotel scenarios, most devices even only use the 24 Mbps data rate.
Based on the packet trace analysis, if we select the NAV values that are most likely in
RTS packet from each device to construct the comb matrix M, we should be able to decrease
the size of M at the cost of a small performance penalty.
A.3

Performance Analysis of γ-Decimation

In this part, we provide the performance analysis of γ-decimation. For the tooth vector
set M = {mi }i∈[1,M ] , where M = |M| and mi ∈ C L×1 , γ-decimation selects M/γ tooth
vectors with largest correlation values to form a new comb matrix. Denote by M′ the set
consisting of these selected M/γ tooth vectors by γ-decimation. Without loss of generality,
we assume the collided signal y contains the first S tooth vectors, i.e., m1 , · · · , mS . In this
section, notations are summarized as follows: (i) o(1) denotes a function that converges to 0
as L → ∞; (ii) E(·) and Var(·) denote the expectation and variance operators, respectively;
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(iii) for a complex number m, m∗ is the complex conjugate of m, and |m| is the magnitude
of m. Now we state the following theorem to show the performance of γ-decimation:
Theorem 8 Define event A as the event that m1 , m2 , · · · , ms are all selected by γdecimation in M′ . Then, it holds that P(A) = 1 − o(1) (i.e., event A happens with high
probability).
Proof: We first normalize the correlation between comb matrix M and the received vector
y. From (3.2), we have
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Let z = [z1 , z2 , · · · , zM ]H . It holds that ∀zi ∈ z,
M

M

L

1 XX
1X
gs mH
m
=
gs m∗i,k ms,k .
zi =
s
i
L s=1
L s=1 k=1

(A.2)

Because each tooth vector mi has the random property by coding, for any entry mj,i ∈ mi ,
we have E(mj,i ) = 0 and let E(|mj,i |2 ) = σ 2 .
Since tooth vectors m1 , m2 , · · · , mS are the ones to be resolved, we know the first S
members in g are not zeros. Define Y as

Y =

M
X

1{|zm |>h},

(A.3)

m=S+1
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denoting the number of false alarms (i.e., noise exceeding the threshold), where h is a threshold, and 1{|zm |>h} is the indicator function defined as

1{|zm |>h} =




1, if |zm | > h

(A.4)



0, otherwise.

To evaluate the performance of γ-decimation, we define another event

B=

S
\

{|zs | > h}

s=1

!

\
{Y ≤ (γM − S)},

where the first part denotes that the correlation values z1 , z2 , · · · , zS are all above the given
threshold h and the second part indicates that there are at most (γM − S) other correlation
values above h. If event B happens, m1 , m2 , · · · , mS will be selected by γ-decimation and
thus event A must happen. This means P(A|B) = 1 and P(A) ≥ P(B). Therefore, according
to Fréchet inequalities, we obtain

P(A) ≥ P
≥P

S
\

{|zs | > h}

s=1
S
\

{|zs | > h}

s=1

!

!

\

{Y ≤ (γM − S)}

!

(A.5)

− P (Y > (γM − S)) .

From (A.5), we need two steps to finish the proof:
1. Prove P

T
S


{|z
|
>
h}
= 1 − o(1).
s
s=1

2. Prove P (Y > (γM − S)) = o(1).
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For step 1, by Fréchet inequalities, we have that

P

S
\

{|zs | > h}

s=1

!

≥

S
X
s=1

P(|zs | > h) − (S − 1).

(A.6)

According to Cantelli’s inequality [199], for 1 ≤ s ≤ S, we have the probability
P(|zs | > h) ≥ 1 −

Var(|zs |)
.
Var(|zs |) + (h − E(|zs |))2

(A.7)

Next we derive E(|zs |) and Var(|zs2 |) respectively. Because 1 ≤ s ≤ S, without loss of
generality, we consider the first element z1 . From (A.2), by leveraging Lemma 10, we have
S

1
1X
2
E(|z1 |) = E( g1 mH
gs mH
m
+
1
1 ms ) = g1 σ ,
1
L
L s=2

(A.8)

and
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gs gs′ E(m∗1,k ms,k )

k ′ =1,k ′ 6=k


×E(m∗1,k′ ms′ ,k′ ) + gs gs′ E(m∗1,k ms,k m∗1,k ms′ ,k ) .

= g12 σ 4 +

1
Ξ1 ,
L

where
Ξ1 =

g12 (E(|m1,k |4 ) − σ 4 ) + E((m∗1,k )2 )E(m21,k )

S
X
s=2

gs2

!

.
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From (A.8) and (A.9), we obtain the variance of z1 as
Var(|z1 |) = E(|z1 |2 ) − (E(|z1 |))2 =

1
Ξ1 .
L

(A.10)

Replacing (A.10) into (A.7), we have

P(|z1 | > h) ≥ 1 −

Ξ1
.
Ξ1 + L(h − gs σ 2 )2

(A.11)

Then, (A.6) can be rewritten as

P

S
\

{|zs | > h}

s=1

!

≥ 1−

S
X
s=1

Ξs
Ξs + L(h − gs σ 2 )2

(A.12)

Ξmax
≥ 1−S
,
Ξmax + L(h − gmax σ 2 )2

where Ξmax = max{Ξs }s∈[1,S], and gmax = max{gs }s∈[1,S]. When L → ∞, the probability
converges to 1.
For step 2, letting y = γM − S, by Markov’s inequality, we have
1
P(Y > y) ≤ E(Y ),
y

(A.13)

then from (A.3), we have

E(Y ) = E

M
X

m=S+1

1{|zm |>h}

!

=

M
X

m=S+1

P(|zm | > h).

(A.14)

According to Chebyshev’s inequality, we can obtain

P(||zm | − E(|zm |)| > h) ≤

Var(|zm |)
.
h2

(A.15)
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Next, we derive E(|zm |) and Var(|zm |). Without loss of generality, we consider the last
element zM . Similarly, we have
S X
L
X
1
gs m∗M,k ms,k
E(|zM |) = E
L
s=1 k=1

!

= 0,

(A.16)

and
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s =1

S
1X 2
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L s=1 s

Let ΨM =

PS

s=1

gs2E((m∗M,k )2 )E(m2s,k ), then we can obtain
Var(|zM |) = E(|zM |2 ) − (E(|zM |))2 =

1
ΨM .
L

(A.18)

Replacing (A.16) and (A.18) into (A.15), we have

P(|zM | > h) ≤

ΨM
.
Lh2

(A.19)

Thus (A.14) can be rewritten as

E(Y ) ≤

M
X
ΨM
Ψmax
≤
(M
−
S
−
1)
,
2
2
Lh
Lh
m=S+1

(A.20)
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where Ψmax = max{Ψm }m∈[S+1,M ] . Finally,
1
(M − S − 1)Ψmax
P(Y > y) ≤ E(Y ) ≤
.
y
Lyh2

(A.21)

When L → ∞, P(Y > y) converges to 0, which completes the proof.



Lemma 10 Given tooth vectors mi and mj , for all mk,i ∈ mi and ms,j ∈ mj satisfying
E(mk,i ) = E(ms,j ) = 0 and E(|mk,i |2 ) = E(|ms,j |2 ) = σ 2 , the following two statements are
1
H
2
true: (i) if i 6= j, E( L1 mH
i mj ) = 0 and E(| L mi mj | ) =

1 4
σ ;
L

(ii) if i = j, E( L1 mH
i mi ) =

1
1
1
2
H
2
4
4
E( L1 mH
j mj ) = σ and E(| L mi mi | ) = L (L − 1)σ + L 3σ .

Proof: Let z = L1 mH
i mj =

1
L

PL

k=1

m∗i,k mj,k .

For statement (i), since E(mi,k ) = E(mj,k ) = 0, we have
1
E( mH
mj ) = 0.
L i
Furthermore, as we know E(|mi,k |2 ) = E(|ms,k |2 ) = σ 2 , we can obtain

L
L
X
X
1 H
1
2
∗
E(| mi mj | ) = 2 E
mi,k mj,k
m∗i,q mj,q
L
L
q=1
k=1

!

(A.22)

1
= σ4
L

For statement (ii), it is easy to know that
1
1 H
2
E( mH
i mj ) = E( mi mi ) = σ
L
L
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and
1
mi |2 ) = E
E(| mH
L i
=
=
Therefore, we complete the proof.

L

1X ∗
m mi,k
L k=1 i,k

!2

L
1
1 X
4
E(|mi,k |4 )
L(L
−
1)σ
+
2
2
L
L k=1

(A.23)

1
1
(L − 1)σ 4 + 3σ 4 .
L
L
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